How financial liberalization took place in the 1980s and 1990s and what was its effects on national economies ? The book by Yves Tiberghien offers original answers to these questions on the double basis of a theoretical analysis in political economy and an unprecedented comparison between France, Japan and Korea.
How could financial liberalization be conducted in all the most developed countries in the 1980s and 1990s, when there was no political consensus ? Why did these reforms not lead to a convergence of national economies towards the Anglo-Saxon model characterized by the domination of market mechanisms ?
The book by Yves Tiberghien, lecturer at the University of British Columbia (Canada), aims to answer these questions. Its approach is opposed to the dominant perspective in economics, which explains the quasi-mechanical character of the transformations in progress by technical progress and/or globalization, an inevitable process. In its analysis of the financial liberalization process, Tiberghien, on the contrary, emphasizes intermediation by policies: the contemporary transformations of national economies – which it summarizes by the expression “ Business restructuring “(Corporate Restructuring) – is certainly the result of external pressures, but cannot be understood without the voluntary (or even proactive) intermediation of policies which carry out structural reforms: this means that the strengthening of market mechanisms in coordinated economies cannot be done without the intervention of the politics. Financial liberalization is analyzed by Tiberghien using the concept of “ Golden Bargain “: It is not an automatic process but is the result of an agreement giving-and and between international investors on the one hand which guarantee the abundant influx of capital and governments which undertake to ensure high profitability of this capital by measures of deregulation of the economy facilitating the restructuring of companies. In this sense, Tiberghien is part of the research axis which analyzes the diversity of capitalisms (Amable, 2003 ; Streeck & Yamamura, 2003 ; Streeck & Thelen, 2005, etc.) and is in fact very close to the so -called “ varieties of capitalism ” (Or Voc) in that it combines a political economy approach and an analysis centered on the firm (Hall & Soskice, 2001).
Let’s say it right away: Tiberghien’s book is remarkable for at least two reasons. It is first of all a real political economy book, the result of research that is confronted with strictly economic questions and which give original answers on the basis of a methodology using political science tools. Then it is a comparative company of three national systems. If the comparison of France – Japan is relatively classic, especially with regard to the state intervention mode in the economy (Sautter, 1996), the introduction of Korea is completely original and really relevant for the demonstration of Tiberghien. In fact, the originality of this book is based on the confrontation of a solid theoretical model with first -hand known land, through an analysis of reform policies and the evolution of institutions and on the basis of land surveys, in particular interviews, put at the service of an analysis of the recomposition of the decision -making process (Process Tracing Analysis).
Despite these obvious qualities, this book is little known in France, which is all the more damaging it offers an original opening to our too often Franco-French debates. The main interest of this book for us is indeed to answer the question of reform by proposing a meticulous study of national cases which can a priori seem exotic to us, to us who do not summon “ the international »That by the United States-which play the role of rejecting/attractor to perfection-and that through a benchmarking systematic with Germany or the United Kingdom. Tiberghien’s implicit idea is that you can learn at least as much a comparison with Japan and Korea.
Korea, Japan and France: three models of reform and institutional change
Tiberghien’s comparative approach leads to an essential first result, the diversity of Japanese, French and Korean trajectories. From this point of view, France and Japan represent antithetical cases ; In the first case, an anti-market discourse was accompanied by a deep and rapid transformation, especially under a socialist government ; In the second case, a neoliberal discourse led to more moderate changes. As for Korea, it represents the case of a coincidence between discourse and the acts which led to a rapid transformation of institutions.
In the case of France, Tiberghien revisits the experience of the Jospin government and shows that it is missing the essentials to propose an interpretation of the policy carried out between 1997 and 2002 which insisted on the emblematic laws and measures that were 35 hours and young jobs or on a suspicious discourse on globalization. Paradoxically, it was during these five years that France experienced its most intense phase of liberalization. Tiberghien obtains this result on the basis of a systematic analysis of the laws voted then, the impact of which is measured in a comparative manner and on the basis of interviews with the main actors. We discover in passing a good dose of cynicism. This chapter is to be read urgently.
