Can we think of social transformation from the perspective of vulnerability? Yes, explains Mr. Garrau, but to do so we must define this notion differently, and describe all the forms of inequality that, in our societies, weaken us and subject us to numerous forms of violence.
Vulnerability, as a category of sociological analysis and a philosophical concept, is the subject of intense editorial news. Within the now abundant constellation of these works, Marie Garrau constructs a dense and original paradigm of vulnerability policies and has the dual horizon of rethinking the concept of autonomy and outlining a theory of social justice. The author’s theoretical gesture of defending the centrality of vulnerability offers decisive avenues for the renewal of contemporary political philosophy.
Should we be afraid of vulnerability?
If we must rid ourselves of our fears of vulnerability, it is first and foremost because we live in a world structured around the “myth of autonomy”, an autonomy thought of as the prerogative of a rational subject, master of his life, of his destiny, and holder of a freedom that must in no way be hindered. Because this founding myth runs through the history of political liberalism, Mr. Garrau positions himself from the outset as a counterpoint to Rawlsian theory, and turns to philosophers attentive to an anthropology of vulnerability (Martha Nussbaum, Joan Tronto, Axel Honneth, mainly).
Yet the task is far from easy, as vulnerability suffers from a form of generalized swarming, in the field of public policies on the one hand, and in the academic field on the other. This virality casts doubt on its descriptive and analytical scope by weighing on it the objection of terminological vagueness. In addition to this epistemological criticism, the notion also suffers from objections addressed on a more strictly political level: it is accused of producing stigmatizing effects on the social groups it is supposed to designate, of justifying paternalistic, even miserabilist policies, of constituting a new economy of power. Despite these pitfalls, M. Garrau defends its theoretical centrality, by means of an undertaking of clarification, in order to promote “for all conditions of an autonomy conceived as relational and expressive” (p. 251).
Fundamental vulnerability and problematic vulnerability
The central idea of the book is that in order to “loosen the grip of stigma, which attaches to those who do not manifest the independence, the assurance or the determination that we commonly associate with autonomy” (p. 339), it is necessary to rethink politics from the point of view of a commonly shared vulnerability.
To establish this thesis, it is necessary to clarify the distinction between fundamental vulnerability and problematic vulnerabilities: “Taking vulnerability seriously implies (…) considering vulnerability in two aspects: a) as a structure of common existence – we say here as “fundamental vulnerability”; b) whose intensity can increase in an unequal manner in certain contexts under the effect of specific social processes, we will speak here of problematic vulnerability.” (p. 19-20) The first meaning thus refers to our common embodied condition, which imposes openness to the possibility of injury, mourning, illness; but also to the essential dependence on the relationships that support our existences (relationships of recognition, care). The second meaning reveals the socially produced intensification of fundamental vulnerability under the effect of the logics of disaffiliation, stigmatization, social disqualification, or even crossed dominations.
One of the major contributions of this work is to rethink the concept of autonomy. Fundamental vulnerability is not the negation or the reverse of a supposedly primary autonomy, on the contrary it is that from which it must collectively constitute itself, and even perform itself: dependent on the relationship to the other, to the world, to the community, to institutions, to “nature”, this autonomy is permanently at stake. Mr. Garrau considers that it must be conceived as expressive and relational. Expressive first, in that it refers to the power to express what we care about. It is based on subjective dispositions to self-confidence, on the exercise and deployment of reason, but also of imagination as a capacity to project and reinvent new possibilities of existence. Relational autonomy then: it can only be deployed on the condition of the lasting inscription of the subject in relationships of carerespect and mutual recognition – as demonstrated by the work of Martha Nussbaum, Joan Tronto and Axel Honneth.
Mr. Garrau thus brings to light the ethical implications of vulnerability. If autonomy depends on a set of interpersonal relationships, it imposes on us a series of mutual obligations. However, sticking to a simple ethical posture would imply a form of renunciation: denials of recognition, experiences of injustice, would then be considered only as individual moral faults, while they have social and institutional conditions. The diagnosis of the social mechanisms that intensify fundamental vulnerability then appears as a necessary condition of the analysis: material precariousness, emotional isolation, unemployment, stigmatization, symbolic and social violence, are all obstacles, for certain individuals and social groups, to the construction of autonomy. Their description, whose sources the author draws from in particular the sociology of Robert Castel and Serge Paugam, cannot be limited to an interpersonal or interactional scale, but must be articulated with an analysis of the institutions, norms and social structures that condition the social contexts of production of denials of care and recognition: this is demonstrated, for example, by the general tendency towards the fragmentation and individualization of social protections, which prevents a large number of individuals from accessing stable employment and social citizenship, and produces combined effects of social disqualification and status degradation (p. 188, p. 200).
