Carried out by the Levada Research Center, the first major investigation into the new Russian elites draws a dark picture from a company “ premium By power.
“” Despite all the speeches on modernization, Russia is similar to a society without a future, a company in a state of decomposition and rotting, taken hostage by a group of clan power. No petrodollar can get it out of this state: a country is not a service station ». It is to this pessimistic conclusion that Russian sociologists Iouri Levada, Lev Goudkov and Boris Doubin arrive at the end of an investigation into the state of the new Russian elites, carried out in the years 2005-2006 in Moscow and in 55 regions of the Russian Federation. The study is mainly committed to examining the role of the elites in the economic and social transformation of the country: can they be the lever of modernization ? Or have they were too shaped by Putin years and the “ premium »Of society (new laws limiting civic freedoms, pressures on the media, Ioukos case, etc.) which has so deeply marked the recent period ? The relationship between the elites and society has evolved since the Soviet era ? To answer these questions, researchers from the Levada Center carried out nearly 600 interviews with representatives of the political elites (members of the executive and elected officials at the federal, regional and municipal (business leaders), media, military and judicial levels of the country.
Before coming to the results of the survey, let us recall that the conception in force in Russia of what a “ elite Is deeply marked by the double imperial and Soviet heritage, a heritage which continues to influence the ways of thinking and acting. For a few brief years after the fall of theUSSRthis term was able to designate interest groups formed around politicians like Igor Gaïdar, for whom the modernization of the country was to result from the establishment of a market economy. However, this time is over and its discredited ideas today: as I. Levada points out in many works, the decomposition of the totalitarian system has only touched the surface of state structures and has practically left representations, concepts and mentalities, so that we have witnessed, since the late 1990s, the resurgence of imperial tradition. Inside it, no place for pluralism: the term “ elite Note concentric circles of people close to an unchanging political power, inaccessible to political competition and citizen deliberation. At the heart of this concentric system, senior officials of the central state, from a third of them (35%) of the police (army, militia, secret services), this percentage amounting to 70% in the intermediate levels of political power.
Levada Center
The Levada Center, named after its director, the sociologist Jurii Levada, was founded in 1987 to analyze the economic transformations initiated by Perestroika. He then bore the name of national center of public opinion. Almost immediately after its creation, the Center widened its field of study to social, national, cultural, religious questions, etc. He regularly produces reports on the state of Russian society and economy. To preserve its independence from the State, the center became a private institution in 2003 and no longer benefits from public funding.
In this tradition, belonging to the “ elite Is defined by loyalty to power and not by competence or responsibilities. Iouri Levada rightly underlines the mediocrity of the current Russian elite, whether it is his level of training, his technical skills or his dedication to the service of the country. Its representatives are only “ temporary »From the central power in place. It is therefore not surprising to note that the elites seem discredited in the eyes of society: only 25% of Russians think that they are concerned with the development of the country and not only of their own career.
How do Russian elites perceive the future of their country ? They certainly recognize a need for modernization but only a minority (35% of those questioned in the survey) defines it by the consolidation of democracy and the rule of law, 31% opting for a slow modernization, closely directed by a strong and protective state of national values and priorities, 18% preferring a path “ specifically Russian “Which refers to” the national idea “, So to a mixture of ideas of” great Russian empire “, Orthodoxy and administrative traditions” specific »Such as sobornost(A “ idea »Actively sought by political power in the 1990s.) Or ZEMSTVO. If the idea of copying the “ Western model So is not unanimous among the elites, this is even less the case with openly anti-Western ideological currents. The economy is actually the main one, if not the only dimension of modernization whose elites seem to be concerned – which corresponds to the objective announced by Putin in 2004, and regularly reiterated since, to double the GDP In 2008. The country’s current enrichment, mainly due to the rise in raw material prices, still serves to strengthen the state much more than to energize society. 77% of those questioned in the survey say that the political role of President Putin is “ essential »In the development of the country.
Unlike the Soviet era, the current elites are not federated by any precise ideology, except by the idea of a strong state and a very “vision pragmatic “Of their own place in the social hierarchy. Their understanding of what a pluralist society is extremely limited. Society does not appear in their speeches, in their projects, or in their actions. Their prospective do not go beyond the legislative elections of December 2007 and presidential in March 2008. The objective they pursue is the maintenance of the status quo.
Seen more closely, the group studied by sociologists is divided into a “ center “(The staff of the executive power) and a” periphery “Composed in particular of businessmen and local managers who, although the center of the center, can exert a certain influence on it. The survey shows that the two groups follow in their words and actions the line indicated by the central power, even when they display a critical attitude towards it. This is the case of the economic elite, the most interested in the development of the country and the reforms it requires (such as the protection of individual freedoms): this fraction of the elites requires nothing more than power “ breathe », That is to say, take care of his own affairs without constantly undergoing state interventions. In exchange, she is ready to look at the social and political context, and will not require reforms that would threaten the “ supreme objective »Of a strong state and a united Russia. More than 61% of the economic elite displays its support for Putin, to which must be added 19% for whom this support is motivated by the absence of other credible candidates. Only 9% of the businessmen interviewed are disagreement with its policy. And yet, pair with Muscovite intellectuals and the media, it is precisely this social category that feels the most marginalized in current Russia, and which most fear the marginalization of the country if the current political line should continue: almost half of business leaders, 41% of media employees and 72% of intellectuals express this concern. This feeling of marginalization seems perfectly founded insofar as central power judges private elites and intellectuals as unreliable and leaves them no autonomy to experiment with new ideas to develop the country.
The main characteristics of the current Russian elite, as they emerge from this investigation and previous studies, are those of cynicism and apathy. In this regard, the elite is not distinguished from the rest of the population: many surveys have shown that the majority of citizens share a paternalistic vision of relations between the State and society. Sensitive phenomenon even in the vision of the past: the short episodes of absence of authoritarian regime-the eight months which separated the two revolutions of 1917 and the decade 1989-1999-are regularly interpreted as periods of chaos, harmful for the “ Russian man ». We are closer to a “ direct link “Between the” tsar “And the nation, in the sense of the Russian formula of XIXe century “ Authority, Orthodoxy, nationality “, That of a democratic society where the elites and civil society keep their autonomy towards power.
To go further:
– The resource site Johnson’s Russia List of the Center for Defense Information.
– The English -speaking pages of the Levada Center