With regard to the application of the model to the Japanese case, Tiberghien brews in passing a certain number of essential questions from the point of view of the political economy of Japan, such as the distribution of power between bureaucracy and policies or the relations of the forces between ministries, or the evaluation of the real impact of external pressure (Gaiatsu) American. He also offers an original assessment of the respective contributions of the Japanese Prime Ministers since the mid -1990s. In this case, he moderates the importance that we too often attaches to Koizumi Junichiro, Prime Minister of April 2001 to September 2006. Within a gallery of portraits of political entrepreneurs, Tiberghien also emphasizes the role and personality of Yosano Kaoru, Minister of Economy and Prime Minister Obuchi (July 1998 – April 2000). A very good mastery of economic and industrial issues as well as an urban electoral base make him the very type of the political entrepreneur. According to Tiberghien, it is the need to maintain the support of the urban electorate that made him the cantor of reforms.
As for Korea, it presents the case of a structural transformation under the characteristic action of political entrepreneurs, in particular President Kim Dae-Jung, elected in December 1997, at the height of the financial crisis which then shaken Asia in general and Korea in particular.
Analyze political decision -making processes to understand the diversity of reform models
To answer the initial question, it is necessary, according to Tiberghien, to open the black box of the political decision -making process: its demonstration is based on a certain representation of the political sphere and in particular on the promotion of the role of “ the political entrepreneur ». The latter can be defined as an individual, benefiting from a particular knowledge of the transformations in progress and a political situation which can make him hope for an important role in the near future. He acts in favor of liberalization because he expects that, in doing so, he will improve his own position in the future. In other words, clean interest is the main motivation of the political entrepreneur, even if the latter is sometimes reinforced by the desire to modernize the nation and to be of service to the community. Tiberghien is then able to explain the diversity of trajectories not by the variety of economic shocks, the differences in preferences of voters or the dynamics of electoral coalitions but by political-structural variables, political strategic autonomy (SPA) and the strategic bureaucratic delegation (Sbd). There SPA characterizes the conditions under which the political entrepreneur can escape control of parties and coalitions. Concretely, this variable includes autonomy within the party or the degree of control over the legislative agenda. As for the Sbdit measures what allows the political entrepreneur to avoid obstacles and criticism. The most comfortable situation from this point of view is to be surrounded by a transversal bureaucracy, that is to say not defending of sectoral interest, with in its heart a unified elite (formed in the same school like theENA In France). The existence of international organizations on which the need for reform can also be brought also leads to a Sbd higher.
Two criticisms, some questions left open and a call for research
This book is an invitation to research, in that it opens several avenues and in that it offers a provocative and stimulating thesis, therefore criticism. A criticism concerns the vision of politicians as entrepreneurs, explicitly inspired by The prince of Machiavelli (p. 220). On the one hand, in doing so, Tiberghien tends to put aside the influence of groups (such as international investors), and even more forces, such as technical progress, which intervene partly independently of individuals and groups. On the other hand, can we not see other motivations in the action of political leaders than those associated with political entrepreneurship ?
In addition, Tiberghien’s contribution arouses several questions that remain unanswered in this book. Among them, we can cite the following:
– Why do voters vote against their interest (at least in the short term) ? Tiberghien focuses on the interest of political leaders to reform, but it seems to put aside that of voters, which is certainly not negligible in a democracy, except to think that it is easily manipulable by political entrepreneurs.
– Why three national systems that have been effective in the past would no longer be today ? The dominant explanation of economists is that this is explained by the change of economic environment marked by the acceleration of technical progress and globalization. As for Tiberghien’s response, it is based on the “ Golden Bargain “, Which implies a certain arbitration, not between equity and efficiency but between two forms of efficiency, on the one hand the process of creative destruction and a better allocation of capital, on the other hand the coordination links at the heart of the definition of the comparative advantage. We are entitled not to fully satisfy these two types of response.
These criticisms and questions left unanswered by the book are not minor. However, they demonstrate, in our opinion, that this book is likely to become a reference and to be discussed as it should. In addition, it manifests a real emergency, that of launching comparative research programs worthy of the name, involving countries and outdoor and outside the United States, on questions that our answers are based on too often domestic analyzes.