Putin Seeks to Dismantle Europe’s Security Architecture

During last week’s Abu Dhabi talks, one of Russia’s stipulations was for NATO to revert to its 1997 borders — a demand Moscow had already voiced in 2021. What does that reveal about how Russia views these negotiations?

The fact that the Russians have returned to ultimatums previously presented to NATO and the United States in December 2021 is not surprising. It was entirely predictable that they would act in this way, because their strategic objectives have not changed, neither toward Ukraine nor toward Europe, nor toward the United States’ role in European security. Seeing Moscow reframe these ultimatums as proposals within the ongoing talks signals that they feel they are in a position of strength.

It should come as no surprise that Estonia rejects such ultimatums, since NATO had already dismissed any discussion of returning to the 1997 borders as early as 2021. Therefore, there will be no change in this regard, nor any revision to NATO’s open-door policy.

How do you explain that Russia feels empowered despite only modest progress on substance and a heavy human toll?

Clearly, the Russians perceive that their indiscriminate bombardment campaign against Ukraine’s civilian and energy infrastructure is currently paying off. This stems from the fact that Ukraine does not receive enough anti-ballistic missiles and air-defense capabilities to shield itself from these threats.

But when you closely examine the front, you see that the Russian military is suffering unprecedented losses — up to 3,000 personnel per day — and Kyiv is reclaiming more territory than Moscow is gaining. Militarily, Russia is not advancing; in fact, it is retreating. Yet it leverages its massive strikes, which badly damage Ukraine’s network, and it uses the diplomatic talks to advance its interests.

How can negotiations proceed given these maximalist demands?

That Russia continues the war, rejects any ceasefire, and thus withholds the first sign of goodwill also reveals its current strategy. It shows they do not take these talks seriously and are trying to impose their views by force to achieve hostile aims.

Let us recall that Europeans have already dismissed these ultimatums. These proposals were sidelined in 2021, and they have not gained legitimacy over the past five years.

What matters most to Estonia in the current negotiations?

Sequencing is evidently crucial here. The first step demonstrating Russia’s seriousness would be a cessation of hostilities along the entire front. We have seen a few minor moves forward on prisoner exchanges, but Moscow’s refusal to start with a truce before addressing, perhaps, guarantees or the security architecture shows that the Kremlin is not genuinely engaged in these discussions for the moment.

For us, the foundational principles of European security remain unchanged and should underpin these negotiations, beginning with each nation’s right to determine its own alliances. No one should be forced into a choice by others, especially not by those waging war against them. Several other consequences flow from this. What matters now is whether and when Russia would accept stopping the fighting as a prerequisite, and then proceed.

Unlike previous cycles, Europe should sit at the negotiating table for the next rounds. Is Estonia satisfied with the composition of the European delegation?

What matters most to us is that nothing about Ukraine is discussed without Ukraine, and nothing about European security can be decided without Europeans.

The joint position matters a great deal as well. When we speak of the European Union, with its 27 member states, there is the High Representative, the President, the Commission, and a whole host of institutions, people, and countries, and Russia publicly ridicules that structure. But we are democratic nations, and that is how the Union is built.

When you look at what is actually happening on the front, you see the Russian army suffering unprecedented losses — up to 3,000 personnel per day — and Kyiv is reclaiming more territory than Moscow is taking.

Kristjan Mäe

What matters most is that we adhere to the lines agreed collectively, which currently sustain the cohesion of the Twenty-Seven and the continent’s security architecture. And we know precisely who the aggressor in this war is, and who the victim is. It is also essential — and the Ukrainians have been very clear on this — that the United States is also part of the effort. What matters most for Estonia is a united stance of support for Ukraine, in the spirit of transatlantic relations.

Are the United States still a partner?

The United States remains an ally of Estonia, of Europe. They continue to play a significant role in European security, that is evident.

How do you foresee Europe’s relationship with Russia once the war ends?

Estonia is firmly committed to a just peace. It is clear that Ukraine bears the heaviest burden and is the primary force opposing Russia. The outcome of the war and the negotiations, whether an agreement is reached or not, will shape the nature of any future ties with Moscow. If peace — or a freeze in the conflict — comes on Russian terms, European security would be at stake, because the Kremlin has made it clear: this war concerns more than Ukraine.

Even the ongoing negotiations show that Russia’s objectives go well beyond Ukraine. The Russians want to renegotiate the entire system — and not merely discuss it: they intend to dismantle the existing architecture and restore spheres of influence. This has been their aim since 1939, and this is simply the continuation of that strategy. The outcome of the conflict will thus also determine Europe’s future relations with Russia.

