Exploring the cultural rivalries that opposed the French and Japanese in Indochina during the period of the Vichy regime, Chizuru Namba provides a new perspective on a crucial period, on the eve of the war for independence in Vietnam.
During the period 1940-45, Indochina experienced an exceptional situation in at least two respects. First of all, in the Asian theater of the Second World War, Indochina was the only European possession where Japan (allied to Vichy) left the colonial system in place. The Matsuoka-Henry agreements of August 30, 1940 authorized the stationing of Japanese troops to whom various facilities were granted. However, French sovereignty is not called into question, and this compromise satisfies both parties. He is criticized by certain Japanese political circles, in particular within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but the army asserts its point of view according to which Japan has more to gain than to lose: Japan benefits from access to crucial raw materials (rice, rubber and coal) without having to take charge of the administration of the territory itself. The general government also adopts a realistic attitude. Cut off from the mainland, he is aware of being deprived of sufficient military forces to oppose an attack by Japan. The impotence of the French authorities in the cohabitation which is being established should not, however, be exaggerated because the French authorities retain a certain margin of maneuver, and manage, for example, to thwart repeated attempts by Japan to ensure control of a daily Indochinese newspaper to disseminate its ideas.
Indochina is also an exception within the framework of the French colonial empire by not rallying behind De Gaulle. Vichy personnel (in particular Governor General Decoux) even remained in charge for quite a long time after the fall of the Vichy government in France (August 1944). For the analysis of Vichy’s policy towards the French colonial empire, Indochina is therefore a privileged field of observation.
The Franco-Japanese rivalry in Indochina
In this very particular context of forced cohabitation, a speckled confrontation occurs on the ground of cultural policies carried out by the French and the Japanese towards the natives. Each obviously exalts its language and culture. But both also tend to grant an increasingly important place and recognition to Vietnamese culture. For example, it is no coincidence that the great poem of the early nineteenth century, Kim Van Kieuwas translated into French and Japanese almost at the same time.
Vichy propaganda strives to strike a traditionalist chord. She plays the card of the supposed adequacy between the values of the National Revolution and those of the old local cultural fund. Thus, we compare the words spoken by Pétain with traditional Vietnamese sentences. We associate the celebration of Joan of Arc with that of the Trung sisters, heroines of the fight against China (around 40 AD). The revival of the study of Chinese characters, the basis of the prestige of the caste of literate elites, is encouraged while an end is put to the system of elected municipal administrative councils (toc bieu), set up in the 1920s. Certain initiatives deserve attention like the cycling tour of Indochina which took place in January 1942, 1943 and 1944, which saw teams from the five ky (Cochinchina, Annam, Tonkin, Laos, Cambodia) as well as French runners. This cycling tour therefore represents a very clever promotion of the Indochinese federation (political framework which is put forward as an antidote to Vietnamese nationalism). This initiative also reflects the very keen concern for the development of physical activities, which translates into an effort in the field of infrastructure (stadiums, swimming pools).
For its part, Japan propagates the ideology of the co-prosperity sphere of Greater East Asia, repeatedly emphasizing the cultural affinities between Japanese culture and that of the populations of Indochina. However, its propaganda has the originality of being also directed in part towards the 36,000 French residents, which can be explained by the fact that a number of remarkable French speakers (and Francophiles) are sent to Indochina by the Japanese government in order to exercise there. responsibilities.
From cultural rivalry to the attack on French military posts
If they settle in a modus vivendi which consists of avoiding criticism directed directly against the presence of the other, the French and Japanese authorities come to stigmatize the other cohabitant in a roundabout way, under the guise of overwhelming the English and the Americans. Thus, the Japanese portray the latter as imperialists custodians of a degenerate Western civilization, which makes selfishness and materialism flourish (so many accusations which can very well apply to France). French propagandists readily describe an Indochina which, deprived of the benefits of French sovereignty, would immediately fall victim to Anglo-American appetites (while it is quite obvious, if we adopt this point of view, that the main threat to the freedom » of Indochina is Japan).
One of the strengths of Namba’s book is that it very precisely analyzes the role and influence of radio, too often undervalued by historians because it leaves little or no written trace. If the number of receivers is limited (50,000 for all of Indochina), it shows that collective listening, the installation of radio buses which crisscross the towns on market days multiplies its audience. By using, in particular, American intelligence transcriptions of Japanese broadcasts, she gives it back all the importance it had in the propaganda of the time. Namba thus contributes to the reassessment of the influence of this media during the Second World War, joining studies such as those of Céline Rase for the case of occupied Belgium.
What was the attitude of the local populations faced with this “ cultural rivalry » ? The range turns out to be very wide, which is not surprising. But we can affirm that it is the wait-and-see attitude that dominates: faced with a particularly uncertain political horizon, it is logical not to compromise. However, certain components of society, such as members of the Cao Dai sect, facing hostility from the French authorities, actively support the Japanese. The separatists were more reserved, because they were disappointed by Japan’s conciliatory attitude towards the colonial authorities, a disappointment further heightened in 1943 when certain European colonies occupied by Japanese troops were authorized to declare their independence.
This period of cohabitation of almost five years ended with the coup perpetrated by Japanese troops on March 9, 1945. Around 2,000 French people were killed, and only a small part managed to reach China. The rest of the French are imprisoned or, in the case of civilians, under house arrest. Vietnam declares its independence on March 11. Japanese propaganda therefore carried out a complete reversal, and had no words harsh enough to stigmatize French colonization.
This beautiful book helps to shed light on a crucial period in the history of Indochina. It addresses a subject which, despite its important implications, had been little treated. This state of affairs can be explained by the obligation to make use of a vast range of scattered sources written in different languages. Namba, by examining archival funds in France, Vietnam, Japan and the United States (as well as periodicals written in French, Japanese and Vietnamese) has therefore filled an important gap. Let us add finally that, although the edition is of good quality, it lacks an index, and that we may regret not finding illustrations which would show some of the productions of French and Japanese propaganda.