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In November 2025, while visiting a drone training center of the army, Taiwan’s Minister of National Defense, Wellington Koo, cited Ukraine as an example to show that an army disadvantaged in terms of personnel and resources can gain an asymmetrical edge by “an innovative and widespread use of unmanned platforms.” The takeaway goes far beyond simply acquiring equipment: it is about adapting doctrine, training, command and control (C2), and the integration between frontline units and manufacturers, for the use of these platforms in wartime. The production tempo and the ability to adapt to enemy countermeasures, which evolve rapidly, are also essential to prevail over the adversary.
For Taiwan, where conventional defensive capabilities clash with asymmetric ones, Ukraine serves as a real-time case study. This is not about drones substituting conventional weapons, but about using both according to operational needs. Drones expand the reconnaissance field, identify and track targets, correct artillery fire, and assess damage. Missiles, artillery, and other conventional systems provide a complementary firepower. The question Taiwan must ask is how best to combine these capacities, given limited resources and stocks, and the need to sustain operations over the long term.
At the same time, Taiwan must account for its own operational environment. The Ukraine conflict is largely ground-based, whereas Taiwan faces threats in the air, on land, and at sea. Moreover, the persistent air and naval activity of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), along with growing pressure in the maritime “gray zone,” blurs the line between peacetime coercion and military operations, potentially shortening alert and reaction times. This is why UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) must take on more missions, including intelligence, surveillance and maritime reconnaissance (ISR), targeting, strikes, communications relays, logistics, and electronic warfare.
Since the large-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense has been closely watching this theater to reassess drone priorities. Changes occurred in 2025–2026 in four areas: defense doctrine, equipment acquisition, force organization, and training and operational exercises. The country has shifted from simply acquiring drones to integrating unmanned systems to bolster its reconnaissance and strike capabilities.
Two challenges stand out. First, how to maintain the ability to build, repair, replace, and modernize drones as war creates new needs? Second, to what extent can systems from different suppliers communicate within interoperable command networks? For Taiwan, answering this is crucial, because it concerns whether expanding its drone fleet will guarantee it real combat power.
Integrating Drones into Defense Operations
Henceforth, Taiwan’s defense doctrine emphasizes the complementarity between conventional capabilities and asymmetrical capabilities. The 2021 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) laid the foundations for this approach. Four years later, the 2025 review further explicitly incorporates unmanned systems into force development and operational planning.
The planning of the National Defense Ministry (MND) relies on these systems, whether at the joint-force level, in tactics, or in combat. From an interservice viewpoint, long-range systems ensure continuous ISR coverage and the guidance of strikes around the island. Tactically, drones enable tracking of naval and amphibious forces and contribute to anti-landing operations. In contact situations, smaller devices enable real-time reconnaissance, target designation, and close-support fire for frontline units.
The QDR 2025 still features a mission described as “defense with resolve and multi-tier deterrence” (防衛固守、重層嚇阻), but it introduces an operational concept: “multi-domain denial and resilient defense” (多域拒止、韌性防衛). It distinguishes several phases of defense: combat preparation, inter-service defense against landings, littoral and coastal battles, deep defense, and long-duration operations. In each phase, the MND emphasizes integrating ISR, C2, precision strikes, AI, and unmanned aerial platforms.
It differentiates three categories of drones by range, capabilities, and assigned missions: interservice, tactical, and combat drones. Long-endurance drones are assigned to interservice operations: persistent surveillance and target designation support. Tactical drones monitor naval and amphibious formations and bolster anti-landing operations. Finally, smaller, short-range devices are reserved for tactical units responsible for real-time reconnaissance, target acquisition, and organic strikes on the front lines.
The deployment of these devices evolves with the phases of the conflict. In wartime readiness, long-endurance drones monitor PLA activities around Taiwan to give early warning and avoid missing any threat. If PLA forces cross the Taiwan Strait, ISR drones are tasked with identifying and tracking amphibious formations and transmitting targeting information to land-based anti-ship missiles and other precision weapons. Attack drones complement these strikes by targeting vulnerable ship components, disrupting their tempo of operations.