Are Europeans fully aware that Russia’s ambitions extend beyond Ukraine?

I would say that European awareness of Russia’s aims and the threat it poses is at its highest level since the end of the Cold War. Yet some countries have encountered it, learned to understand it, and must continually strive to comprehend it.

The key is not to let the Russians trap us. The first trap is the one we discussed: they present themselves as if they hold the advantage, as if they are achieving military successes on the front, which would imply we must accept whatever they impose. No. We hold the reins of European security. What matters is the scale of military and financial aid we’re prepared to provide Ukraine, and that depends only on us. If we affirm that the values underpinning our daily prosperity matter to us, then everything we are doing now to support Kyiv will cost far less than the consequences of a peace concluded on Moscow’s terms.

Would a compromise whereby Ukraine would join NATO but withdraw from Donbass be acceptable to you?

That kind of decision is for Ukraine to make. What we Europeans must do is ensure it has options — military, diplomatic, and economic — because it is the one defending Europe against Russian aggression today. For some time now there has been talk across the continent about negotiating with Russia from a position of strength. That precisely means providing Kyiv with sufficient support in all three areas, thereby giving it room to maneuver.

We cannot judge or criticize the choices Ukrainians will ultimately make, since it is their country that is at war. They understand the situation better than anyone: they know in detail the costs of the conflict and the options available to them. We should therefore focus on that, as well as on our governments’ stance regarding Ukraine’s accession to NATO or the European Union.

On this point, Estonia strongly supports both. That is the message we must credibly convey; then it will be up to Kyiv to decide on the various aspects of these negotiations. Our role is to create the most favorable conditions for the Ukrainians to make the best decisions.

Could upcoming elections in several European countries, including France, influence the war’s course or Europe’s relations with Russia?

First, elections are a normal and welcome feature of democracy. It is always a positive thing. Estonia itself is preparing for a spring vote as well. It is difficult to say to what extent these electoral milestones will influence Europe’s overall support for Ukraine.

What matters here is that, regardless of the outcome of its ballots, my country will remain a steadfast defender of Kyiv and will urge all Europeans to do likewise. A vote brings in new people, new ideas, and new energy. I won’t speculate further; I’ll simply say that, for Estonia, Ukraine’s future matters.

What is your view on the meeting this week between Trump, Xi, and Putin?

I think this meeting is one of a kind in both its timing and its venue. It is up to the leaders of those nations to decide whether to meet, and we will soon learn what they have agreed upon.

Russia intends to dismantle the existing architecture and restore spheres of influence.

Kristjan Mäe

Nevertheless, the United States will remain an ally for Europeans. Russia certainly is not, and China’s role in backing Moscow in its aggression against Ukraine is evident. We will thus await the summit’s outcome and, of course, ask our American colleagues how it unfolded.

Has Europe gone far enough in defense cooperation since 2022, and even more so since Donald Trump returned to the White House?

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has dramatically altered how Europe perceives the Russian threat, whether military or otherwise. Differences persist, as they always have on our continent — geography and history matter. All of that is understandable.

This shift in perspective has also shown up in budgets. Most European countries have already substantially increased defense spending, whether in absolute terms, as a share of GDP, or both. In this regard, Estonia, the other Baltic states, and Poland are leading the way by dedicating at least 5% of their GDP to defense. Several allies have committed to reaching 3.5% and have accelerated that trajectory.

Europeans must assume greater responsibility for their own security, and two major, positive developments are evident: a more widely shared understanding of the danger and a rise in military investments.

Are these investments sufficient?

Differences in threat perception persist, as do disparities in defense spending. We have clearly seen that insufficient investment in this area has contributed to gaps in Europe’s defense-industrial base. You can only obtain what you put into it. You can be effective up to a point, but if you don’t invest enough and fail to create the production you need, you won’t cultivate the competition the defense industry requires.

This vicious circle — limited defense spending, where large contractors swallow most of the funding and set prices and delivery schedules — helps explain why European defense capabilities aren’t advancing quickly enough.

Developing them takes time: elections come, changes occur, and momentum can waver in a field where such fluctuations cannot be afforded. There’s also an ongoing debate about which came first — the egg or the chicken. Governments tell industry: “Take more risks, you’re entrepreneurs. If you invest, the money will follow.” And they reply: “Show us the money, show us your commitment, guarantee long-term investment, and then we’ll be willing to take risks.” That is the vicious circle we’re trapped in, and readiness suffers as a result.

