Serge Audier has undertaken to rewrite and rehabilitate the history of neo-liberalism but this essential task cannot be limited to showing what neo-liberalism was not. Because it has become a historical phenomenon well beyond its philosophical scope.
Serge Audier has established himself as one of the most important French political genealogists. His method is simple: it consists of taking an idea or a concept and studying its philosophical coherence, its origins, and the networks that surround it. Either the concept he chooses is defined historically – this was the case with his work on liberal socialism, the “ solidarity » and French republicanism ; or he himself defines a general theme – as in his work Anti-68 Thought (2008), in which he wanted to bring together a wide range of contemporary French political discourses and show the extent to which they were structured around a rejection of 1968. Whatever the concept chosen, his works are generally based on a careful analysis archives and pay particular attention to the various meanings of a concept, the objective being to disentangle myth and reality.
This method is widely used in his new work, Neoliberalism(s): an intellectual archeology. Based on previous work on the Walter Lippmann Colloquium, Audier undertakes a systematic questioning of a set of preconceived ideas on the definition of neo-liberalism and its origins. It focuses primarily on the period 1930-60 and on the relationships between a number of key figures of mid-century (neo-)liberalism. XXe century, the best known of which are Friedrich Hayek, Ludwig von Mises, Wilhelm Röpke, Raymond Aron and Milton Friedman. Beyond these recognized actors, it also contributes to making known a whole group of philosophers, economists, intellectuals and political theorists who gravitated around the Walter Lippmann Colloquium in the 1930s and the Mont Pèlerin Society after the Second World War.
In search of neo-liberalism
This is where Audier shines the most. Apart from a tendency to multiply mini-biographies, the two long chapters which he devotes to the networks which linked these main actors of liberalism clearly demonstrate the fragmentation of European and American liberalism in the face of the great tragedies of the time. Some were tempted by authoritarianism, which first appeared in the form of fascism, then the military dictatorship of Pinochet, while others set out in search of a “ liberal revolution » by denouncing Roosevelt’s New Deal or post-war Keynesianism. Even as neoliberalism triumphed in the 1970s, its main protagonists still could not agree: should we advocate a conservative restoration or a market-based individualism ? The celebration of the minimal state in the 1980s was attractive, but neither Thatcher nor Reagan really succeeded in “ push back state borders », to use the famous phrase of the British Prime Minister. Thus, the golden age of neoliberalism appears just as confused as its hesitant beginnings in the 1930s.
Following Audier, it is therefore absurd to claim that a harmful, well-defined ideology called “ neoliberalism » revealed itself in the 1930s and finally flourished in the 1970s. This erroneous logic would have penetrated the writings, among others, of Serge Halimi, Noam Chomsky, François Denord and especially Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval. They are accused of grossly simplifying the concept of “ neoliberalism “, and to construct a dubious teleology linking the Walter Lippmann Colloquium to the financial crisis of 2007-2008 via American neo-imperialism and the dismantling of “ social Europe “. The instrumentalization by these authors of the neo-liberal term would have led to a mass of falsifications, simplifications and chronological distortions which ignore the complexity of the commitment “ liberal ” At XXe century. Thus, it is wrong to consider the work of a Hayek or an Aron simply as an ideological toolbox necessary for neo-liberalism and it is dangerous to make amalgamations between the Mont Pèlerin Society and the rise of capitalism. “ savage ” At XXIe century.
We better understand this frustration with these critiques of neo-liberalism if we situate them within contemporary French politics. As many historians have pointed out, France fiercely resisted liberalism throughout the XXe century. Even the French revival of neo-liberalism from the late 1970s was severely constrained by the Gaullist legacy and the durability of Marxism. The authors targeted by Audier took advantage of this situation by extending a critique of liberalism which has long been an essential element of contemporary French political thought. Using Bourdieu, Foucault or the alter-globalization movement as intellectual alibis, they track down the elements “ ashamed » of the history of neo-liberalism and find a favorable echo, particularly among the French public sector, which is known for its hostility towards the influence of “ Anglo-Saxon liberalism “. In this context, we better understand the importance of Audier’s nuanced account. It shows without doubt that the history of “ neoliberalism » is not linear and that its ideologues were not all – far from it ! – champions of socio-economic inequality.
