Chantal Jaquet discovers a Bacon who goes off the beaten track: to conquer the sciences, philosophy had to rely on history without forgetting poetry either. The ant that collects and the spider that ratiocines can do nothing without the bee that transforms: imagination.
From the outset, Chantal Jaquet’s work surprises with its length. This length – 291 pages, in a collection which, in general, does not exceed 130 pages – could alone testify to the ambition of this work. It is from Treatise of Advancement of Learning (1605) (NLP) and its extended Latin cover, De Dignitate et Augmentis Scientiarum (1623) (D.A.) that the author intends to shed light on the Baconian project of “ regeneration of science » (p. 7) as a whole. This concern for completeness is maintained. It is therefore not the Bacon of the method usually presented in France that the author shows us. Ch. Jaquet takes the plurality of knowledge seriously, covering all the fields addressed by Bacon: from history to politics, law and morality, including of course natural philosophy. The work therefore does not otherwise present a Bacon that we think we know ; it leads through the whole of Baconian thought, following the thread of the “ promotion » knowledge. This covers two tasks: defending knowledge and showing what progress is possible.
The classification of knowledge: history and poetry
First, promoting involves indicating what is missing and what remains to be explored. This amounts to classifying knowledge. However, this division, the cornerstone of the Baconian project (p. 18), is not an encyclopedia of acquired knowledge. On the contrary, it is underpinned by a “ programmatic design of knowledge, which engages the future and requires a collective organization of research » (pp. 13-14). In this, Bacon breaks with the principle of previous classifications. To this rupture is added another, more subtle one. Bacon distinguishes three parts of knowledge: history, poetry and philosophy. If philosophy has a central role, Bacon “ considers that history and poetry constitute fields of knowledge in their own right (and) grants them an unprecedented place in the hierarchy of knowledge » (p. 17). Ch. Jaquet thus devotes half of his work to history and poetry. Thus with history: if it is first of all the description of facts, “ in a more technical sense, history ceases to be the simple relation of empirical facts to become an elaborate material serving as a basis for true induction » (p. 35). This is true of all forms of history. If civil history is not in the strict sense experimental, like the natural history Bacon desired, it nonetheless remains an active history, which questions the past. For example, Bacon calls for a history of letters, which must give “ a global and ordered vision of the state of knowledge » (p. 58). This requires “ replace(r) knowledge in its institutional and political context » (ibid.). The aim is to show the forms of institutional organization in particular which promote the progress of knowledge. Brief, “ Bacon conceives of history as a questioning, as a forced unveiling » (p. 68). Only this activity of the historian makes it possible to give meaning to history itself, by allowing lessons to be learned from it. Ch. Jaquet therefore deals with a Bacon relatively unexpected for the French reader. A history of history can hardly do without the Baconian reference: Bacon is one of the first to see (civil) history as knowledge in the same way as natural history.
After history, Bacon deals with poetry. It is impossible to summarize Ch. Jaquet’s analyzes – this is one of the most important passages of the work. All its place is given back to the imagination. Not without radicality, the author makes it a central faculty. Commenting on the famous image opposing the empirical ant which amasses everything it finds, the rationalist spider which draws its discourse from itself and the bee which transforms what it discovers, Ch. Jaquet writes: “ this text is often cited to define the Baconian method and to celebrate the alliance between experience and reason, but we have rarely asked ourselves what is this specific faculty by which the bee philosopher modifies and transforms matter ? It can be neither memory alone, which only allows for painstaking work, nor reason alone, which encloses us in its cobwebs. By elimination, only the imagination remains to carry out the synthesis with the help of the other faculties of the understanding. » (p. 119). Imagination participates in the constitution of knowledge. But it’s a double-edged sword. In the order of belief, imagination dominates. It can thus produce the illusion of knowledge if we confuse the fields as happens too often. Ch. Jaquet highlights the shadows in the picture (p. 128 ff.). We must therefore submit the imagination to reason in the field of philosophy, where real progress remains to be made.
The possibility of knowledge: philosophy
The promotion of knowledge only makes sense if knowledge is actually possible. This is Bacon’s second task – both more important and more problematic, and which is undoubtedly the most commented on. In NLPBacon only directly attacks the theological critiques of libido sciendi. It shows on the one hand that the Bible does not condemn knowledge and above all it proposes a new articulation between theology and philosophy, demonstrating their reciprocal limits. If philosophy must be freed from theological supervision, it can play a role in opening people to religious reflection or in preparing them for faith. There is neither antinomy nor total separation of domains (p. 252 ff.). Bacon’s philosophical project is part of a form of religious teaching: the philosopher in the service of humanity illustrates the spirit of charity ; and a use of reason in sacred matters, of illustration or deduction of moral directive, is possible. Besides this distinction, there is the whole work of reforming the understanding. In this regard, C. Jaquet necessarily emancipates himself from NLP. Without the author’s position itself being banal, it is a more classic place of commentary, which the end of the work takes up (p. 258-288), to interpret the Baconian reform as purification of the mind, based on a detailed analysis of the idols that besiege the mind and the strategies that Bacon opposes to them.