Finally, an ethics of vulnerability, if it wants to give itself a political horizon, must also tackle all the socially accepted representations that support, justify and contribute to reproducing the unequal sharing of problematic vulnerabilities. The theory of domination, inspired in particular by materialist feminism, must contribute to subverting the logic of indifference to the vulnerability of others, as much as the structural effects that can hinder resistance and social transformation. The stereotypes that discipline bodies and practices are in fact largely part of an economy of power likely to render obsolete the prospects of rebuilding social justice.
What vulnerability policies?
If it is a question of rethinking social justice based on the centrality of vulnerability, it cannot be limited to a redistribution of “equal basic rights and primary goods” (p. 317), without replaying the effects of stigma on vulnerable groups. Avoiding this pitfall consists of taking into account the contents of emancipation that are expressed in experiences of contempt, but also of protest and revolt. This is why, on the ground of an institutional theory, the politics of vulnerability must jointly consider the conditions of an inclusive democracy and a democracy of protest. The tradition of republicanism, which draws its strength “from the political ideal that it defends (allowing) to justify the fight against the social processes of vulnerability and the promotion of relational and social conditions of autonomy” (p. 231), offers precisely a consistent theoretical framework for formalizing the policies of vulnerability, on a triple level: that of the conception of democracy, that of social policies, and finally that of republican virtues, in other words of the interpersonal conditions allowing to establish an ethics of recognition.
The idea of protest democracy borrowed from Philip Pettit, in fact defends the idea that the people can make corrections to the laws, and therefore that the demands for care, respect and esteem, carried by social conflicts, must be able to weigh on their definition and the determination of public policies. For this, it is necessary to articulate protest and participation, as defended by Iseult Honohan, so that each minority has an audible voice in the democratic public space, and can take part in collective deliberations.
This definition of inclusive democracy is, however, only the necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a genuine policy of vulnerability. In a second sense, it must tackle material and symbolic inequalities. M. Garrau then draws inspiration from the work of Stuart White, in order to think of a form of social state capable of “neutralizing, correcting or compensating for all arbitrary inequalities from a moral point of view” (p. 319). In this respect, she discusses concrete proposals, such as the establishment of a civic minimum, of a starting capital, or of the taxation of inheritances and interpersonal gifts. Finally, it is because laws and public policies must be relayed by individual behaviors, in other words because there is an intimate complementarity between ethics and the policy of vulnerability, that M. Garrau pleads in fine in favor of the theory of republican virtues: “Common ends cannot be achieved and institutions cannot endure if citizens do not implement specific dispositions and virtues” (p. 329). According to the author, it is under this condition that citizens can be made sensitive to interdependence and common vulnerability.
To become collectively aware of fundamental vulnerability and problematic vulnerabilities. This tacit mode of order of the work, however, comes up against the weight of social, political, and imaginary resistances, which hinder the deconstruction of the myth of autonomy, and which are lodged at the very heart of our language games, deconstruction without which the politics of vulnerability risks being confined to a set of ineffective and stigmatizing institutional devices. As Wendy Brown notes when she questions “the making of contemporary political desire”, the whole difficulty of such a program would be due to the affective dynamics of “resentment, vengeance, and thwarted will to power” (ibid.), which reinforce political impotence, by falsely diffracting its causes onto the most vulnerable. How can we prevent the policies of vulnerability from being recovered by an “authoritarian liberalism” and integrated into its practical repertoire to contain social conflicts, the “society of the ungovernable” (ibid.) ? Even if this goes beyond the scope of the book, knowing how to arm the policies of vulnerability against the crises that are today cracking the horizons of emancipation, the crisis of capitalism, the ecological crisis, would allow us to extend the analysis towards a critique of contemporary violence, but also the consideration of the relationships of care and recognition that are also woven with beings, human and non-human, environments and contexts with respect to which we are interdependent.
Despite these grey areas, the proposal defended in this work, far from falling into “the unfortunate formulations of an identity rooted in the lesion” (ibid.), involves giving a strong and dense meaning to politics as a construction of the commons and as emancipation.