Ingenable justice

Since its publication in 1971, the Justice Theory by John Rawls is an essential reference for those who wonder about justice and ethics. Amartya Sen’s work, The idea of ​​justicewhich has just appeared in its French version, clearly takes a position in the debate initiated by Rawls. Sen is however limited to what he calls “ A theory of justice in the broad sense “Which consists not” to offer answers to questions about the nature of perfect justice “But to” Determine how to promote justice and eliminate injustice (P. 13). The book includes, in fact, a number of arguments that Sen has developed in the past thirty years. Some of the criticisms he makes, especially against Rawlsian theory, are however much more developed than in his previous writings.

The question of justice can, according to Sen, be understood according to two distinct methods: one, which he describes asTranscendental institutionalism And who would be that of Kant, Rousseau, Locke and Rawls, “ Search for perfectly fair social devices “By making the definition of just institutions” the main task – and often the only – of the theory of justice (P. 20). The other method – which would be that of Smith, Condorcet, Bentham, Marx and John Stuart Mill – establishes a link between justice and the comparison between people’s lifestyles, their concrete behaviors and their interactions within the framework of various institutions . Sen opts for this second approach, “ comparative “, While criticizing the first.

A distance from the Rawlsian approach

Sen recognizes that Rawls has drawn attention to intrinsic importance (in itself, and not as a complementary means to others) of freedom. But, for him, although “ Freedom must have a certain priority, it is almost certain that a total and unreserved priority is excessive (P. 96). This criticism was already present in Inequality re -examined (1992) and in Development as Freedom (1999).

However, in The Idea of ​​JusticeSen takes more distance from the theory of Rawls, by contesting the very foundation of the principles of justice. He thus doubts that individuals placed in a hypothetical situation (“ original ») Where they ignore their future place in society can be able to agree on« All of the principles called upon to govern just institutions, those on which a fully fair society must rely (P. 87). There is, in fact, no reason for individuals to choose, as Rawls does, “ The most extensive freedom system As a primary principle of justice.

Under these conditions, we are in front of the “ Arrow’s impossibility theorem », According to which there is no rule making it possible to deduce a collective classification coherent from the various possible options from the rankings of these options by the individuals who form the company. Indeed, the interests of these individuals being – at least in part – contradictory, we understand that these individuals may not always agree on the order of priority in which the problems to which society must be treated. There is therefore no supreme option among all the possible options, while the search for this option is, according to Sen, at the heart of the approach of transcendental institutionalism. The problem of adopting an ethical criterion – or hierarchical principles of justice which guide the choice of actions and institutions – remains. Sen, however, offers a completely different solution.

The refusal of an explicit definition of the just

He believes that there is no need to give a precise definition of what justice is to decide what is right or not. Sen “ does not see at all why », To judge an option X better than an option, it would be necessary to go through the identification of a completely different option, the Z option, which would be the” Best of all ». “” The possibility of having a ‘perfectly recognizable option does not imply that it is necessary or even useful to refer to it to judge relative merits of two other options (…). To believe that in general one cannot reasonably compare two options without having previously identified the supreme option would be really curious. There is no analytical link here (P. 137-138). Sen explains that knowing that Everest is the highest top in the world is useless when you want to compare the altitudes of Kilimandjaro and Mont McKinley. We can however retort that, in this case, the measurement stallion is simple and known (the height) and that it is enough to specify the nature of what we are looking for (the highest, the lowest) . In terms of justice, if we are in a comparative perspective, the problem is also to specify the measurement stallion (freedom, collective happiness), thanks to which can be determined if a situation, a rule or an action is better than another. As John Stuart Mill Force forcefully pointed out in his test Utilitarianismit is precisely thanks to the existence of a criterion, acting as a stallion, that we can classify the choices (see Mill, 1861, p. 158).