THE desiderata from the Baconian commentary
The interpretation of the promotion of knowledge proposed by C. Jaquet is convincing. But she never fails to raise questions – which we hope her work will be an invitation to resolve. It is undoubtedly not the least of the merits of a work on Bacon to also show – in accordance with what Bacon wishes for the sciences – what are the desiderata of Baconian commentary.
The first point concerns the evolution of Bacon. Ch. Jaquet mentions the differences between NLP And D.A.and she accounts for it. But it is sometimes difficult to grasp the place of Novum Organum (NO) between the two. Although it is closer chronologically to D.A. than NLPCh. Jaquet sometimes uses it as if it provided an obvious reading key for the two works. There is no doubt that she is attentive to the place of NO in the evolution of Bacon, as shown by the analysis of the notion of logic. But this work remains to be done. Likewise, Bacon chose not to publish some of his works, such as the Challenge to Philosophical Doctrines Or The virile production of the century. He makes strategic choices that he does not validate. Therefore the question remains: is this variation in the promotion of knowledge something other than a rhetorical variation, or does it hide more substantial modifications? ? The analysis of imagination proposed by Ch. Jaquet invites us to be wary of the response which would like to stick to rhetorical variation. Playing on imagination and belief cannot be without consequences on the conception we have of knowledge itself.
The second point of embarrassment is systematic. Bacon’s position poses the problem of the beginning – which Ch. Jaquet lucidly poses (p. 199). In this regard, his position is justifiable, but problematic. She concludes: “ understanding needs less reform than training. It is only restored by establishing itself, that is to say by carrying out its work of interpretation. This is why the Baconian project presents itself as a great establishment of science (Instauratio magna) and not as a restoration. Against constantly recurring error, invention is in short the best prevention » (p. 288). But this does not resolve the question: what if the understanding was incapable of inventing ? This creates a tension in Ch. Jaquet’s position, since she also admits that “ inductive history is the remedy for the anticipations of the understanding, because it allows it to gradually rise from the particular towards the axioms » (pp. 52-53). Now this inductive story is “ pre-philosophical ”, below interpretation: this is therefore not the only remedy – and understanding can be established before interpreting. In Ch. Jaquet’s defense, it must be admitted that Bacon’s position is undoubtedly ambiguous. By his radical position, Ch. Jaquet forces us to clearly pose the problem. And thus poses the need to resolve it. This necessity is all the more pressing since Ch. Jaquet rightly recalls Bacon’s inscription in his time – whether it is a question of relating his conception of history to Machiavelli (p. 75-76), of recall the proximity of Bacon and chemistry (p. 175), or even bring Bacon and Télésio together (p. 186), as if everything was not to be rejected in what presents itself as knowledge before Bacon. It could therefore be that for Bacon, we must begin: understanding will strengthen as it progresses. This is at least what the analysis of literate (or ordered) experience suggests, which Ch. Jaquet says is, along with interpretation, one of the pillars of invention (p. 192).
The promotion of knowledge is first and foremost the promise of possible progress. But we must emphasize the indeterminacy necessary in Bacon’s eyes for this progress. It is not possible to say what it will be precisely. Bacon points out directions ; it provides a map that should allow others to navigate. Research is like navigation on little-known or even unknown seas – this is certainly the final meaning of Bacon’s marine philosophy (p. 8). Bacon provides a compass so you don’t get lost. This does not mean that we know where we are going. And above all, this means that no one has the right to demand to know a priori where we are going. Promoting knowledge, in a final sense, therefore ultimately means ensuring its autonomy within appropriate institutions. This is the only real regret we have after reading the book. In NLPBacon addresses the king, and demands a reform of scholarly institutions as a condition of progress. And even if she clearly sees that there are lessons to be learned from history from this point of view – lessons that Bacon draws for his part – Ch. Jaquet passes over this aspect of Bacon’s reflection in silence. However, it is fundamental. The autonomy of science is not only a matter of theoretical freedom ; or rather, explains Bacon, theoretical freedom only has meaning if it is practically founded. The promotion of knowledge is also a matter of politics.