E. Anscombe recommends abandoning morality, which she considers obsolete, to replace it with an ethics of virtues which is inspired by individuals or acts that we can take as models of our behavior. Such ethics, however, suppose that we change our way of conceiving the relationship between the mind and the body.
Why, in the 1950s, certain philosophers (mainly Elizabeth Anscombe and Philippa Foot, followed by others) considered that modern moral philosophy was obsolete and that it should therefore be replaced by virtue ethics ? Valérie Aucouturier’s book, Elizabeth Anscombe. Mind in practice (CNRS2012) helps answer this question. It is certainly first of all a unique introduction in French to the work of one of the greatest contemporary British philosophers (who died in 2001). However, it seems to us that Aucouturier was not mistaken in making moral philosophy the culmination of Anscombe’s philosophical research in other branches of philosophy.
Against Cartesian mythology
Virtue ethics began as a critique of Cartesian-inspired psychology. We will not be able to do ethics, says Anscombe in substance, without “ having gotten rid of the Cartesian mythology that my mind and my body are two different substances » (p. 25). This mythology also includes the common belief (including among scientists) that our intentions are “ in our heads “. It is based on the particular status given by Descartes to self-consciousness. This would have a privilege regarding the knowledge that the one who acts has of himself.
The issue at stake in this attack on Cartesian-inspired philosophy is therefore the following question: does the agent have specific authority to determine what he does? ? The first part of Aucouturier’s work, devoted to “ philosophy of mind » by Miss Anscombe, develops the criticism of the mentalist thesis according to which it would be mental events which would give meaning to the action, in which case the agent, having sole knowledge of these events, would have exclusive authority to determine what he do.
This criticism of mentalism is today well known in France since the various research works (in particular those of Jacques Bouveresse) on Wittgenstein. It is associated with a refusal of the alternative thesis in psychology, especially popular across the Atlantic, of behaviorism which reduces thought to what can be observed. Anscombe reminds us on this occasion that thinking is not an activity like paying: an observable act is not always required for it to take place. It avoids behaviorism by giving weight back to the context which is the true source of the meaning of our actions. Learning colors, for example, does not consist of the association, after repetition, of a stimulation of the organ of sight with the color word “ red “. Rather, it assumes a context where an adult shows colored objects to a child to get the latter to name the color of each. The child learns to behave in this context as if he were learning the rules of a game. The rules of practice give meaning to this activity. Thus the interest of these pages is in the introduction of a new conception of the mind, a “ mind in practice » : « thought, the spirit, manifests itself above all in our varied activities (our language, our actions, etc.), so that is where we look for it and not in an unfathomable interiority. » (p. 77).
The ethics of good intention
From the perspective of a moral philosophy, this new conception will allow a rejection of subjectivism. Virtue ethics in fact contests the point of view according to which it is the agent who has the sole authority to determine both what he has done (see the second part of the work entitled “ philosophy of action “) and whether what he did was good or bad.
The ethics of good intention, which Anscombe opposes, consists of claiming that it is the agent’s conviction to do good that determines the nature of the action. Nothing is less true for Anscombe according to whom the point of view which judges the action must be external to it. Because “ overall, a man intends to do what he actually does » (quoted p. 82). We therefore do not need testimony about what happened in his heart to understand his intentions.
We will find a good illustration of the ravages of an ethic of good intention in the report by Raoul Peck broadcast on ARTE titled “ Deadly assistance “. Peck clearly shows how humanitarian workers, particularly American ones, armed with good intentions objectively did not do what they claimed to do, namely provide assistance to Haitians after the 2010 earthquake in Port-au-Prince mainly through fault. for having consulted those primarily concerned, the Haitians themselves.
Anscombe also shows that this ethic of good intention at “ hint of Cartesianism » (writes Aucouturier p. 168) can nestle even in doctrines that we would tend to consider intuitively as good or just. Thus the doctrine of double effect which considers that we must always be able to distinguish two effects of an action: the object of its intention on the one hand and its predictable consequences on the other.