As fighting draws closer to the Taiwanese coast and then inland, short-range reconnaissance and attack drones become more useful to artillery, ground maneuvers, and direct engagements. In prolonged operations, smaller drones, including First-Person View (FPV) units, would provide dispersed units with localized reconnaissance and tactical strike capabilities. Specialized platforms could also serve as communications relays and resupply assets.
This distribution aligns with the National Defense Report 2025, which emphasizes interservice ISR, precision fires, decentralized operations, and resilience of resistance. More importantly, it highlights linking these capabilities together. The QDR 2025 envisions a reactive “Kill Web” that connects sensors, shared operational imagery, C2 systems, and frontline forces. The MND also stresses that ISR tools should be linked to long-range precision weapons to strike the nerve centers of PLA landings. Dispersed deployment, mission command, and redundant communications are intended to ensure combat effectiveness even if individual platforms or network links are compromised.
Therefore, integration lies at the heart of force planning. The aim is to fuse drones, unmanned surface vessels (USVs), naval mines, and land-based anti-ship missiles for coastal defense, together with attack drones integrated with HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems), self-propelled artillery, and anti-tank missiles for land operations. In other words, drones are being designed less as stand-alone weapons and more as components integrated into existing reconnaissance and fire-support apparatus.
This shift in doctrine is not simply about broadening the drone role from reconnaissance to strike. It aims to place these aircraft at the core of the reconnaissance-strike architecture, multiplying sensors, targeting information, and engagement options across different phases of defense. Combat effectiveness depends on the resilience of command and control networks, the speed of information sharing among units and services, and the ability to sustain operations in the face of degraded or destroyed communications and individual platforms.
Drone Procurement Policy: Scale, Strike Capabilities, and Domestic Production
The new Taiwanese strategy translates into a more ambitious procurement policy, both in volume and quality. Before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Taiwan largely relied on acquiring advanced platforms from the United States and on domestically produced devices from the National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST).
American platforms include both long-endurance ISR systems and loitering munitions. To date, Taiwan has purchased four MQ-9B SkyGuardians (equipped with maritime ISR payloads) and ordered 685 Switchblade 300 drones, as well as 291 ALTIUS-600M drones (delivered). There is also a plan to purchase 478 ALTIUS-600ISR reconnaissance drones and 1,554 ALTIUS-700M anti-armor loitering munitions.
Meanwhile, NCSIST has designed and built several Taiwanese systems. The Albatross, Teng Yun, and Cardinal series offer different levels of reconnaissance capabilities, while the Chien Hsiang and Mighty Hornet (I–IV) series are intended for strike missions. The Navy has also planned to invest NT$16.8 billion (€465 million) to acquire 32 Albatross II drones: the goal is a modular platform combining reconnaissance and strike functions.
However, war in Ukraine shows that relying exclusively on sophisticated, specialized platforms is risky. Attrition rates require constant replacement of aircraft and spare parts. Electronic warfare, communications, navigation, and software technologies advance so quickly that equipment becomes obsolete almost as soon as it is deployed. But there is more. Taiwan is an island; in the event of a blockade or prolonged conflict, foreign supply would be blocked and access to essential parts would be limited. Stocks would not suffice unless Taiwan can repair damaged systems, compensate losses, and deploy upgraded models in real time.
Hence the creation of a third pathway: ready-to-use Commercial-Off-The-Shelf (COTS) drones, produced by Taiwanese companies. These are essentially Category 1 and 2 devices whose production is faster and more abundant than that of specialized, larger drones. The strategy rests on three principles: mass procurement, predictable orders, and iteration. Indeed, predictability of orders encourages investment in production and innovation, and batch production enables technical modifications across series.
