Weakened by the social crisis and popular dissatisfaction, the Communist Party tries to silence the memory of the cultural revolution, of fear that the Maoist heritage would alumine the challenge of its own power.
The silence surrounding the 40e Anniversary of the cultural revolution reflects the political climate in China today. Publishing houses, media and universities have received the discreet but formal instructions not to organize or report demonstrations on this subject ; The initiative of a renowned group of intellectuals, presented last March during the “ Political consultative assembly of the Chinese people », To build a museum of the cultural revolution was completely ignored by the authorities ; The researchers invited to a commemorative conference in New York could not leave China. If the Overseas Chinese have devoted numerous publications and demonstrations to this most painful episode in the history of the People’s Republic, in China even the power prefers visibly to decree collective oblivion.
It is not the first time that the cultural revolution, launched by Mao in 1966 and interrupted after the death of this one ten years later, was the subject of a “ memory policy In China. At the end of the 1970s, its official version was an essential issue in the power struggle between the Maoists and the “ veterans “: Since Mao had claimed it as one of the” Two great works of his life “, The radical Maoists, who had known their political ascent at that time, saw in the cultural revolution the source of their own legitimacy. For the “ veterans Like Deng Xiaoping on the other hand, the reconquest of power passed through the denunciation of Maoist crimes committed during this period. Given the extent of the suffering caused by the cultural revolution, it is not surprising that the population and the intellectuals have rallied without reservation to the position of the latter ; It was this anti-maoist alliance that opened the way for reforms and prepared the ground for the official condemnation of the cultural revolution. In 1981, in order to consolidate the victory of “ veterans »And to turn the page permanently, on 11e Congress of the Communist Party thus adopted a resolution qualifying it as “ Internal disorder period, wrongly initiated by the leader (MAO) and manipulated by counter-revolutionary groups (the Band of the Four, the Biao Lin group) ». “” Completely reject the cultural revolution “Became the popular slogan of the time and sums up the common position of the party, intellectuals and society.
An uncomfortable criticism
However, as it increased, criticism of the cultural revolution gradually turned into a criticism of the regime as a whole. In response, the “ veterans »Tried to supervise him without however going so far as to prohibit him, since she continued to mobilize the population and legitimize the modernization policy. Thus the memory of the years 1966-1976 became the stake of a very ambiguous relationship between Chinese intellectuals and power: the former used the possibility of criticizing the cultural revolution to challenge, certainly diverted but more and more vigorously, the communist regime as such, while the last carefully monitored criticism to preserve the status quo policy. We then understand why certain proposals, such as that of the great writer Ba Jin to found a museum of the cultural revolution for “ Recall this disaster to the whole nation “, Has never been selected. Throughout the 1980s, conflicts between these two ways of interpreting the slogan “ Completely reject the cultural revolution Enamel the Chinese public debate.
The shock of the year 1989, however, changed the situation. After the revolt of the Tienanmen square, the Chinese authorities became extremely sensitive to any questioning. To condemn the cultural revolution suddenly appeared as potentially subversive: had the rebellious students had not drawn from this criticism of many arguments to scratch the regime and demand democratic reforms ? Determined to put a stop at “ peaceful regime transformation », The official press and the leaders then imposed the law of oblivion on the cultural revolution ; Which succeeds all the more easily as over the years, it became a distant historical fact and whose young Chinese, often more concerned with the new material well-being than human rights, had no direct experience. Over time, nostalgia was also felt among the ancients “ red guards “: A largely idealized image of” red years »Little by little in their memory that of suffering and terror. Their strategy consisting sometimes in denying the historical facts, sometimes to justify them a posteriori was not without consequence on the perception that young Chinese people of the years 1966-1976 today have. At the same time, the unequivocal moral condemnation of the 1980s was diluted in post-modern relativism which had emerged in the furrow of economic modernization. This relativism is perfectly visible in part of the intellectuals of “ The new left “Which, under the impact of a certain Western thought but in the ambition of inventing a modernity” Chinese », Displays an increasingly ambiguous attitude on this subject.
Faced with the growing risk of seeing the cultural revolution fall into oblivion, part of the intellectuals has engaged more in the search for historical truth. The work of certain elders “ red guards Like Xu Youyu or Wang Youqin are as much personal testimonies as detailed analyzes of the mechanisms of terror: Wang’s book, the fruit of an investigation into the summary executions that took place at the start of the cultural revolution in the Beijing region, shows that killings not only affected the party’s elites but also ordinary people. Even in the work of researchers “ officials “, Loaded by the party to write the authorized version of history, personal experiences and the sense of responsibility before history and the Chinese people can invite themselves to give rise to important stories. Despite growing control, it is still possible to publish memories of this period, and the testimonies of historic actors become more and more personal. The meaning of this work does not only reside in the search for the past, but also and above all in the struggle for the present and the future. Precisely because writing on the cultural revolution becomes a fight for human rights and the rule of law, the authorities are taking more and more measures to limit it or even ban it. In 1999, the American academic of Chinese origin and recognized specialist in the cultural revolution, Song Yongyi (Song led, among other things, work on the Chinese cultural revolution (Zhongguo Whehua Dageming Wenku Guangdie,, CD–Roma Published in 2002, an increased version was published in 2006), produced by a team of American and Chinese researchers., made the personal experience when the authorities arrested him because of “ espionage During a field survey in China.
This desire to put an end to any debate on the cultural revolution also shows that power is increasingly fearing the social dissatisfaction that increases in society. The Maoist heritage is currently resurfaced in China, in the form of a criticism of social inequalities, corruption and misery of disadvantaged classes. Thus, the slogan used by Mao to justify the need for the cultural revolution – “ The bourgeoisie is within the party », Slogan as absurd as popular at the time, is now becoming a sort of reality. For those who cannot imagine other ways to eradicate these social evils, a campaign of “ popular democracy Inspired by the years 1966-1976 may seem like an effective solution. The return of the spectrum of the cultural revolution reveals the extent of the social crisis and political instability in contemporary China.
Article published in The life of ideas (paper version), published in February 2007