Towards a history of neo-liberalism ?
We therefore appreciate this rethinking but it is not enough to reconstruct the full meaning of this highly politicized term “ neoliberalism “. Indeed, although Audier is right to reject the Marxist theories that abound on the subject of neo-liberalism, is it really necessary to also reject all the conceptual questions raised by his critics? ? This is what is least convincing in Neoliberalism(s)in particular for the historian who seeks to understand the diffusion of supposedly neo-liberal ideas from the 1970s. The notion of “ rationality » neo-liberalism, for example, is dismissed by Audier on the pretext that it screens the complex history of neo-liberalism in XXe century. Certainly ; but this notion does not automatically mean a “ hegemony » underground or Foucauldian. It is also located in history. In Europe, it emerged at a time when the Christian democratic consensus was running out of steam after the Second World War and it was fueled by the social movements of the 1960s and the anti-totalitarian thinking that prevailed in Europe. We could even see in this news “ rationality » the return of a « merchant class », whose legitimacy was shattered by the Crisis of the 1930s, but which found its second wind at the moment when the post-war technocratic State encountered new resistance in the 1970s. It is this new generation, a curious assemblage of individualist ex-sixty-eighters, brilliant politicians and business gurus, who enthusiastically embrace neo-liberalism and transform it into a global political philosophy.
Just like the contemporary accusers of neo-liberalism on whom Audier unleashes his anger, this generation distorts or misunderstands neo-liberalism. However, this does not invalidate their reading. On the contrary, these errors of interpretation are as much a part of the archeology of neo-liberalism as the differences of opinion between its founding fathers. By insisting on its purely philosophical and doctrinal aspect, Audier neglects the role played by global hostility towards “ Thirty Glorious Years » statist in the neo-liberal renaissance of the 1970s in Europe and the United States. In order to better understand the “ neoliberal temptation » of this decade more importance should have been given to the impact of the ideas of Hayek or Friedman. This would have made it possible to show that, despite their diversity, the vast majority of “ neo-liberals » shared a real skepticism towards the state and a great hostility towards communism, which largely contributed to their success.
It also seems to me that Audier pays too little attention to some of the key concepts that have come to dominate our vision of neo-liberalism. The idea of “ walk », which – whatever one thinks – has become one of the most striking attributes of neo-liberalism, is a good illustration of this. Audier rightly points out that a large number of those who were later labeled as neo-liberals were in reality extremely hostile to a market reduced to a “ invisible hand » self-regulating. This vision of “ walk » has, however, become the cause celebre of an entire generation of American decision-makers, academics and politicians in the 1980s and 1990s. To understand this, one must follow a method like that of the historian Daniel Rodgers, which describes the circulation of ideas beyond the limited circle of the Mont Pèlerin Society. We then see that the “ walk » neo-liberal is not only the invention of the anti-liberal polemic in XXIe century ; he also contributed to the reconceptualization of the social and economic relations of an entire generation of European and American elites during the last decades of the XXe century.
Despite its pretensions, this work is defined more as a meticulous dissection of the life of a small group of mid-century liberals. XXe century than as a historical analysis of neo-liberalism. Audier brilliantly depicts the passionate disagreements between the greatest liberal minds of Europe and America. He carefully studies the networks that brought them together. It even offers a broad synthesis of contemporary research on liberalism, with a bibliography in several languages. However, as the story moves into the 1970s – the moment when the neo-liberal movement became dominant – it is overwhelmed by its subject. The author describes the sometimes close relationships between neo-liberalism, neo-conservatism and religious theo-conservatism, but this is not enough to decipher the transformation of a hitherto fragmented neo-liberal ideology. It is difficult to understand how it managed to constitute a coherent ideology and why its principles and hypotheses attracted so many influential actors at the end of the XXe century. Audier’s stimulating analysis then rather represents a “ prehistory » of neo-liberalism that a “ archeology “. A complete history of neoliberalism remains to be written.
Translated from English by Emilie Frenkiel.