China is neither unfit for democracy, nor predisposed by its failed traditions to political liberalism. It is to dismiss these two simplifying speeches that this work bringing together the greatest specialists in political China is consecrated.
It was in the 1990s that a questioning values emerged on the Asian continent emerged on the foundation of human rights. It is not human rights or the democratic regime in themselves that are rejected, but the Western claim to impose them as judgment criteria, by denying other cultures any possibility of discussing or adapting them. The rapid development of a good number of Asian savings (Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong) has greatly encouraged this cultural relativism. Castigating western individualist and competitive trends, the theory of “ Asian values »Partly attributes to solidarity, team spirit, respect for family and hierarchy and work at work, the success of these countries permeated by Confucianism. The articles gathered in China and democracy By Mireille Delmas-Marty and Pierre-Etienne Will submit to the analysis, from a new perspective, the discourse attributing to Confucianism and traditional Chinese institutions of the almost democratic virtues erected as a model for the West. It is with the same irritation that they wonder about the supposed incompatibility of the “ tradition »Chinese policy with the values and practices of modern democratic liberalism offered as an example to China for more than a century.
The authors preferred to forecasts on the future of the People’s Republic of China a “ Historical inventory that is both critical and open of both public and civil institutions, practices, debates of ideas and experiences likely to influence China in one way or another with the different forms of political modernity, or to assess the repertoire of ‘political resources inherent in Chinese society’ (P. 30). This investigation leads to the observation that, if a democratic system is inseparable from a form of rule of law, the reciprocal is not necessarily proven. However, political changes are now accompanied by numerous legal reforms, which, although notoriously instrumentalized for the end of the political regime, undeniably produce “ system effects »Marked by a certain increasing empowerment of lawyers and the appearance in the Chinese population of a kind of legal conscience (Stéphanie Balme). The internationalization of law intensifies these system effects, but their political impact is not easily predictable insofar as the consequences of globalization fuel the debate on the limits of democracy and thus strengthen Chinese skepticism in the face of “ model Liberal democratic. Indeed, legal globalization, marked by the constitution of virtual spaces without borders, accentuates the current crisis of democracy and the rule of law. This crisis of Western democracies is caused by the appearance of a form of participatory democracy, the destabilizing power given to the constitutional judges to censor the law passed by the Parliament and the progressive extension of the system “ exceptional Reinforcing the executive power in the fight against global terrorism. Mireille Delmas-Marty thus describes the whole “ paradox Globalization: it promotes democratic openness while aggravating the crisis of the rule of law, which has repercussions in the Chinese debate on the relevance of a democratic reform.
This thoughtful reassessment of the Chinese traditions leads to the conclusion that in -depth knowledge of Chinese law excludes the idea, which is quite widespread that Chinese thinking is deeply foreign to the very notion of law. On the contrary, Jérôme Bourgon wonders if the principle of legality of crimes and penalties – a principle formulated by Beccaria according to which no crime is punishable if it has not been defined and if the penalty it causes has not been expressly provided for by a written law – is not a Chinese invention and does not testify to a real legal science. The advertising of laws, the predictability of sanctions, the control of judicial decisions were in fact rather better assured in the Chinese legal system than in its equivalents of the old European regime. However, the notion of renzhi (government by men) – opposed to fazhi (Government by law)-constitutes a risk of authoritarian deviation since it is reflected in the idea that there are principles above the laws. In addition, the powers are not separated in the Chinese tradition, the legal is not independent: the moral values and the ethics of the leaders take precedence over the laws.
These analyzes also lead to the conclusion that, if the “ germs “Of the democracy claimed by the” new contemporary Confutens In the end are quite difficult to identify in the Chinese tradition (Anne Cheng), China can however take advantage, according to Pierre-Etienne Will, of a democratic past. THE Mencius or the Document book developed, more than two thousand years ago, the notion of the primacy of the people in relation to the sovereign. The people were conceived there as the “ foundation of the nation “(guoben Or Bangben), “ The most precious “(Min Wei Gui), having the right to rebel against a sovereign unworthy of his mission. Under the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644), some literate-functionaries dare to speak and once again affirm these principles in the context of a critical reflection on autocracy. They abundantly evoke the theory of the two sovereignties – that of the prince and that of the people, master of the master of men. According to Pierre-Etienne Will, there was a certain legal control of the acts of the State or the sovereign, whose duties prevail over the rights, which constitutes the draft of a system or even a constitutional control. It is the explanation of this controversy, accompanied by open opposition demonstrations, which makes this moment, at the end of the Ming, unique. The Manchu regime of Qing, more disciplined and poorly tolerant of criticism, later in fact a scarecrow: this open debate would have caused the disorders behind the fall of the Ming.