Finally, at the EU level, there has been much talk of joint projects or flagship initiatives. Yet it emerges that a handful of large member states control the lion’s share of the market. We can repeat in political discourse that we have too many models of battle tanks, frigates, or aircraft configurations, but there are almost no proven successes in this area. Regardless of the intensity of talks with the Baltic states, the Nordic countries, or Central Europe, this dynamic is likely not to change.

What, today, is the biggest obstacle to breaking free from this vicious circle?

Small and medium-sized enterprises — including French ones — feel, even at the national level, that they cannot compete with the big contractors. In terms of scale and production, many players are already well established, and subsidies for R&D and innovation do not suffice. If we do not support them, we simply feed the very problem we set out to solve. We must break this cycle by opening the market, which is very difficult within a single country where some groups have an inherent advantage; it is at the European level that action is required.

Estonia fully supports a strong European defense-industrial base, but protectionist measures would merely consolidate the giants’ grip on the majority of the market. Our economic policy has always been to encourage innovation, risk-taking, and entrepreneurship, and to avoid state regulations that dampen competition.

Competition is therefore the key. Europe’s defense market must be globally competitive; if it remains fragmented without integration, that would pose a huge problem. It will only become so if companies can also compare themselves within Europe. The continent’s industry should not end up producing more expensive and lower-quality products in the long run. What we want is outstanding gear, delivered as quickly as possible, at a reasonable price, and nothing else will achieve that.

What are these excessive regulations you mention?

Take, for example, the European SAFE fund (Security Action for Europe). The administrative burden it imposes on our defense ministry is excessive. The requirements, the sheer amount of paperwork to qualify and to verify that funds were used properly, have reached a point where one might want to avoid this type of financing. Borrowing directly from a bank may be more costly for a government, but the indirect costs tied to EU bureaucracy pose numerous challenges, especially for a small country.

Is Europe’s defense industry hampered more by excessive regulation and a lack of competition than by insufficient coordination and integration?

Integration is a challenge every country faces. History has shown that only war tends to forge real unity in effort, with a division of labor like: “Your sector focuses on this category, yours on that one.” It sounds straightforward on paper, but a look at some naval programs, the main battle tank project, or the Future Air Combat System (Scaf) shows that even when two or three states pursue a joint project, it can fail. Each country continues to defend its own industry.

That makes perfect sense, because it is a source of prosperity. But one must be able to say: “We are not competitive in this field.” That can be a government decision, as if telling an entrepreneur: “Do what you want, but if you’re not up to it, I’ll turn to another European country.” If we do not decisively move beyond this step and instead continue to prop up existing domestic companies, we feed the very problem we are trying to solve.

The continent’s industry should not end up with a more expensive and lower-quality product. What we want is excellent equipment, delivered as quickly as possible, at a reasonable price.

Kristjan Mäe

That is why competition matters. It happens that some companies fail, and we must accept that. Today, most governments are increasing defense spending, and there are more startups than ever. Everyone is building a drone. Everyone claims: “I have a system that has proven itself in combat, the prototype is ready. Just give me a little money and production will take off.” Their numbers are absurdly high at the moment: we must give them a chance, but we should also let some disappear. Success also comes through failures.

In light of urgency, can Europe do without buying foreign military equipment?

That’s precisely where threat perception comes into play. We must weigh short- and long-term risks, and several countries, including Estonia, are doing so. We have prioritized price, quality, and delivery times given the security situation Europeans face.

At the same time, we are striving to support our defense industry’s development, because we see that in a crisis or war there are things we simply must produce ourselves, or at least be able to manufacture. It’s not easy, but it is indispensable.

Could the Volunteer Coalition eventually become a new framework for Europe’s security architecture?

It was created to provide Ukraine with support and a security framework, and the Koalicja exercise underway in Poland illustrates this. But the center of European security — the arena where the most consequential questions are still debated — remains NATO. We also have the European Union. The coalition brings together a broad range of nations, some of which aren’t even on the continent. It’s a forum that currently enables discussions about Kyiv’s fate and the guarantees afforded to it. Estonia, however, continues to view both organizations as the bedrock of its own protection, as well as that of Ukraine.

Could a new treaty, wholly devoted to defense, become necessary to formalize these different layers of cooperation: the Volunteer Coalition, bilateral pacts, and France’s nuclear deterrence?

For us, deterrence and defense — including collective security — remain within NATO. Within the European Union, we also have Article 42(7) and Article 222. So no, we do not seriously consider any alternative to these mechanisms, because NATO is the most advanced politico-military alliance Europe has ever known, and its future deserves to be defended with effort as well.