To work, or not

This book is a welcome synthesis of universal income, at a time when interest in this idea is growing in the public debate, especially after the recent Swiss referendum, or the last presidential campaign in France. Universal income suffers from a bad image coming from the unusual nature of the idea that one can deserve an income without work or assets, but also suffers from the simplistic arithmetic which consists in believing that its introduction would cost the amount of universal income per capita multiplied by the size of the population.

False objections

The authors address these and other objections, beginning with a definition of what they consider to be a true universal basic income: individual, with no conditions for obtaining it (except perhaps age requirements) or restrictions on its use. They distinguish it from its “cousins,” the universal endowment of capital (a form of universal inheritance paid to all upon reaching the age of majority), the negative income tax, the low-income tax credit, low-wage subsidies, the job guarantee, and work sharing. They then trace the birth of social protection and the idea of ​​an income guarantee, before tackling the heart of the argument: the ethical justification for universal basic income, its economic feasibility, its political prospects, and the difficulties associated with the globalization of the economy.

The book is very accessible and easy to read, but it is also rigorous and very rich in historical, economic, and political information. How does it respond to the two objections cited at the beginning? The cost of universal income can in theory be almost zero, if aid and taxes are adjusted so that disposable income remains identical to that of the old system. Let us suppose for example that universal income is €500 per month and per person. In this hypothesis, a person receiving €400 in social assistance in the old system will receive the universal income of €500 and could pay a tax of €100 to keep his former disposable income. A person paying €1000 in tax will receive universal income and could pay €1500 in tax to regain his former disposable income.

This response to the objection of cost of course gives rise to a second objection, that of the emptiness of the universal income if the adaptation of taxes to ensure its financing makes the operation neutral for everyone. To this second objection, the authors first respond that taxes can be adjusted in various ways, the introduction of the universal income being able to be the opportunity to increase the progressivity of the tax, and be made easier by the introduction of new taxes, such as the Tobin tax on financial transactions or the carbon tax. In addition, the operation is absolutely not neutral for people who, in the old system, did not use or gave up applying for the social assistance to which they are entitled (i.e. up to half of the population concerned, for certain assistance). This generates a real additional cost compared to the old system, but it is also an essential advantage. Universal income better covers poor populations, avoids their stigmatization and the degrading controls that can accompany social assistance, which is often conditional, and ensures a better guarantee and the absence of delay in the payment of aid. These advantages are considerable, and constitute the main reason why the author of these lines supports the proposal for universal income. But this assumes that this income is high enough so that social assistance for the poorest can be eliminated.

Real freedom

The moral objection to unrequited income, also mentioned above, is not very convincing conceptually, since the relationship between contribution and social status is very loose in a market economy (income often owes more to luck than to merit), but can have a real influence in the political game if the electorate is sensitive to it. The authors’ response to this objection is based on a philosophical argument, and mainly on the idea that the real freedom of people is what a just society must promote – real freedom here refers to what people can really do in their lives, as opposed to formal freedom which simply allows without guaranteeing the corresponding means. According to them, universal income is a vector of real freedom, not only through greater access to consumption, but also through greater freedom from the labor market and degrading or dangerous jobs, greater possibility of practicing low-paid (cultural or social) activities, and greater security in being able to take entrepreneurial risks. It is interesting to note in particular that, if its amount is well chosen, universal income increases both the possibility for workers to accept attractive but poorly paid activities and to refuse repugnant activities if they are not paid well above the current level.

It is surprising that, in their analysis of the arguments justifying universal income, the authors cite a large academic literature, but completely ignore the theories of equity of recent decades, which provide arguments to justify the highest possible universal income (with or without tax exemption for income below the minimum wage, depending on the principles of equity chosen), and which were developed in particular at the University of Louvain-la-Neuve (the one where Philippe Van Parijs worked) by François Maniquet (admittedly, in the economics department, and, to be transparent, in collaboration with the author of these lines – see reference at the end of the text).

The quality of social relations

While the argument that universal basic income increases freedoms is indisputable, one might wonder why money would be the best way to make people free. Money, when its quantity is modest, does not buy access to quality social relationships, nor access to power in decisions that profoundly affect people’s lives, such as political decisions in their jurisdiction, or economic decisions in their living area and workplace. With regard to work life in particular, it is odd to focus only on what Albert Hirschman called ” exit ” (the possibility of exerting pressure by threatening to leave) to change economic power relations, while there are many interesting ideas based on the ” voice » (participation in decision-making processes by voting or any other procedure allowing one to express one’s opinion without threatening to leave the organization), that is to say on a real democratization of the company. The authors seem to adhere to a very economistic vision of human and social life, while the environmental threat undoubtedly places us at a historical moment where it would be appropriate to distance ourselves from such a vision and to reflect on power and social relations, instead of concentrating on economic resources. The fact that universal income facilitates the development of non-market activities should not exempt the authors from reflecting on the distribution of power and decision-making procedures, which the State should regulate directly and not only through the very indirect and very ineffective means of unconditional subsidies to individuals.

Furthermore, even if the moral objection to income without compensation is weak on a philosophical level, it remains true that most people feel a real need to feel connected and useful. From this point of view, it seems much more attractive to seek to make the company more humane than to allow people who cannot find decent work to stay at home. With universal income, some of them will be able to devote themselves to non-market activities, but how many will waste their time on video games, pornography and sink into depression? There is a real need to organize social life in such a way that relationships in the company, in neighborhoods, between the citizens and the administration (the police, social workers, justice), are respectful and emancipatory. Universal income can slightly improve things, but the authors remain strangely silent on direct interventions that can strengthen freedoms in this relational domain.

In this perspective, the proposal of Anthony B. Atkinson in his latest work, Inequality. What can be done?to accompany the universal income with a strong incentive to participate in activities responds both to the political concern to satisfy the widespread social preference for reciprocity and to the real problem of promoting the social integration of those in the greatest difficulty. As the authors recognize when they discuss this idea, this formula of course risks reintroducing the intrusive paternalism of certain social aids and a certain dependence on employers, but if the very principle of support is the quality of social relations, this must include relations between vulnerable people and social workers. And if the company is democratized, dependence on employment should move from a negative dependence (on dominant colleagues or bosses) to a positive dependence (associated with a real attachment to work and to the community of colleagues).

In conclusion, this book is by far the best synthesis available on the subject of universal income, and its reading by all interested persons would help to raise the level of public debate when this idea is introduced on political platforms. It would avoid difficulties similar to those experienced by George McGovern in the United States and Benoît Hamon very recently in France, when they had to abandon or eviscerate their universal income proposal under fire from erroneous but falsely convincing criticism.