The first commercial drone procurement program, launched in 2022 and funded in 2024, involved 3,422 devices across six categories, for a total of NT$6.9 billion (€190 million). In July 2025, a second program covered 48,750 drones across five categories, but the shift was not purely quantitative. The first program prioritized ISR, while four of the five categories in the second program emphasized strikes. This shows that the National Defense Ministry envisions commercial drones as both reconnaissance tools and near-disposable strike assets. In August 2026, new legislation aimed to boost UAS purchases. A catalog of 1,446 coastal surveillance drones, 208,200 coastal attack drones, and 1,320 one-shot underwater attack vehicles was drawn up by the ministry, with the goal of procurement by 2031.
The drone program in Taiwan now rests on three streams. The American stream and the NCSIST stream continue to provide sophisticated systems designed for specific tasks, while domestic industry guarantees higher-volume production that enables quicker technical updates and parts replacement. The growing number of platforms capable of strikes also signals a shift toward a more diversified, multi-task force.
Technical standards, production lead times, operational constraints, and maintenance protocols vary across streams. While diversification reduces dependence on a single supplier, it raises real integration challenges. Expanding the fleet will not yield combat efficiency gains unless communications networks, data formats, and the operation of disparate systems are compatible. It risks complicating logistics and the organization of the whole enterprise.
Institutionalizing Drone Capabilities within the Armed Forces
On one hand, Taiwan is acquiring more drones; on the other, its armed forces are reorganizing their units and modernizing their training to adapt to the increasing use of drones in daily operations. Each service has created a dedicated unit and a training center to bring these devices into the core of the military structure.
The Army has formed drone battalions under the northern (3rd), central (5th), and southern (4th) theater commands, plus drone factories in the Guandu district guarding Taipei and on the Penghu Islands, a strategic site in the Taiwan Strait. The battalions report to artillery commands, where drones can assist in target acquisition, fire correction, and damage assessment during conventional shoots.
The Marine Corps is also evolving. The latest restructuring plan for the MND shows the 66th Marine Brigade converting its tank and artillery battalions into drone and fire-support battalions. The aim is to strengthen the organic reconnaissance and strike capabilities of this unit so that it can operate in a more dispersed manner.
In July 2026, the Navy created a Littoral Combat Command that brings together coastal anti-ship missile units, maritime surveillance tools, and drone reconnaissance forces. Three elements were integrated: the Hai Feng coastal missile group, reconfigured into three littoral combat battalions; coastal radar units formerly under the Maritime Surveillance Command; and the Maritime Tactical Reconnaissance Battalion, which operates Albatross drones. This consolidation is intended to improve coordination between maritime surveillance, targeting, and coastal-based anti-ship launches, reducing the time from detection to fire.
The Air Force relies on networked drones to reorganize its aviation, air defense, and battle management. In 2026, two of four MQ-9Bs were delivered to Taiwan and tested at Hualien Air Base in September. The remaining two deliveries are expected in 2027. These long-endurance aircraft are meant to extend the ISR coverage over the Taiwan Strait and surrounding waters, providing faster alert capability and improving information sharing with operational commands and existing air defense networks.
Training has also benefited from changes. Since 2025, conscripts undertake an eight-hour module encompassing theoretical courses, simulations, and drone piloting exercises. It is essential that more service members master these tools. Moreover, this approach helps select the best candidates for specialized training. Each service is reviewing its training. The Navy opened a dedicated unit within its Specialized Training Center in April 2026. The Army established a training center in January 2025, elevated to the status of the Command for Unmanned Systems Training in April 2026. This Command oversees operator and instructor training, tactical development, testing, and sets evaluation and appraisal standards.
These reforms aim to complement the procurement policy, which alone is insufficient. Deploying drones at scale requires trained teams, clear mission-planning procedures and intelligence-sharing, robust maintenance contracts, and satisfactory coordination with conventional fires. Training centers must closely monitor operations to turn them into tactics and evaluation criteria, updated as platforms and terrain evolve.