Classification criteria

Sen rejects the need to know “ The best option To make comparisons between any two options. What can be admitted. But it also does not offer a unique criterion which would compare these two options. For him it would be enough that “ A theory of practical reason is large enough and encompassing to predict an argued debate within it – it is in any case in this spirit that this book intends to approach the theory of justice (P. 123). But one “ argued debate “Does not necessarily lead to a consensual solution – in this case, to decide what is right and what is not.

Even without a stretch criterion, Sen thinks that we can, despite everything, lead to numerous agreements on injustices: “ To emerge a shared and operative vision of many concrete questions related to rights and duties (and also to what is good and bad), no need to demand that we (have) fully defined the just by separating it from the ‘unfair. A joint resolution to fight to put an end to the famines, genocides, terrorism, slavery, untouchability, illiteracy, epidemics, etc., does not require the prior existence of a consensus just as Large on the calculation of inheritance tax, the wording of tax declaration sheets, the level of the minimum wage or the laws on copyright (P. 187). However, just as there is no particular reason for Rawls’s principles of justice to result from the choice of various individuals, we do not see why there would be a consensus for “ finish »With famines, untouchability, epidemics, etc. In fact, as Sen himself admits: “ Even when all the parties in question have their own complete rankings which do not coincide, the “intersection” between these rankings-that is to say the convictions on the justice shared by the different parties-will provide a more partial order or less extensive (depending on the importance of the common points between rankings) (P. 141). In short, the agreement will be all the wider and extended as individuals have rankings with many common points. By extrapolating, we can even say that if individuals share the same conception of justice, the classification will be complete. But in the event of a discordant vision, at least partially, nothing guarantees that the agreement relates more to famines, genocides, epidemics than the wording of tax declarations. But above all, it is not enough that the feeling of injustice about these plagues is shared so that there is an agreement on the means to be implemented to fight against them. The capability approach, on which Sen insists in the last part of the book makes it possible to answer these questions ?

Capability

For Sen, capability is defined as “ The real freedom we have to choose between different ways of living (…). The capabilities approach judges the advantage of an individual to his (capacity) to do things that he has reasons to value (P. 279-284). Sen is careful not to advance an explicit criterion of well-being or justice. He even claims this lack of criterion and underlines “ The absurdity of the sometimes advanced argument according to which the capabilities approach can not be used – and “operational” – that if it is accompanied by a predefined weighting of the various operations appearing on a fixed list of relevant capabilities. The search for a predetermined weighting is not only conceptually unfounded, but it also neglects the fact that the assessments and the weights to be used can be reasonably influenced by our own permanent examination and by the impact of the public debate (P. 296-297). Thus, he returns to the exam by everyone and the public debate to decide – but we do not know more about the content than Sen gives to the concept of justice.

When Sen brings some details on his approach, he writes that she “ Indicates a information basis on which to concentrate To judge and compare the global individual advantages. She does not offer a particular recipe herself on how to use this information (…). The capabilities approach certainly emphasizes the capital importance of the inequality of capabilities in the evaluation of social inequalities, but it does not offer any particular recipe concerning public action (P. 285). This can disappoint the one who expects to find in Sen’s work, as he announces in his introduction, a reflection to determine how to promote justice and eliminate injustice.

The vocabulary used by Sen, to which is added the slightly responsible style, can make it difficult to read The idea of ​​justice. You might think that it is the price to pay to understand a subtle and complex thought. However, if the work makes it possible to return to the perspectives developed by different ethical doctrines, on some criticisms that can be made to them, and if it allows to approach a certain number of essential questions for a reflection on justice ( Like the question of the criterion according to which one judges a better situation than another), Sen is not placed on the same level as the approaches of the philosophers he disputes. Unlike Rawls (1971) or Bentham (1823), Sen is not trying to propose a complete and successful theory of justice – to which everyone could subscribe after examining their arguments. His remarks is limited, in fact, to assert that only the “ reasoned examination “And the” public debate »Will make it possible to establish what is right, of what is not.