At XXe century, the Chinese history of democracy has accumulated disenchantments. Democracy is primarily associated with modernization: to strengthen its power, China must get rid of its cultural heritage, especially confugee, made responsible for its reaches, and import from the West Science and Democratic Institutions. But democracy then becomes in the discourse of power, but also in that of dissent, alternately “ servant, scarecrow or goddess (Michel Bonnin). Yves Chevrier and Xiaohong Xiao-Planes analyze with precision the meanders of the institutional transformation of the State of the “ first XXe century (1895-1949). After the failure of the hundred days (September 21, 1898), of parliamentary democracy in 1913, of the movement of May 4, 1919 and the victory of the authoritarian state of Guomindang, MAO instrumentalizes the notion of democracy and the “ throw after use ». The cultural revolution, a period of anarchic chaos and violence deemed more “ fascist That democratic, serves as a negative model so that the concept of democracy spontaneously reappears among young intellectuals during the 1970s with those of law or legality. But, in the 1980s, the foreign goddess became a scarecrow assimilated to anarchy and the disorders linked to the “ Great democracy »Maoist of the cultural revolution. This assimilation becomes a leitmotif of official propaganda. It is still so today: the resetting of the people and the economy, according to the leaders, imposes for the moment a more suitable system than democracy. Paradoxically, the democratic system remains the ideal horizon to be achieved, and the current constitution is, in theory, democratic. So much so that Michel Bonnin urges Chinese rulers to move from discourse to reality. Indeed, the theory is always disconnected from the real functioning of the country. The political office of the central committee, which is not mentioned anywhere in the Constitution, directs China. The state is weak because it is devoured by the party, which is completely incompatible with modernization and commodification. “” The obvious development of corruption, the private appropriation of state property by simple administrative decision, as well as the fracture between the beneficiaries of the reforms and the left-handed create risks of burst that only a political reform could mitigate (P. 515).
In addition, Chinese society is increasingly independent. The popularization and education campaign intended to create a society governed by law has certainly contributed to the development of a civic conscience without which any democracy is impossible. However, we can be concerned about a lack of actors, in particular due to the depoliticization of certain intellectuals who focus on their research and new technocratic experts who remain state as well as the efficiency of democratization to ensure the continuity of economic development and guarantee social peace has not been proven. However, the lukewarm reforms are proven to be insufficient for the moment to harmonize the relationships between the different social strata, and the instability increases. New leaders no longer benefit from the revolutionary or charismatic legitimacy of previous leaders. They are judged on their results, which is more and more difficult in the context of the rapid development of disturbing social tensions and a civic conscience. “” China is therefore condemned to democratize “, According to Zhang Mon, even if the process promises to be difficult (p. 517). The democratic transition could be progressive: the party would not have zero to initiate a deep political reform. He “ would be enough “That the elections to the Popular National Assembly and to the provincial assemblies become” real »Elections and that direct elections are no longer limited at the lowest level.
It remains to be seen whether this is possible in the short term. The party seems to have been able to save time. He was able to strengthen his power in the countryside thanks to a more transparent recruitment of his executives: the local elections, even filtered by the party, are perceived by the population as fairer. They are also deemed more democratic. Thus, these local elections, certainly apparently manipulative, nevertheless lead to the improvement of social stability, administrative efficiency and political legitimacy of the party. The introduction of democratic elements, even limited, could therefore lead to a “ Chinese Democracy with single party “(Gunter Schubert) corresponding to” dose of “ democracy “Which China needs to balance the divergent interests of the company and the party in terms of participation and control (P. 732).
What emerges from the volume is that it is currently impossible to predict the precise evolution of the democratization of the Chinese regime triggered by the reforms. These articles nevertheless make it possible to disentangle the complexity of speeches and the history of the democratization of China in order to draw up an inventory of possibilities. We cannot simplify the situation by saying that Chinese democracy and tradition are incompatible, or on the contrary promise a democratic destiny to China. The most likely scenario, according to Mireille Delmas-Marty, is undoubtedly democratization by the “ Legal fertilization of the political field (P. 811).