Authoritarianism thrives

The latest report published by theNGO Freedom House paints a bleak picture of the state of democracy around the world. According to its director, Michael J. Abramovitz,

Political rights and civil liberties around the world declined to their lowest level in more than a decade in 2017.

Over the past twelve years, countries experiencing a decline in their democratic environment have outnumbered those whose democratization has progressed each year. The failure of the “Arab Springs”, with the exception of the Tunisian revolution, forces us all the more to question this return to authoritarianism, but also the determinants favoring the success of democratization processes. This is what Robert R. Kaufman and Stephan Haggard – professors at Rutgers and California Universities respectively – propose in Dictators and DemocratsThe two political scientists explore the conditions favorable and unfavorable to the rooting of democracy.

A Critique of Modernization Theory

As S. Haggard and RR Kaufman,

Modernization theory links competitive policy to long-term development, the emergence of middle classes, and other economic and socio-structural changes.

This theoretical current was gradually forged by the work of D. Acemoğlu and I AM Robinson, but also by other authors such as C. Boix, DJ Samuels and BW Ansell. However, by exploring the series of cases from the third wave of democratization (conceptualized by Samuel Huntington, this period encompasses the whole of the processes of exit from authoritarianism that have crossed the world since the mid-1970s, from Mediterranean Europe to the former Eastern bloc via Latin America), S. Haggard and RR Kaufman notes that two elements contradict this theory. First, while some democratizations are the consequence of distributive conflicts (i.e. mass mobilizations motivated by a desire for resource distribution), others are initiated by elites. Second, inequalities and their level have no significant effect, whether during transitions caused by distributive conflicts or driven by elites. On the contrary,

transitions arise at all levels of inequality, regardless of the measure used. (p. 50)

The authors finally note that inequalities do not seem to make new democracies more vulnerable to attempts to return to authoritarianism.

While inequalities do not have significant effects on the democratic transition, economic difficulties nevertheless constitute determining factors in the failure of democratization, even if many counter-examples are mentioned by the authors. S. Haggard and RR Kaufman notes that a return to authoritarianism is more likely in the poorest countries, tending to confirm here one of the key ideas of modernization theory, according to which economic development decreases the probability of authoritarian resurgence. Moreover, in countries where the democratic transition failed, growth was on average lower than that of states where democracy persisted. However, the two political scientists note that democracy is managing to take root in several poor countries. Based on this observation, they argue for greater consideration of political and institutional factors, the influence of which is relegated to the background by the proponents of modernization theory.

Two types of democratic transition

S. Haggard and RR Kaufman note the prevalence of a “weak democracy syndrome” that risks hindering the process of exiting authoritarianism. It manifests itself through three phenomena: the frequent involvement of the military in the political sphere (what the two political scientists call “praetorianism”), a weakly institutionalized political game (characterized by a marginalization of the opposition and an authoritarian exercise of power on the part of the party winning the elections), as well as mediocre economic performance. The authors also emphasize that, even when the level of development is taken into account in the analysis, the political factors mentioned above contribute to strongly explaining returns to authoritarianism. This negative influence of weak institutionalization on the rooting of democracy is reminiscent of the conclusions of certain studies on “competitive authoritarianism.” By emphasizing the negative role of praetorianism on the processes of democratization, the authors also oppose Ozan Varol’s thesis on the “democratic coup d’état”, according to which certain specific circumstances allow putsches to fulfill a function of exit from authoritarianism. They also recall that, if democratic transitions are weakened by economic crises, these are partially fueled by certain institutional dysfunctions. According to the two political scientists, the deviant cases that constitute the rooting of democracy in poor countries and the return to authoritarianism in middle-income countries fall under this syndrome of weak democracy.

Taking as a criterion the degree of freedom granted by the authorities to civil society mobilizations, the authors propose a distinction between “open” and “closed” authoritarianisms that allows us to better understand why some democratic transitions succeed and others do not. Thus, transitions structured around distributive conflicts tend to occur more in regimes closed to this type of mobilization than in relatively open regimes. More precisely, military or single-party regimes will be more likely to face distributive conflicts than multi-party regimes. These phenomena are fueled by the prevalence of trade union organizations and the degree of industrialization. The authors here agree with some conclusions from the literature on political disputes: mobilization against the regime “is a function of two key factors; the opportunity structure provided by the authoritarian order, and the organizational resources available to protesters.”

Democratic transitions led by the ruling elites themselves are distinguished by the role that international factors play in their emergence. Drawing on the work of Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, the authors show how the processes of “influence” (leverage) and “relationship” (linkage): when influence consists of “actions by external parties that directly induce incumbent authoritarian leaders to reform or step down,” the relationship “includes a variety of political and economic ties and transnational relationships that operate more indirectly on leaders’ motivations.” S. Haggard and RR Kaufman nevertheless points out that these external factors often interact with internal determinants, notably conflicts within the political elite. However, transitions of this type can also appear in a context where the ruling class is united, notably when it believes it can keep control of the democratization process while reducing the costs of repression, in order to retain power after the liberalization of the regime. Apart from direct military interventions from outside, we can therefore distinguish three types of elite transitions: transitions following an overthrow of the elites, pre-emption transitions and institutional transitions.

When Democratization Fails

Distributive transitions seem to the authors to be more conducive than elite transitions to the entrenchment of democracy, for three reasons: mass mobilizations would increase the probability of freer and more competitive elections, would reduce the capacities of the old elites to negotiate institutional arrangements in their favor and would lead to a more robust defense of political and civil liberties. However, if these distributive transitions have the merit of developing the implantation of democracy by reducing the prerogatives of the old authoritarian leaders and increasing the responsibility of the new rulers, mass mobilizations can also polarize society and harm the integrity of institutional procedures, particularly when they lead to the overthrow of elected governments.

Finally, the authors draw attention to returns to authoritarianism that are part of a populist dynamic, in which opponents of the new regime seize power by claiming to defend social categories that are left dissatisfied by government performance. The populist leaders mentioned by the authors often come to power through the ballot box, but gradually show authoritarian tendencies in the way they exercise it. This mode of return to authoritarianism thrives particularly in societies where the democratic system is hardly able to redistribute resources to the disadvantaged sections of the population.

In addition to providing an original perspective on the populist phenomenon, Dictators and Democrats makes a fundamental contribution to transitology. The interest of this work also lies in the wealth of methodological approaches used, combining case studies and quantitative analyses. However, by focusing their approach on democratic transitions and returns to authoritarianism, the two political scientists seem to give secondary conceptual importance to the work dealing with “hybrid regimes” and questioning the “transitional paradigm”, whereas a greater mobilization of these would undoubtedly have enriched the interpretation of their results. Despite these theoretical limitations, Dictators and Democrats is set to become an essential reference in the literature on democratization.