Politics, practical science

Is politics a science? ? Yes, replies Plato, but a science whose object is not knowledge. And it is to the extent that the politician possesses this science that he is able to govern.

Dimitri El Murr’s work aims to grasp certain aspects of Platonic political thought from a reading of one of the main dialogues, the Politics, devoted to this question. But for the author it is not a question of simply providing a commentary. He pursues a particular objective which is to seek to situate this work in all of Plato’s texts. However, according to him, the Policy is not simply an intermediate dialogue between Plato’s two other great political works (the Republic and the Laws), which we are accustomed to considering as more important than him. Dimitri El Murr makes the opposite hypothesis: the Policy sheds light on these two other works by providing a “ complement » of information essential to understanding the Platonic project.

Dimitri El Murr also wishes to challenge an interpretation too often developed, according to which the Policy would only constitute a methodological illustration of the meaning of dialectical activity. According to this interpretation, the definition of political science in this dialogue would only have secondary value compared to the main issue, which would be to grasp what precisely the dialectic is. Supporting a different interpretation implies both re-capturing the complete unity of the dialogue, its precise structure but also not giving a fragmented reading, isolating only the aspects which seem relevant depending on the interest one has in the dialogue. (retain, for example, only the passages devoted to the definition of dialectic). The method of this work therefore consists of scrupulously following the development of the dialogue (through a commentary on its main parts), to show that the definition of political science is indeed, through and through, the main issue.

The interpretations of Policy

Contemporary comments have too often reduced the work to a school exercise in definition or to a methodological presentation concerning dialectics, that is to say the method implemented by the philosopher to study the Ideas, which are the eternal essences. of all things. But the question about the true meaning of dialogue is old. The Neoplatonists read the dialogue as a physical dialogue, that is to say relating to nature, because the central myth exposes the divine ordering of the world. But they also recognized the political function of myth and dialogue. In contrast, the so-called tetralogical classification adopted by Thrasyllus and grouping the dialogues into nine groups of four, saw in the Policya teaching of the so-called division method, which consists of obtaining the definition of a given reality by successive subdivisions of a more general kind. The oscillation, and sometimes the hesitation, between these two readings of the dialogue (methodological or political) therefore goes back to Antiquity itself. Dimitri El Murr maintains on the contrary that it is impossible to favor one element to the detriment of the other but that the Policy skillfully and subtly articulates both aspects. In this way, it extends certain recent works such as the work of Melissa Lane, published in 1998 (Method and Politics in Plato’s StatesmanCambridge, Cambridge University Press).

The work therefore gives a presentation of this thesis as well as the overall structure of the dialogue, emphasizing its unity. Concerning the first aspect (the articulation between dialectical science and political science), the author argues that political science and dialectics maintain, in dialogue, a complex and even ambivalent relationship since the first is the “ target of the main investigation » (p. 70) but that it is also a paradigm for the study of the second. This means that the search for the definition of political science sheds light on the dialectical method which, in turn, provides a better understanding of political science itself. Concerning the second point, it is the method of division (“ diarytic approach », p. 77) which gives unity to the dialogue: each of its parts is the development of different divisions and the moments which appear to constitute digressions, like the central myth, are integrated into this search for the definition of politics. It is therefore not out of weakness that the interlocutors of the dialogue take the path of myth since this is at the service of the diairetic method (p. 77-79). It is she, rather, who gives their meaning to the different passages of the dialogue.

The object of Platonic political science

What is the result of this definitional research carried out by Plato? ? Plato makes politics a science, but it is a cognitive science and not a practical one, that is to say a science which seeks to know and not to produce. This is explained in particular by the fact that the king reigns through his intelligence and not directly through his body. But this position poses a difficulty because politics is indeed a science of action. This is why Plato ranks this science among those he calls “ prescriptive “. It leads to action but in a mediate way. The notion of prescription is therefore central since it makes it possible to articulate the cognitive dimension and the practical dimension of political science, and thus gives it its specific character. However, this prescriptive dimension takes a particular form: the politician, or king, commands auxiliary arts, which are subordinate to him (rhetoric, judicial art, strategy) and it is in this sense that the Politician completes the Republic rather than he is not opposed to it. The true politician shows himself capable of governing because he possesses a science superior to all others where the Republic was content to affirm the identity of politics and philosophy, without indicating how, from such an identity, could result from the government of men.

