Employer organizations are less well known than employee unions. However, the question of their representativeness, their functioning and their influence arises with just as much force. It is therefore fortunate that a sociologist is finally investigating with precision behind the scenes of MEDEFin order to share a journey full of surprises.
The millions of businesses in France are run by business leaders. They are represented within employers’ organizations. The principal of these organizations is the MEDEF. This name, given in 1998, means French business movement. It has thus replaced for fifteen years the acronym of CNPFevoking too much “ employer “.
At the moment when Laurence Parisot cedes the presidency to Pierre Gattaz, after eight years in office, it is interesting to take stock of the issues but also of the functioning of this organization. What is internal cohesion ? Is there consistency of action ? What is the exact weight, facing the State and employee unions? ?
With such decisive questions, one can only be surprised by the scarcity of work on the subject. After a socialist senator for ancient history (Henri Weber, 1986) and a talented journalist for recent history (Guillaume Delacroix, 2009), it is therefore fortunate that a classical academic has investigated, for several years, encountering almost around a hundred people, often at the highest level of the organization.
Journey to the land of bosses
The introduction shows how a sociologist manages to successfully approach bosses. Michel Offerlé investigates with meticulousness and neutrality. To the astonishment of his colleagues, he quotes Mao (p 21): assuming that the business manager is a “ enemy “, it is appropriate to “ to know “. Here we find accents of Henri Weber.
The first chapter traces recent history (1998-2013). It thus extends the already very detailed story of Guillaume Delacroix which ended in 2009, towards the end of the first Parisot mandate, after the Seillière-Kessler period.
Chapter two is one of the high points of the book. THE MEDEF is first positioned within the employers’ space where it certainly occupies a central place but where it coexists with the CGPME (small businesses),UPA (artisans), theUNAPL (liberal professions), even the FNSEA (farmers). Relations with very large companies, also united within theAFEPare also mentioned. The confederal structure which crosses professional branches and territories is then presented. All of this finally leads to the key question of representativeness. If all the companies in a branch are not federated and if all the branches of the economy are not confederated to the MEDEFwhat is the exact representativeness of the latter ? While quantifying this with maximum precision, the author recalls that in France, the real question is that of representation, beyond representativeness. Ultimately, the number of members or their locations almost does not matter. Once a sector agreement is signed, it concerns all companies in the profession. Once a national inter-professional agreement is adopted, it extends to all companies in the country. The same can also be said for employee unions.
Chapters three and four present the base and then the top of an organization that, in fact, functions along these lines. In fact, it is the companies that delegate representatives within the branches or territories. Then, it is the elected representatives of the branches and territories who designate the representatives of the central authorities. In this regard, the president has nothing of the “ boss of bosses “. It is rather the latter who appointed him, for a five-year mandate, extendable for three years. That being said, Michel Offerlé questions the trajectories of elected officials but also permanent staff and the reasons for joining the movement for a grassroots business leader. It shows that utilitarian motivations are strong, for example having services (such as tax or social law advice). But the member also seeks sociability, notability, even a commitment to principle. As for the power of the summit, it seems particularly dependent on the weight of funding. To the point that the whole thing ends with the question: “ Who pays decides ? » We are witnessing in particular a rebalancing between branches: the weight of industry is now caught up and exceeded by that of services. In this regard, the rivalries between theUIMM and the GPS are a reflection of this underlying trend. We should take into account the multiple portraits and testimonies that punctuate the demonstration.
The fifth and final chapter addresses the question of the external influence of MEDEF. The author comes from political sociology, in particular through the analysis of the collective action of interest groups. He had already applied this reading grid to MEDEF in a previous work. We then see how internal compromises are convertible into external influence. This ranges from economic to social areas: from action towards Bercy in terms of taxation to negotiations between social partners with employee unions.
Representativeness of social partners in France
All important questions are asked. The work thus proves essential, especially as it is based on an abundance of data, both quantitative and qualitative. You have to see Ernest-Antoine Seillière compare himself to a Margaret Thatcher of the bosses… and then designate Laurence Parisot as a Tony Blair who must continue, by softening ! Or a Georges Drouin defending the services from his Western territory, etc.
The author is the first to mention the incomplete nature of certain data as well as the limited nature of certain responses. So he calls for other work, which he is in the process of initiating. From this perspective, some avenues seem interesting.
Regarding the culture shock experienced by certain business leaders when they move from the management of their company to the responsibilities of elected employer representatives, it would be appropriate to cross-reference this with different corporate structures. A boss of SMEs or a manager of a centralized multinational certainly has a greater shock when arriving at the head of a confederation than a mutual insurer, the boss of large-scale distribution or the manager of a family conglomerate. By their structures, the latter are more obliged to consult the base and to bring together various entities.
As for the very utilitarian reasons for becoming a contributor, they are undeniable. At the same time, the author happily uses grids from the sociology of commitment, usually applied to political, union and association activists. Perhaps we need to explore this avenue further. There is an analysis of: “ The spirit of Medefian capitalism » (p 284 ff.), from the book Need for air from 2007. It emerges that there has been a constant in the doctrine for decades: defense of free enterprise in a (social) market economy. But there are also internal divisions between liberal, social, statist, globalist bosses… There are also “ the indignation » (Seillière talks about it before Hessel, but he is against the 35 hours). In short, there are certainly interests but also passions and principles. As a result, there is also a desire to share these principles, including with circles known to be suspicious: journalists, teachers, artists, magistrates, etc.
On links with the State, the author places little emphasis on the differences between periods where left or right majorities alternated in France. We can think that business leaders and their elected officials MEDEF do not have the same view on Martine Aubry or Jean-Pierre Raffarin. Likewise, the comparison with employee unions ends too quickly, even though we have seen how fruitful it proves to be in analyzing grassroots motivations. However, it seems that the CGT or the CFDT have exactly the same confederal structures as the MEDEFwith branches and territories. As a result, these confederations experience similar internal tensions. Moreover, the problem of representativeness arises in the same terms. Again, it is not necessary for each employee to be a member of a union so that everyone is then affected by the agreements that are signed. The big difference is rather that the contribution comes from the employee’s wallet for joining a union, whereas it comes from the company coffers when the company manager joins one or more employers’ organizations. Beyond that, it would be interesting to develop the study of jointism, where union and employer organizations jointly manage, under the control of the State, the social protection system (sickness, unemployment, retirement), even in its occupational health aspects. , professional training, etc.
Ultimately, it would then be possible to link this lobby organization analyzed in the work to more traditional considerations on economic and social regulation in France, very marked by a three-way game between State, employers and unions. In this regard, the journey behind the scenes of MEDEF that Michel Offerlé shares with the reader provides essential light. In particular, it sheds more internal light on the conditions in which the major law of August 20, 2008 on the representativeness of social partners was prepared. But, with the arrival of new leaders, both in government and at the head of large trade union centers or the MEDEFthe rest of the story is already being written.