Each branch adopts the use of drones for its missions. The Army and the Marine Corps focus on tactical reconnaissance and strike support. The Navy is responsible for maritime surveillance and coastal strikes. The Air Force handles long-endurance ISR missions and integrates air defense. Once the organization is in place, it all hinges on cross-branch coordination and on the training and doctrine’s flexibility to adapt to new technologies and operational constraints.
Testing Drone Integration Through Inter-Service Exercises
In 2026, the Taiwanese armed forces conducted several exercises showing that drones are now being integrated into operational plans. Earlier demonstrations tended to focus on individual platforms, while more recent maneuvers aim to coordinate the reconnaissance and strike capabilities of drones with the conventional weapons of different units.
In January 2026, the Navy organized a combat-readiness exercise that integrated surveillance drones to ensure targeting for the Hsiung Feng anti-ship missiles; it also employed a Mighty Hornet I, a Taiwan-made platform, against maritime targets. In April, during an Air Force exercise named Tianlong, Chien Hsiang loitering munitions contributed to a simulated counter-blockade with coordinated air and maritime strikes. In June, the Army’s 21st Artillery Command drone battalion (3rd Theater Command) conducted a live-fire maritime engagement exercise using the ALTIUS-600M to practice hovering, search, and target identification. It was the first time such an exercise received media attention. Tactical drones were also seen reinforcing inter-service units during immediate-combat alert exercises.
Finally, in August, Han Kuang 42 provided an opportunity to test drone use across several services, on different terrains and at various phases of a conflict. Three notable innovations merit mention.
First, drones are no longer limited to specialized units. Ground and reserve formations are using tactical drones for reconnaissance and situational reporting. On the other hand, forward observation and target acquisition are handled by smaller platforms. Mobilized reservists had been trained for the exercise, demonstrating the armed forces’ effort to improve operator skills.
Second, the exercise mainly ensured that drones were integrated with conventional fires. On August 8, the Navy conducted a littoral strike exercise in Kaohsiung: mobile radars first detected targets, then ground-based ISR drones enabled their identification and real-time tracking. The information obtained was used to coordinate engagement of land-based anti-ship missiles and missile-launcher boats. When enemy forces (simulated) approached the coast, short-range reconnaissance and attack drones were integrated.
The exercise was a perfect example of multi-layer maritime defense: the choice of sensors and weapons depended on target location and maneuver constraints. Drones served to strengthen coastal surveillance and target designation, while conventional missiles remained essential for long-range strikes.
Ground operations followed the same logic. During anti-landing drills near Kinmen, drones supported Javelin missiles, rockets, artillery, tanks, and armored vehicles to ensure inter-service operations integrated aerial reconnaissance and strikes. In Matsu, during a counter-blockade simulation involving coast guard and amphibious forces, drones provided maritime surveillance and tracking while transmitting information. In all cases, the aim was to demonstrate the drones’ role in evaluating local maritime conditions and coordination, particularly for Taiwan, an island whose access and communications would be restricted in a conflict.
Third, these drills highlighted force protection and logistics support. The Air Force tested multi-layer anti-drone defense, while drones were used in logistics-disruption scenarios. Moreover, several Army units demonstrated how to manufacture and repair drones using 3D printing.
These initiatives drew heavily on Ukraine, where defense relies not only on reconnaissance and strike capabilities but also on resistance to enemy drones and electronic warfare, as well as the ability to replace and adapt systems as threats evolve. On-site repair and maintenance reduce dependence on ad hoc facilities and shorten repair cycles for damaged platforms.
The year 2026 shows that Taiwan is testing drones designed as an integrated operational system. Yet it is hard to know whether these maneuvers would be viable in a real conflict. We lack enough data to assess their effectiveness in a prolonged electronic warfare scenario, in the face of recurrent communications disruptions, or under high drone attrition rates that could undermine command structures, personnel skills, maintenance, and the ability to compensate for losses.