Certain passages of the dialogue, however, resist such analysis. The question arises in particular regarding the myth integrated by Plato in the central part of the text. Its study poses formidable difficulties, including the problem of knowing how many cosmic phases it presents. The traditional interpretation has two, while some contemporary commentators opt for three. The author does not intend to return to this controversial question even if he does not hide his preference for the traditional interpretation. Let us instead retain an original aspect of his analysis. The myth considers that during a first phase of world history (the Age of Kronos), the divine pastorate was exercised directly over men and thus made politics useless while a second phase (the Age of Zeus), which sees the gods abandon this pastorate, makes politics necessary in the form of a human pastorate, which turns out to be very different from that of the divine pastorate. But, if during this second phase, politics becomes possibleit does not necessarily come true. This is why, when he negatively describes this phase as gradually sinking into chaos because men are abandoned by the gods, Plato actually wants to emphasize that this chaos only arises from bad policy which, according to the author, would be Protagorean in essence, that is to say democratic and based on human measure alone. On the contrary, a well-defined policy would avoid this chaos. The lesson of the myth is therefore to show the need for another conception of politics. What is this other conception ?

To present it, Plato uses the famous paradigm of weaving which makes politics an art of intertwining, aiming to harmonize different elements together to make the same fabric. This paradigm, as the author will show, makes it possible to resolve the problem previously pointed out: how can a cognitive science show itself “ practical » ? Indeed, wool weaving requires distinguishing between auxiliary arts (notably those which manufacture the tools necessary for weaving) and arts which are “ direct causes » of fabric production, such as carding and spinning. Now, it is indeed the art of weaving which sets the end of all these other arts and which thus commands their exercise. The application of the paradigm therefore allows us to understand that, while remaining cognitive, political science is also prescriptive since it governs the other arts which are indirectly linked to politics. Political science is therefore an architectonic science, as Aristotle will remind us at the beginning of theNicomachean Ethics.

The problem of the value of law and political regimes

But two particular passages of the dialogue have given rise to fierce debates about the meaning that should be given to them. The first (293 e-297 b) concerns the status of the law, the second the status of “ ranking » of the different political regimes (291 d-303 d). Plato considers that the true politician, through the knowledge he possesses, is above the laws to the extent that he is their source without being subject to them. Does this point constitute a criticism of the law, which would always be inferior to practical wisdom (phronesis) of politics ? This is not the case according to Dimitri El Murr, because the politician makes use of it which the author calls “ substitute »: even if it cannot be applied to all cases, the law remains necessary and replaces political science, on the condition that it can be adapted and revised by the politician as soon as this proves necessary. The law is therefore an instrument by which political science presents itself as prescriptive.

The second problem is that of the classification of constitutions. Plato presents six of them (monarchy, tyranny, aristocracy, oligarchy, democracy depending on whether it is based on laws or on the contrary frees itself from them) which he considers to be more or less distant imitations of the ideal regime constituted by the government of the true political (and which therefore constitutes a seventh political regime). Does this mean that certain regimes, including democracy, are rehabilitated since, to the extent that their laws are improved, they would thus approach this ideal regime? ? This is not the case according to the author. Political regimes are based on laws, which themselves do not emanate from political science but rather from the ignorance of citizens or those who legislate. If they can imitate the ideal constitution, it is therefore only by their stability, that is to say by their capacity to preserve such laws whereas regimes which would change their laws without relying on the knowledge of the true political would move further away from the ideal constitution represented by the latter’s reign. Imitation does not lead to the rehabilitation of certain regimes such as democracy since these regimes do not imitate real politics, they are content to reproduce the substitutive nature of the law without reproducing the knowledge which presides over it.

Dimitri El Murr’s work thus presents valuable and careful analyzes of different passages of the dialogue. It offers, in particular, a very useful study of weaving and its technical implications as well as its paradigmatic use by Plato and thus allows us to better understand the structure and meaning of the Platonic text. But it is the general intention that will especially attract attention. The author wishes to show, from one end to the other of his analysis, that the Policy does not constitute a shift in Platonic political thought towards a sort of reformism and rehabilitation of certain imperfect political regimes (such as democracy). Contrary to an often widespread thesis which sees in the last Platonic dialogues the recognition of the unrealizable character of the ideal city that the Republicleading to the defense of forms of political organizations that are more “ flexible », Dimitri El Murr shows that the Policy only deepens and clarifies a position which was already that of the Republic by giving meaning (which had not been done in this dialogue) to the notion of political science used by the ruler of the ideal constitution.