Human, transhuman

Still little known a few years ago, transhumanism is now fashionable. There are countless television and radio shows, special issues of magazines and books on the phenomenon. No one is unaware that Google wants to kill death or that strong artificial intelligence – that is, superior to human thinking – is supposedly just around the corner. Riding the wave of science fiction, some transhumanists dream of emulating the human mind on a computer, while others imagine a hybridization of man and machine. Some even prophesy the emergence of a posthuman, freed from the constraints of biological evolution specific to living beings.

This bubbling of ideas and fantasies has given rise to a number of more or less indignant or ironic clarifications. For example, we can mention The Myth of the Singularityby Jean-Gabriel Ganascia (Seuil, 2017), which puts an end to the fear of artificial intelligence escaping human control. However, until now, transhumanism has rarely been the subject of a strictly philosophical analysis. In addition, the authors who have attempted it have in common a very critical approach to the phenomenon, seeing it as a resurgence of Gnostic dualism (Jean-Michel Besnier, Tomorrow the posthumansHachette, 2009) or a digitalization of life (Éric Sadin, Augmented humanityL’échappée Editions, 2013).

A Deflationary Perspective

Hence the originality and great interest of Trans/Posthumanist Philosophy and Ideologieswhich had been preceded by a pamphlet entitled Is transhumanism a humanism? (Royal Academy of Belgium, 2014) and a Encyclopedia of Trans/Posthumanism. The Human and its Prefixes (co-directed by Gilbert Hottois, Jean-Noël Missa and Laurence Perbal, Vrin, 2015). Gilbert Hottois, professor emeritus at the Université Libre de Bruxelles, a recognized specialist in the philosophy of technology, intends to approach transhumanism from a perspective that could be described as deflationary. As Jean-Yves Goffi specifies in his interesting preface, this requires studying “this movement for itself and not as a symptom of something else” (p. 8). Thus, G. Hottois intends to introduce the best theorists, by focusing on ideas that “deserve to be taken seriously by philosophers” (p. 286), instead of engaging in the “technolatry, prophetic or commercial rhetoric” widespread in transhumanist works, which in turn give rise to “easy trials” (p. 18). This is probably why he places Max More, father of Extropianism and director of the cryogenics company Alcor, in the history of the movement rather than as one of its current figures.

Although at no time does G. Hottois declare himself a transhumanist, it is clear that he feels sympathy for this current, in which he sees a synthesis of rationalism, utilitarianism, pragmatism, materialism and evolutionism. In other words, it would be neither more nor less than one of the forms of the philosophy of technology at the beginning of XXI^e century. Unsurprisingly, G. Hottois defends the idea that man is a natural cyborg, that is to say a technical being, language being only one of these techniques and not what would take humanity out of the animal condition. A strong thesis, the full scope of which the author measures. For him, technology is at the service of freedom, which must be understood as the right to modify oneself – since our species is not fixed in nature. The consequence is the blurring of the line between repair and improvement, the latter being seen as both an individual right and a collective duty. Ethics commands us to fight against suffering and death, and the physical and mental transformation of humans is only the means to achieve this goal. Thus, contrary to what the detractors of transhumanism maintain, the desire to achieve amortality is not the fruit of exacerbated egocentrism, but the logical consequence of our natural desire to preserve ourselves in existence. On this point, G. Hottois underlines that the digitalization of the human mind on an electronic medium, often considered far-fetched, is an idea “central to posthumanism” (p. 113).

An experimental philosophy

The author states several times that the questions addressed by transhumanism will have to be resolved experimentally, and not by theoretical debate alone. In other words, transhumanism would be a practice that allows the philosophical approach to be renewed, while “traditional” philosophy would remain a prisoner of a particular technique that it would have hypertrophied: language. The hypothesis is interesting, even if it will certainly arouse controversy. G. Hottois shows himself here to be perfectly in phase with the transhumanists, who place technology at the heart of culture, thus disrupting classical humanism.

This emphasis on experimentation leads the author to give a significant place to techno-art, which uses technology to transform the appearance of the body or perception, in order to give a glimpse of or experience unusual modes of existence. Thus, when the Australian artist Stelarc grafts an ear onto his left forearm, or when the British engineer Kevin Warwick has an electronic chip implanted in his arm allowing him to remotely control the opening of a door, they allow us to glimpse what transhumans would be like.

Politics and Transhumanism

Transhumanism raises political questions. In this area, G. Hottois seems to adhere to technoprogressivism, which claims to be a synthesis of libertarianism and conservatism. From the former, progressive transhumanism takes up the demand for the broadest possible individual freedom. From the latter, it hears the warnings against the risk of widening inequalities (the richest benefiting from technical improvements – for example, greatly increased intelligence – which ensure them an increase in their economic and social capital).

The author also details how roadmaps and reports from US and European government agencies have changed the perception of technoscience, bioethics and the human being since the beginning of the XXI^e century. This investigation of public policies related to transhumanism is rare enough to be noted.

Social logic and utopia

Trans/Posthumanist Philosophy and Ideologies will undoubtedly spark discussion. In addition to the relationship between technology and language, already mentioned, perhaps the irenic vision of transhumanism will be called into question. Some readers will deplore the fact that G. Hottois has not developed the affiliation of transhumanism with science fiction, which is nevertheless a major source of the movement. But it must be said, in defense of the author, that he has already written on this theme (Philosophy and science fictionVrin, 2000; Philosophical, political and imaginary genealogies of technoscienceVrin, 2014).

As for us, we would like to highlight a persistent oversight in transhumanism. If there is indeed a transhumanist concern for politics, it seriously ignores the logic of competition and distinction between individuals. So that the demand for absolute freedom of choice for each person, and in particular the right not to improve oneself, seems to be wishful thinking or a decoy when access to employment is based on competition. This freedom risks being purely formal, masking an obligation to increase oneself more and more, under penalty of being downgraded. Certainly, transhumanists emphasize the risk of a two-tier society. But the only answer they give to this problem is improvement for all. And this, because they are convinced – G. Hottois with them – that ecological, existential, technological and social risks can only be controlled by more technology. But this raises questions.

Another point of discussion concerns the concept of utopia. On several occasions, G. Hottois states that transhumanism is not a utopia, despite a “utopian rhetoric” with “prophetic and millenarian accents” (p. 103). The author rejects eschatological readings of the phenomenon, with an argument: the desired improvement is not defined in advance and has no term. There is no end of time or end of History leading to paradise or the first morning of the new world. It is understandable that the author is concerned to distinguish his transhumanism, defined as an experimental rationalism, from religions described as illusory. But does this presentation correspond to reality? When Ray Kurzweil (director of engineering at Google and co-founder of Singularity University) predicts for 2045 the human 2.0, immortal and whose organs will be replaced by nano-robots, or when Nick Bostrom maintains that the risk of destruction of humanity by an artificial superintelligence is real in a relatively near future, how does this differ from the visions of a utopian or the prophecies of a religious person? Transhumanism affirms an indefinite progress and seeks to modify the present from this vision of the future. As such, it seems to be a utopia, far from the simple pragmatic philosophy described by G. Hottois.

These questions do not in any way disqualify a book that is a model of precision and clarity, perfectly informed and a pleasant read. From a formal point of view, one will appreciate the index of names and the detailed table of contents, which are valuable tools. On the other hand, one will regret the absence of a bibliography, which is not entirely compensated for by the numerous references in the footnotes. Ultimately, and although one may not share all of the author’s interpretations, Trans/Posthumanist Philosophy and Ideologies is now the reference book on the subject.