“ Thus, by administering a certain treatment to his patient, a doctor may very well know that this treatment will cause undesirable side effects for the patient, but these are not the ones he is targeting with his action (neither as a means nor as an end). ) ; what it aims at is the healing of the patient. The doctrine of double effect then says: if an act has two effects, one of which is good and the other evil, it is permissible to perform this act if (1) the evil effect is not intended intentionally, (2) the good effect is not produced through the bad effect and (3) the good effect, all things considered, “ surpasses » the bad effect. » (p. 166)
But that would mean that it would still be possible to defend oneself. by the absurd process » writes Anscombe (quoted p. 167) consisting of choosing to describe one’s intention as being good and the bad consequences of one’s action as being unintentional.
“ Abandoning Morality for Virtue »
Aucouturier repeatedly insists that we can make a secular reading of the philosophy of Anscombe, an author renowned for her committed Catholicism. This is indeed another characteristic of virtue ethics: its supporters consider that ethics must be expressed in secular terms. Thus we must interpret Anscombe’s rejection of any morality based on the idea of a “ great legislator ” (either “ the god of Christian morality » tells us Aucouturier p. 171), like that of Kant, or even moral philosophies that try to preserve Christian moral values without the legislator, like that of Hume.
Anscombe recommends, according to Aucouturier, and like all proponents of virtue ethics, to “ abandon morality for virtue » (p. 188). No longer center our analyzes on the concepts of moral duty, moral good or evil to return to the heritage of Aristotle who made the virtues the object of ethics: here is the path traced by Anscombe and to which we give from the name “ of virtue ethics “.
From then on, research in ethics turned to concepts which embody virtuous acts such as keeping one’s promises, analyzed by Anscombe. On this occasion, the idea of universal moral principles to be respected is replaced by a thesis inherited from Aristotle – and specific to virtue ethics – according to which certain conventions are good for the flourishing of humanity or necessary for the human life. So it is with the promises which make it possible to “ make us do things to each other without using physical force » (quoted p. 186).
Ethical sources
What, in such a perspective, can take the place of ethical sources? ? In other words, what will be the origin of our evaluative judgments praising or condemning an action? ?
The first ethical source is, as we have just seen, these concepts taken from our language and which embody virtuous or vicious acts in practice, such as the promise. It is important to note that, for proponents of virtue ethics, there are in this sense acts which are intrinsically bad or unjust, such as murder or theft. The concepts of virtue or vice can serve as a model, a definition of what is just or unjust, good or bad to do, in the analysis of other cases.
This source is of great use in professional ethics for example. It allows us to say that the task entrusted to a worker carries within itself its own perfection. So with reception in medico-social institutions: welcoming someone means listening to them and being attentive to their uniqueness. This definition is the model of virtue in the matter. It makes it possible to reject other standards, external to this task, such as the number of people welcomed in a given time.
The second ethical source in virtue ethics is the model of the Virtuous Man. “ And the ideal of the virtuous individual meets the needs that men have to flourish » (p. 188). We can therefore use the actions of a model of virtue like “ standards » for our behavior.
It is here, perhaps, that Aucouturier’s bias in favor of a secular reading of Anscombe does not allow us to give all the intelligence that his philosophy deserves. Indeed, according to Anscombe, the Virtuous Man – who embodies all the virtues that the human species can hope to possess – is none other than Jesus Christ. However, it is entirely possible to consider, even if you are an atheist or a Muslim for example, that Jesus Christ has a lot of merit without in any way wanting to take his life as a model of virtue. In other words, virtuous men are not necessarily considered as models by those who, moreover, would nevertheless be ready to praise their merit. Furthermore, a Man’s virtue is based on dispositions of character. However, we cannot hold him responsible for his character, which partly tempers his merit.
But there is more: it is not possible to establish practical truths from the case of an excellent life if it depends on the character of the person who lived it. This second source does not fail to raise questions. Can we then be satisfied with the analysis of the concepts of virtue and vice as a form of moral philosophy? ? In any case, this is what virtue ethics offers, to which Aucouturier’s work constitutes a good introduction.