Return of the ramparts

While the migration issue was a marginal subject in classical philosophical theories, recent decades have seen the rapid growth of a genuine moral and political philosophy of immigration. With Strangers in our Midstthe British philosopher David Miller joins this growing debate to defend a clear and unambiguous position: according to him, states have the right to show preference for their own citizens, which implies in particular that they have a full and complete right to limit immigration if this conforms to their own interests. In this, David Miller’s position opposes cosmopolitan theories defending the opening of borders as a moral and political necessity.

Although this is David Miller’s first book devoted entirely to the philosophy of immigration, the work is in line with the author’s previous works devoted to the question of nationalism and the difference between national justice and global justice. The book has all the characteristic qualities of D. Miller’s work: the British philosopher once again deploys a clear argument that is largely based on empirical work drawn from the various social sciences. As in his other works, the author seeks to reconcile two apparently opposing positions. On the one hand, he wants to defend common sense and popular opinion, arguing in favor of the right of states to defend their own interests and close their borders. On the other hand, he attempts to formulate a critical philosophy, which can show the moral deficiencies of current policies. This perspective is notably expressed in Strangers in Our Midstby defending a (limited) opening of borders to refugees (but not to economic migrants), by defending the equality of all persons legally residing in a territory, and by criticizing the supposedly devastating effects of the brain drain (the ” brain drain “) in the countries of origin. In practice, however, Strangers in our Midst appears more as an enlightened defense of the status quo than as a proposal for a radical change in our migration policies.

National preference and border closures

In the first chapters of the book, D. Miller defends the right of states to close their own borders. D. Miller’s argument is based on two fundamental principles: first, on what he calls “weak cosmopolitanism”, and second, on the right to self-determination. By weak cosmopolitanism, D. Miller means in particular the idea that

if there are no relevant differences between people, we must give them equal consideration. (p. 23)

If this principle implies that all human beings deserve a priori equal consideration, it is perfectly compatible with a difference in treatment if there are “relevant differences” between individuals. In the context of migration, the fact that we constitute a political, economic, and national association with our fellow citizens implies for D. Miller that we have particular duties towards them, which do not extend to foreigners and therefore to potential migrants. Consequently, D. Miller defends the idea that we have limited duties towards people outside our political community: we only have duties towards them if their situation is critical (in particular in the case of human rights violations), or if helping them would represent only a negligible cost for our political community.

However, according to David Miller, immigration has a potentially high cost for the host community, as it represents a threat to the right to political self-determination. By self-determination, Miller means “the right of a democratic public to have a wide range of political choices within the limits of respect for human rights” (p. 62). Immigration would threaten self-determination in two ways: first, it changes the composition of the sovereign people, which would make control of the future more uncertain. Miller’s argument is as follows: migrants have different values ​​than the host population; and if a people does not know what values ​​its citizens will hold in the future, it is difficult to determine to what extent decisions made in the present will continue to be implemented, which can limit a people’s ability to choose its future. Second argument: immigration would threaten the self-determination of the host people in that ethnic diversity would lead to a decrease in trust in others. D. Miller draws here on economic work studying the impact of diversity on social cohesion. However, he continues, trust constitutes the basis of many policies, particularly in the social field; the financing of solidarity measures presupposes that citizens have confidence in the fact that other members of society will do their part of the work. Diversity would therefore constitute a strong threat to the capacity to choose a set of social policies. D. Miller’s conclusion is therefore that immigration represents a potential danger for the self-determination of peoples, which in turn justifies that States have a right, or almost a duty, to close their borders.

This sovereign right to close borders is, however, tempered by the duty of States to protect human rights, including outside their borders. Consequently, D. Miller considers that States have a duty to accept refugees, as long as this reception does not represent a disproportionate cost for them. In the case of economic migrants, on the other hand, the choice of whether or not to accept them remains at the sole discretion of the State.

Migrants’ rights and duty of integration

The choice to welcome economic migrants is therefore purely at the discretion of States. The situation changes, however, if a State chooses to welcome migrants. According to D. Miller, from the moment migrants have been legally welcomed, obligations of justice constrain their possible treatment. Because of the moral equality between individuals subject to the authority of the same State, D. Miller considers that migrants who are destined to remain in a territory must have the same rights as national citizens. He defends a philosophy of equity, which imposes rights and duties on both the host country and the migrants. He considers that migrants are entitled to demand the same social and political rights as citizens born in the country; in exchange, the host State can demand from migrants complete integration into the host culture, which would involve in particular learning the language and political culture of the country. David Miller thus devotes a certain number of pages to the defense of citizenship tests. These tests, which have spread throughout Europe since the 2000s, make citizenship conditional on passing a civics exam, which aims to assess knowledge of the culture, history, and political institutions of the host country. Miller contests the idea that such tests can be considered “oppressive,” and defends their function of linguistic and civic integration. Even if the usefulness of such measures can be contested, the political conclusions of these chapters on integration seem much more consensual in comparison with the more intense debates around the question of open borders.

Uncertainties about the cost of immigration

Much of the interest in Strangers in our Midst rests in his unabashed defense of closed borders. Despite the merits of such an approach, however, it can be argued that David Miller’s arguments in favor of closed borders rest on extremely shaky foundations.

As we have seen, his first argument is based on the fact that the self-determination of a people implies the existence of shared values ​​that are stable over time; however, D. Miller continues, the arrival of migrants could call these national values ​​into question. This argument can be considered to have two major weaknesses. First of all, as D. Miller himself acknowledges, generational differences make it illusory to think that social values ​​can persist identically over time (one only has to think of the rapid secularization of European societies during the 20^e century). Immigration is not the only threat to the stability of social values ​​in Europe. Second, it must be said that the argument is terribly vague. D. Miller does not say exactly what values ​​he has in mind, how they might change, and how this change in values ​​would call into question the self-determination of a people. It is difficult to see, for example, how an increase in the number of migrants could be likely to change the French people’s attachment to social security, the pension system, education, etc. It is likely that D. Miller has more specific political issues in mind (the question of gender equality, for example); but, in that case, a precise discussion of these potentially conflicting themes would have been necessary. An appeal to the supposedly different “values” of migrants seems too general and too vague to constitute a convincing argument.

The second argument in favor of closed borders is based on the fact that ethnic diversity would represent a significant cost for the host society, in that it would constitute a threat to mutual trust. While such an argument is obviously not absurd in itself, it would require to be supported by a solid empirical basis. However, even if D. Miller cites some work in support of his thesis, he himself recognizes that a debate exists within the social sciences on this subject, and that the question of the link between immigration and trust is far from being resolved. One of the central arguments of the book would have required a more solid foundation.

Overall, Miller’s book is a welcome contribution to the debates on immigration, and proof that philosophers can shed new light on issues at the heart of current political events. But the book also shows that philosophy cannot replace the social sciences in formulating concrete policy recommendations.