To guarantee the quality of jobs after learning and better target expenses, it is necessary to make companies more responsible.
The problem
Continuing your studies by carrying out a first experience in the labor market directly in connection with the content of its training and its professional objectives is widely acclaimed by young people. In fact, following proactive policies, learning has experienced a very strong increase since 2020 ; +78% between 2020 and 2022 and +33% between 2021 and 2023 (Thao Khamsing, 2024). However, responding to this request is very expensive to public finances, without the effectiveness of the system being clearly demonstrated. The total public spending relating to this system for the year 2022 was estimated between 16.8 and 20 billion euros (Court of Auditors, 2024 ; Coquet, 2023). The development of learning has resulted in a radical change in the structure of beneficiaries. The share of apprentices preparing a higher diploma increased from 40% in 2018 to 63% in 2022 (Coquet, 2023). However, the evaluations relating to the period preceding the reforms suggest that going through this type of device has no effect on the insertion of graduates of the superior (Brébion, 2019).
However, young people (even graduates) are more exposed to forms of precarious employment at the entrance to the labor market as previous generations at the same age (Lemistre, 2022 ; Peigny, 2023). The massive development of learning has not reduced these differences. A recent cereq report (Center for Studies and Research on Qualifications) shows that if graduates in learning access a little more easily to employment than others, this effect does not persist in time (Dabet et al., 2023).
The development of aid strengthens the significant windfall effect of companies that would have hired their apprentice anyway after the learning period. It also strengthens the risk of substitution for learning made less expensive by aid, to regular jobs, especially less qualified, for companies that do not hire their apprentices at the end of their learning. However, purely and simply delete access to the system for higher education diplomas, in order to focus on young people preparing a lower level diploma can prove to be counterproductive insofar as it is one of the devices which now participates in assistance in the empowerment of students (see the proposal “ set up an income guarantee for studies »).
To improve the apprenticeship system, reduce its cost and target young people for whom alternation is a real advantage for accessing the labor market, it would be advisable to transform the current system of assistance to companies in an advance whose reimbursement would be conditioned on objectives in terms of the quality of integration into the employment of the apprentice.
How does it work ?
By recruiting an apprentice, the employer receives the equivalent of current aid in the form of an advance and undertakes to guarantee the quality of the integration of his apprentice, whether it is hired in his business or not. After apprenticeship, if a number of quality insertion indicators in employment are filled, the advance is not reimbursed. Otherwise, the employer reimburses the aids from which he benefited.
Without being limited (see the index proposal for the quality of the use of Christine Erhel), two simple criteria can be introduced to measure the quality of insertion: the duration between the end of learning and obtaining a first job (if it is a CDD at least 6 months or a Permanent), and a salary objective of this first job in connection with the degree referred to.
For companies that employ apprentices targeting a higher education diploma, this a posteriori control of the quality of integration by the Opco (competence operator) should make it possible to limit both substitution effects and windfall effects. If for a type of diploma (of a given level and specialty) the quality objectives are sufficiently ambitious, this will lead to target public spending of learning in the superior on quality insertions.
Furthermore, for companies that employ apprentices that do not target a higher diploma, this mechanism could help limit the “ smicardization For the beginnings of career, as soon as wages higher than the minimum wage are set for apprentices working in branches in which the salary negotiations are not dynamic.
On what research work is the proposal founded ?
From the point of view of the effectiveness of public policies, available assessments show the limits of learning effects for higher education graduates in the labor market and the importance of its cost (Brébion, 2019 ; Coquet, 2023 ; Dabet et al., 2023). Nevertheless, within the French framework, the system participates in aid in the empowerment of students that it is necessary to develop.
How to implement ?
Learning contracts will give rise to tripartite conventions between apprenticeships, the company and theOpco. These tripartite agreements will establish the integration objectives from a repository which would be set at France competence in connection with the social partners.