In Xi Jinping’s China where any dissent seems impossible, heterodox publications have continued to express themselves on various media, even if it remains difficult to understand the logic of censorship and sanctions to which the authors have exposed themselves: an anthology sketches the panorama.
“ When the Youxing independent bookstore in Chengdu was closed, a netizen asked: why close it when the events it organizes are exciting? ? Precisely for this reason, replied the owner “.
Shortly after coming to power in November 2012, Xi Jinping had the Party Central Committee adopt document number 9 known as “ seven forbidden »: the terms civil society, freedom of the press, independence of the judiciary, historical errors of the Communist Party, historical nihilism, citizens’ rights, crony capitalism, and universal values can no longer be mentioned in official publications. It was a matter of silencing the political critics who had emerged in the Chinese public space and threatened to weaken the power of the Communist Party in the early 2000s. The Chinese, plunged back into a totalitarian regime, were nevertheless reduced to silence ?
The book coordinated by Anne Cheng and Chloé Froissart shows that this is not the case. Under the leaden cover imposed by those in power, discordant voices continue to be heard. Texts of political reflection, academic articles obeying scientific criteria rather than the thought of Xi Jinping are published, often on the Chinese internet, sometimes overseas ; and even if they are drowned in a deluge of propaganda, they show that the Chinese (or at least some Chinese) refuse to submit to the dictates of the Party.
The texts collected in this work give a good idea of the variety of ideas of those who resist the hegemony of official discourse. Their authors are ordinary citizens as well as academics, members of national minorities and Hans. The generations also mingle even if we meet a large number of former Red Guards or, as we would say back home, boomers.
For ease of reading, the editors have grouped these texts into four thematic parts: writing of history, constitutional law and criticism of the regime, borders and ethnic minorities, and finally citizens facing the Party-State. Each text is preceded by a detailed presentation of the author and his works, which allows the reader to get to know those who “ think in resistance in today’s China “. The editors have, rightly, chosen to present only articles, most of which have been published over the last fifteen years by authors who reside in China and Hong Kong. Some temporarily found their place on mainland sites before being erased, others in Hong Kong or abroad. Certainly, censorship has been strengthened since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012. Online or offline publications are subject to much more drastic censorship than under his predecessor. However, certain texts sometimes slip through the cracks of censorship and remain on the internet for some time before being deleted. And unlike what happened under Mao, the debates continue in private. However, it is undeniable that spaces of freedom have been greatly reduced since 2012.
The fantasy of the One
We must recognize that sometimes it is difficult to understand why power was unleashed against certain authors. This is particularly the case of the text signed by Rahile Dawut: “ The Mazar of Ordam » is an anthropological article describing a pilgrimage which took place every year from 1980 until its ban in 1997. The author, herself a member of the Communist Party, does not at any time address a theme “ sensitive » and is content to analyze, based on very detailed fieldwork, the cultural diversity of Xinjiang: “ the development of this type of pilgrimage and ritual offering was influenced by numerous pre-Islamic practices, the most important of which came from Buddhism » (p. 286). We are a long way from the assertions of Islamist extremists who insist on the region’s Muslim identity. Is it because the pilgrimage is prohibited that Rahile Dawut, a researcher recognized by all international specialists, was sentenced to life in prison? ? We must believe that, while prey to the fantasy of one person (to use Claude Lefort’s expression), Xi Jinping’s party believes that recognizing the diversity of cultural practices without condemning it is equivalent to endangering sacrosanct national security.
It is this obsession which also explains the Party’s relentlessness against Ilham Tohti. In a poignant autobiographical article, the professor at the University of Minorities explains how he sought to make the Hans understand the socio-cultural specificities of the Uyghurs: “ In addition to my academic work, I would like to be seen as an emissary and a bridge that promotes exchanges and communication between ethnic groups. » (p. 260). Ilham’s incessant commitment attested by its creation of the site Uyghur online, accessible in the People’s Republic until Xi Jinping came to power, his numerous interventions in favor of multiculturalism and dialogue have earned him the esteem of all those who wish that China can resolve its inter-ethnic tensions to move forward. But above all it earned him a life prison sentence in 2014.
Everyone knows that, since 2016, defending Uyghur culture can lead to internment in “ vocational training “. But we cannot approach Tibetan culture any further. Thus, the text by the writer Tsering Woeser, which analyzes the difficulties of Tibetans living on either side of the Nepalese border – a not particularly sensitive subject – was unable to find its place in official publications. In Xi Jinping’s China, it is recommended to emphasize the great unity of the Chinese nation.
