Four scenarios for the future of Europe

Former director of the Legal Service of the Council of the European Union, Jean-Claude Piris delivers in this work a concise and stimulating analysis of the institutional future of the European Union. It is a legal work which strives to go beyond the formal theory of law to approach the political construction of the Union. However, as is often the case, when lawyers are interested in politics, the reflection remains institutional and somewhat lacks a sociological substrate. Jean-Claude Piris thus makes a host of interesting observations, whose analysis of causality remains a little disappointing because it ignores social debates too much. It has indeed become difficult to truly innovate in thinking about the future of the European Union without carrying out a comparative analysis of social divisions, memory representations, etc.

This does not detract from the interest of the reflection carried out by Jean-Claude Piris. As an informed practitioner of European matters, engaged in the revision of several treaties, Jean-Claude Piris starts from the incontestable observation that the governance of the enlarged Union lacks effectiveness and that the institutional reforms which have followed one another since Maastricht (the Treaty of Lisbon being the last) were only aspirin tablets. The author also rightly points out that the internal market is still far from being completed, as are other community policies such as economic policy of course, but also energy policy and foreign policy. No one will be able to dispute this starting point. However, Jean-Claude Piris feels that the latest enlargement to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe is, to a large extent, responsible for this stagnation. This is also what the author wrote in an article in Financial Times of November 3, 2011. It joins a fairly widespread regret among certain French pro-Europeans, like Bourlanges, and in a certain way also Delors, according to which enlargement to the East, although politically legitimate, still has a little killed the beautiful project of European unification. Accept that the end of the Cold War, a major event of XX^e century, has changed the perspectives of European construction compared to the initial project will still take time in France where those who love Europe (alas, fewer and fewer) remain attached to the identity of the Founding Fathers.

To save the European Union from its crises of both governance and public policy, Jean-Claude Piris envisages four scenarios. The first consists of profoundly modifying the European treaties. But the author does not believe it, to the extent that he has difficulty seeing the Twenty-Seven launching into new long negotiations after the Lisbon experience. Jean-Claude Piris is certainly right although we should not neglect Angela Merkel’s declarations aimed at fundamentally reforming the treaties. It is unlikely, however, that France (without which it is difficult to act) will be able to accept it, when we observe how the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister are already having difficulty getting their majority to accept ratification. of the European budgetary treaty. The reasonable political project embodied by the two heads of the executive only marginally reflects the expectations of many French people who in no way wish their country to share with others the long term of the new course of the world. Nostalgia for the Trente Glorieuses (including among those who did not experience it) leads, on the contrary, to consider that the refusals of Europe and globalization are the best recipes for a better future. The French thus maintain, including when they are left-wing, the utopia of colonial grandeur, considering that a France sharing its fate with others because it would have become smaller, is equivalent to the most horrible renunciation. . They have this in common with the British, although the latter mainly fear for their political system, while the French fear for their economic condition.

The second option highlighted by Jean-Claude Piris aims to exploit all the potential of the Lisbon Treaty by implementing the forms of differentiation between Member States offered by the treaties. The author thus addresses one of the debates which has caused a lot of ink to flow within the European Union since the end of the Cold War: that of Europe at several speeds. After defining concepts like “ the vanguard “, “ the pioneer group » or even the “ center of gravity », Jean-Claude Piris rightly points out how differentiation is already a reality within the framework of the current treaties. Whether it concerns the reinforced cooperation since the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Schengen cooperation on the free movement of people, the Europlus Pact signed in March 2011, or the new structured cooperation which allow differentiation in terms of defense. Perhaps Jean-Claude Piris should have further highlighted an essential opposition between desired differentiation and differentiation due to lack of capacity. In the first case, like keeping the British and the Danes away from the euro, the differentiation is assumed by the States and the people as a political choice. In the second case, it is suffered and gives rise to the feeling of discrimination. This is the case of the Poles facing the governance structures of the euro. Warsaw’s waiting position regarding the single currency leads it to consider any step in the politicization of the governance of the euro as a sidelining. Not being part of a first circle, even though we aspire to it, is certainly all the more difficult to live with as the members of this first circle clearly no longer meet the admission criteria. Let’s think of Greece, Spain and Portugal against the euro.

For Jean-Claude Piris, differentiation is clearly the solution that will make it possible to govern the European Union of tomorrow. This certainty fuels its third and fourth scenarios, the first aiming to create a multi-speed Union through political means, the second through legal means. What exactly does this distinction mean? ? For the author, the political path corresponds to the public announcement of political progress through a declaration signed by voluntary member states. The Lisbon Treaty thus fully allows the 17 members of the Eurogroup to accelerate their progress, to the extent they wish. In this scenario, there is no modification of the treaties. All that matters is the political choice to do more. Conversely, the legal route takes the form of an international agreement. Alongside the large Union of 27 (tomorrow at 28 or 30), a new treaty is created only between the States which would like to go further in the economic and monetary field, but also defense, civil and criminal law or even the environmental protection. This is the institutional formalization of a hard core similar to that proposed by Christian Democratic deputies Schäuble and Lamers in 1994 and which France refused. The whole point of Jean-Claude Piris’s analysis consists in proposing, for this fourth scenario, new institutions capable of coexisting with current European institutions. This is the case, for example, with an Administrative Authority of five members which would share responsibility for the initiative with the Commission. Likewise, the new entity would have an Administrative Tribunal which would take into account the case law of the Court of Luxembourg.

We feel that Jean-Claude Piris is attracted by this fourth option and he is right. The future of European construction raises more than ever the question of a new institution, made up of a limited number of member states wishing to move forward. The European budgetary treaty is already too broad (25 states out of 27, that is to say all except the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic) to constitute its framework. As Jean-Claude Piris rightly says, it is not a question of thinking about this new organization by opposing the old ones to the new member states, because countries like Poland or Slovenia have every vocation to be part of the hard core. . It is appropriate to bring together those who see the political necessity. This scenario openly raises the question of France, where we can legitimately ask ourselves whether its society and through it, its political leaders, want to be part of a European avant-garde. Nothing is less certain when we see the good scores of the National Front and the Left Front in the elections, or when we hear the positions taken by certain elected representatives of theUMP or the Socialist Party. Germany seems more ready for it and this is a point that Jean-Claude Piris could have analyzed more. Finally, such an organization can only succeed if it is not done on the sly and if it clearly assumes a federal objective. Jean-Claude Piris is not convincing when he writes that we should definitely not talk about federalism. The only way, on the contrary, to make the Union take a leap forward is to return to a maximalist political discourse that completely assumes the opposition and controversies it arouses. In a way, we must move away from the diplomatic method and enter into the realm of politics. This is at least one point that the French, so quick to praise the benefits of conflict in politics, will no longer be able to criticize. It remains to convince them that a political project can be legitimate by seeking to go beyond the borders of their beloved nation state.