In France the idea that property is a natural right emerges and triumphs over XVIIIe century, under the leadership of the Physiocrats. It is such a conception that the solidarist movement will criticize a century later in order to promote the social state.
The legitimacy granted by French solidarists to the social state at the end of the XIXe and at the beginning of XXe century would result from a reversal of the paradigm of French possessive individualism, developed a century earlier by the Physiocrats, that is to say from the use of part of the goods held by individuals in the name of collective considerations. This is the thesis defended by Pierre Crétois, for whom this reversal constitutes a republican gesture since the right to property is thus subordinated to civic considerations.
The work constitutes a work in the history of ideas which allows us to trace the evolution of conceptions and debates concerning private property, particularly in France. The author does not limit himself to philosophical texts, but also draws his elements from economics or law. Beyond the theses of the Physiocrats and the Republicans, it also sets out the debates which took place during the French Revolution, showing how a Lockean-inspired conception of property first triumphed over a Rousseauist approach. , before the development of the solidarist perspective.
The affirmation of French possessive individualism
By focusing on French debates on private property, Pierre Crétois’ primary desire is to develop a reflection on possessive individualism which is intended to be broader than that developed by Macpherson (CB Macpherson, The theory of possessive individualism from Hobbes to Locke (1962), translated by M. Fuchs, Paris, Gallimard, 2004. )). A pioneer in work on this issue, Macpherson focused on its advent during the XVIIe century in England only, relying on the work of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke.
In France, the reality of such a conception of property is a little more recent. It is during the second half of XVIIIe century, under the leadership of the Physiocrats, that private property imposed itself in place of a more open conception of property inherited from the Middle Ages. If it was previously possible to be the owner of property, and in particular of land, it was important to also respect the rights of non-owners, such as for example a right of passage, or a seigneurial right to hunt. Thus, due to simultaneous rights on the same land, founded by custom, the enclosure of plots and therefore their private appropriation was made impossible.
The Physiocrats’ defense of private property is compared to Lockean theses, without making them similar. Just like the English philosopher, Quesnay and his fellow students believe that self-ownership or “ personal property » constitutes a natural right which must be politically guaranteed, without any compensation whatsoever. However, the status of the argument which makes it possible to justify such a thesis is quite different. On the one hand, it is important for Locke to define the principles of a social contract making it possible to guarantee respect for a natural right to be the owner of oneself and of goods legitimately acquired, in particular through work. On the other hand, physiocrats focus on the positive consequences for the economy that can result from the guarantee of property rights by the State. It is more prosaically a matter of asserting that such a guarantee must promote freedom of trade within the economic sphere, and thus allow a return to an order “ natural “. In other words, the development and respect for private property constitute, according to them, an essential cog in the possibility of liberalization of economic exchanges.
Republican subjugation of property rights
Pierre Crétois therefore does not fail to compare his research on French debates concerning property with the theses defended by Macpherson. But in explicit opposition to the latter, he believes that Hobbes’ contribution concerning possessive individualism cannot be assimilated to that of Locke. Certainly, Hobbes and Locke both developed a contractualist theory and have a common anthropological conception, namely that human beings are naturally owners of themselves. But what distinguishes them is the following fundamental element: for Hobbes, the social pact and the advent of Leviathan supposes partly renouncing this right of nature. Within the state of nature, self-ownership, or more precisely its enjoyment, cannot be fully guaranteed: individuals live in a permanent state of war in which the law of the strongest reigns. The political power constituted following the social contract is, on the other hand, able to put an end to this state of war, but this security thus obtained is at the cost of at least minimal submission to Leviathan. In other words, Hobbes would not strictly speaking be a defender of the paradigm of possessive individualism, but rather of its reversal: possessive individualism is only possible to the extent that one subscribes to general or collective imperatives, and the The right to property can no longer be considered an absolute right.
This reversal of possessive individualism is first put into perspective with the republican defense of social redistribution by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. One of the originalities of the work is thus to link the Hobbesian and republican theses around property. Without calling into question the very principle of an individual right to property, it is in both cases analyzed through the prism of collective interest. Rousseau believes that such a right can only be guaranteed to the extent that it serves the general will, or at least does not go against it. Redistributive policies are thus justified in the name of the negative consequences of social inequalities on the common good, but also because a property right can only exist and be guaranteed thanks to the society within which individuals evolve. Rousseau’s thinking about property constitutes an illustration of his thesis of the subordination of the individual to the general will.
Still from this perspective, the solidarist movement, led by radical politicians – Bourgeois, Fouillée and Duguit in particular – is also studied because of the arguments put forward in favor of the development of the social state. According to them, individuals owe a social debt to other members of society. They actually underline that the members of a society owe each other what they are and what they possess: they would be nothing and would possess nothing without the society within which they were born. Not only does society make it possible to preserve everyone’s properties, but the quality of living conditions results directly from the collective effort made by contemporaries and past generations. By virtue of a reciprocal logic, it is therefore legitimate to ask everyone to contribute to the proper functioning of society, for example by ensuring the financing of public services, in particular through taxes, and thus to accept that the individual property of each person is, at least in part, for the benefit of all.
The philosophical origins of the social state in question
Can the overthrow of possessive individualism produced by the solidarists/republicans be considered as the only theoretical explanation of the advent of a social state and the acceptance of social redistribution in France? ? By proceeding with a sometimes too strict opposition between two labels that would be republican thought – embodied here by Hobbes, Rousseau and the solidarists – and liberal thought – under the pen of Locke and the physiocrats, no doubt out of a desire to synthesize and Staying with the French case, the author seems to answer in the affirmative. However, in the field of ideas, and without underestimating the Republican contribution, liberals also have arguments to put forward in favor of redistribution and the constitution of a social State, in particular those who subscribe to the within a liberal-egalitarian current, like John Stuart Mill. While granting fundamental importance to individual freedom, most of them do not forget that such freedom would be impossible without the contribution of society and the members who compose it. The guarantee of a right to freedom thus implies a contribution to the proper functioning of this society and its institutions.
Without the author making explicit reference to it, it is striking to note that the different elements put forward within the proposed historical journey have obvious links with contemporary discussions around the legitimacy of tax. As Pierre Crétois points out, the right to private property is little questioned today in public debate, unlike the legitimacy of social redistribution, and recourse to the history of ideas allows us to take a step back necessary. Several explanations can undoubtedly be put forward to understand such a phenomenon. But, precisely, this is partly due to the fact that possessive individualism, merit and individual success, are more valued than are the idea of interdependence between members of the same community and therefore of the contribution essential to the collective for the benefit of everyone.