Unity which can only be achieved under the leadership of the Communist Party. If he is wary of ethnic diversity, he is even more worried about reflections concerning constitutionalism and the law. The interview with jurist He Weifang and the article by his colleague Xu Zhangrun show that these ideas continue to exist in universities despite numerous study sessions on Xi Jinping’s thought. However, the Party does not tolerate them and the two professors were retired. Zhang Qianfan, for his part, left spontaneously, touched by the age limit: this did not prevent him from affirming his faith in liberalism, more of a social democratic tendency. In the article published in this book, he does not hesitate to criticize market fundamentalists who consider equality to be the enemy of freedom. Political scientist Zhou Baosong, based in Hong Kong, also disagrees with those who consider that the fight for freedoms must necessarily involve a critique of the welfare state. Liu Yu, who teaches political science at Tsinghua, one of the most prestigious Chinese universities, presents Hannah Arendt’s analyzes on the banality of evil in conferences, leaving it to his listeners to apply them to the regime of their choice.
The book shows the pluralism of ideas of liberal intellectuals who resist the standardization imposed by the Party. This in itself is already a form of resistance. We see that the imposition of Xi Jinping Thought has not succeeded in suppressing all discussion.
An original reflection on Maoism
But I would like to make special mention of Wang Lixiong’s impressive reflection on Maoism. A friend of Liu Xiaobo, the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize winner who died in prison in 2017, Wang, an independent intellectual not connected to any university, has been thinking about the nature of the regime for decades. The article reproduced here was published in 1999 in Hong Kong in the journal Chinese Social Sciences Quarterlyfrom the time when freedom of expression reigned in the former British colony. It shows the specificity of Maoist totalitarianism which unfolded from 1958, with the Great Leap Forward. He asserts, with supporting evidence, that Mao was not satisfied with the system put in place in 1949: “ Today we apply a market system and our wage system is unequal (…) these are things that are very little different from what was done in the old society » (p. 149). Also, as Wang Lixiong remarks, believing that his comrades had betrayed the socialist ideal, the Grand Helmsman did not hesitate to “break the old system to achieve his political ideal” (p. 142).
This is how in 1966, seventeen years after the Party took power, he launched the Cultural Revolution: he called on students and high school students to rise up against the “bourgeois intellectuals” and the Party cadres who had transformed into a “new bourgeoisie”. They must transform the Chinese into new men whose model is Lei Feng, the soldier who only dreamed of being a screw in the machine of socialism. To defeat those who stand in the way of his revolution, the Grand Helmsman advocates “great democracy”:
Apart from the fact that it is forbidden to attack Mao and some of his close associates, there are practically no exceptions to political freedoms. They had never reached such a level.” (p. 144).
But this results in the opposite of liberation:
freedom only manifested itself through the destruction of the law. Despotism was expressed through the absolute domination exercised by Mao’s thought and his intolerance of any intellectual heresy. The masses had become insensitive to ideological oppression: they only felt the thrill of liberation by destroying the existing order” (p. 145).
In conclusion, Wang Lixiong states:
It is much more illuminating to describe Mao as an idealist in search of the highest good than as a black-hearted tyrant (…) Humanity must not only guard itself against tyrants, but also against idealists of this kind. Whenever an idealist who believes he holds an absolute truth is allowed to take control of the destiny of humanity, he will impose, certainly with sincere motives, on everyone to submit unconditionally to his ideals…all resistance and discontent must be mercilessly suppressed ‘in the name of the revolution’ (p. 155).
Note that, even in 1999, Wang Lixiong’s analyzes did not find their place in official publications. It is probably because he does not hold any official position and is not well known in China that he has not been worried. However, he had to resolve not to publish in his country.
In conclusion, despite the desire of those in power to lock the debate within the cage of Xi Jinping Thought on socialism in the colors of China for the new era (official name of Xi Thought), Chinese citizens continue to reflect on the world and analyze it. And contrary to the uniformity that the Party seeks to impose, this intellectual sphere is pluralist, and will perhaps serve as a basis for movements which will not fail to agitate Chinese society when the power of the Helmsman weakens.
This pluralism of thought escapes superficial observers of Chinese reality. This is why the work of Anne Cheng and Chloé Froissart is essential reading for anyone who wants to understand China today.