Next Step: Maintaining and Concentrating Combat Power
Taiwan has moved beyond questioning the military value of unmanned systems. Now it must determine the pace at which it could deploy these devices at scale, adjust them against new threats, and integrate them into existing battle networks.
The immediate priority is to sustain equipment procurement without sacrificing flexibility or technical adaptability.
In August 2026, the country passed a law providing six years of funding for unmanned systems, but each purchase still depends on the annual budget. In other words, if budget adoption is delayed, the awarding of contracts, delivery of matériel, activation of units, and training will also be delayed. The National Defense Ministry warned that this could block purchases and hinder force development as the army relies more on drones and the creation of new operational units.
Moreover, Ukraine’s experience shows that drone technology—and the countermeasures required to defeat them—assists, evolves very quickly. These weapons are only useful if they incorporate the latest technologies and configurations without destabilizing the defense industry whose procurement cycles are longer. Upcoming acquisitions must consider field feedback and updates while avoiding oversized orders that risk becoming obsolete before delivery.
Testing is equally important. Take the example of military units and manufacturers: they need access to the radio spectrum, real-world beyond-line-of-sight trials, an appropriate airspace, and a credible electronic warfare environment. Any limitation hampers their ability to evaluate new systems under realistic conditions. In short, procurement flexibility and testing capability must go hand in hand.
Second Challenge: How to Link Different Drone Fleets into an Operational Network Given Their Diversity?
The United States sells drones to Taiwan. NCSIST manufactures some locally. Domestic companies also supply commercial models to Taiwan. Indeed, these three streams provide steady production but rely on communication systems, interfaces, software, and maintenance protocols that have little in common.
The National Defense Ministry has already established networks to facilitate information sharing and coordination among sensors and weapons, including the Taiwan Tactical Network, the Team Awareness Kit, AI-powered decision-support tools, and common operational situational awareness. Yet assessing the interoperability of systems from different manufacturers within a single command-and-control framework remains difficult.
Interoperability requires at least that drone-derived information reaches the units and weapons that need it in a usable format. There are more advanced forms of interoperability that enable the sharing of targeting data, joint mission planning, and the ability to sustain operations in the event of platform loss or communications outages.
Data sharing is not everything. Each fleet may require its own operational procedures, control posts, spare parts, software updates, and maintenance, which would burden units and complicate sustaining large-scale operations. Given drones are spread across different streams and operational formations, these constraints become increasingly heavy.
Would More Drones Simply Deter?
Since 2022, Taiwan’s drone program has progressed at a pace that shows the country intends to strengthen deterrence through denial. Its objective is clear: fragment its ISR and strike networks so that the PLA cannot neutralize its defense by targeting only a few strategic nodes. To do so, it must strengthen its asymmetric defense and its defensive autonomy.
Asymmetric defense aims to inflict losses on a more powerful adversary by employing deliberately fragmented, resilient, and low-cost capabilities, while ensuring these capabilities share information and form a tandem. Defensive autonomy refers to building a system that can compensate for the interruption of external supply. If attrition rates are high or an embargo blocks external sourcing, it is essential to be able to manufacture, repair, modify, and replace equipment locally.
Not only are these two defense strategies linked, but the Taiwanese government is mindful of them. Budget for acquisitions is rising, drones have become a cornerstone of the military organization, and the latest exercises demonstrate better coordination with conventional fires and inter-service operations. That said, gaps remain. Annual budget fluctuations threaten procurement plans. The cycle of acquisitions and testing must be streamlined and adapted to technical changes. Finally, there is no proof yet that such a disparate drone fleet can be interoperable on a large scale.
A major uncertainty remains: how long could Taiwan’s system endure in the event of a war? Even though the country has broadened its range of trials, there are few elements showing that drones have been stress-tested in scenarios of intense electronic warfare, disrupted communications, high attrition rates, or limited resupply. In itself, the number of drones Taiwan possesses is not deterrence. What matters is the ability to use, replace, and adapt these assets at any point during a conflict.