Brexit and Euroscepticism

Euroscepticism: a renewed tradition

Polls are still divided as to the outcome of Thursday’s referendum, but one element remains certain: the majority of British people today say they are Eurosceptic – or at least hostile to Europe. How to explain this phenomenon? In the United Kingdom, Euroscepticism is the result of both recent developments and older political traditions, dating back to the aftermath of the Second World War. From the start of the process of European construction, the country had been keen to keep its distance. To explain it, it is necessary to go beyond the stereotype of insularity. Certainly, this distrust is partly based on sovereignist arguments, which are still present in today’s Eurosceptic discourse. Unlike its continental European neighbors, the United Kingdom did not suffer Nazi occupation, nor did it play the game of collaboration. It therefore did not feel the need to rebuild itself via an extensive inter-state partnership. On the contrary, during the so-called “consensus” period (1945-1979), Conservatives and Labor partially put aside their political differences to rebuild the country, while relying on already established national political traditions: the pursuit of welfare state policies (welfare state), initiated under the liberal governments of the beginning of the century, and the reaffirmation of parliamentary sovereignty. In fact, confidence in the Parliament of Westminster (in London) as a bulwark against political interference, whether from the monarch tempted by tyranny or from external powers, has been at the heart of British constitutional principles since the XVIII^e century, and has remained one of the pillars of national identity ever since.

But alongside this sovereignist discourse, distrust of Europe is fueled by internationalist arguments. Strong in the memory of the Empire, the United Kingdom perceived the common market in formation as too narrow a framework for its global ambitions. From a geopolitical point of view, the priorities therefore went to strengthening the special relationship with the United States, and to maintaining post-colonial ties within the framework of the Commonwealth. This extra-European commitment also had the advantage of offering a counterweight to the Franco-German couple, whose power continued to assert itself.

These initial reluctance can therefore be understood as a conflict between strongly differentiated political cultures. From this perspective, it is not surprising that the United Kingdom’s membership of the EEC in 1973 was placed under the sign of economic interest rather than that of political cooperation. The Conservative government of Edward Heath believed that the common market constituted a favorable framework for the exercise of free trade. Consequently, distrust of the European Union did not disappear after 1973. It even gained ground, as European construction went beyond the simple economic framework of its beginnings to assert its supranational political vocation. Thatcherite politics had its influence: the glorification of neo-liberal idealism went hand in hand with the desire to go it alone in the face ofEU. But British Euroscepticism has experienced an unprecedented revival since the 1990s and the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, under the government of John Major. The rejection of the single currency and Schengen aimed to preserve the interests and integrity of the nation in the face of supposed interference from Brussels bureaucrats. This period also confirmed the evolution of the Eurosceptic discourse towards the right of the political spectrum. First of all, within the Conservative Party, particularly within a hard wing which wants to be the heir of Thatcherism in the face of “empathetic conservatism” (compassionate Conservatism) defended by David Cameron’s government. The success of UKIP (United Kingdom Independence Party), a populist party that came first in the 2014 European elections, popularized an argument that had hitherto been marginal in British Eurosceptic circles: the demand for a pure and simple withdrawal ofEU. If the party relies on the country’s sovereignist tradition, between defense of the pound sterling and rejection of European bureaucracy, it also builds its strategy on a particularly tense social context, where the specter of foreigners is constantly raised. Since the wave of immigration of workers from Eastern Europe that began in 2004 with the expansion ofEUuntil the current refugee crisis through the recession of 2008, the situation has only reinforced the Euroscepticism of the British.

Sociology of Eurosceptics

Contrary to what this shift to the right might suggest, there is indeed a left-wing Euroscepticism in the United Kingdom. Historically, the left wing of the Labor Party included a good number of Eurosceptics. Before Thatcher, as we have seen, the Conservative Party considered the EEC as a privileged platform to serve the economic interests of the country, provided that free trade is promoted; in these conditions, Labor feared an ultra-liberal drift in the European Union, which explains the opposition of many Labor members to membership in the years 1973-75. Left-wing Euroscepticism lost ground under Thatcher: in the 1980s, the Trades Union Congress (UTC), central organ of British trade unionism, understands its interest in creating alliances with socialist groups on the Continent, and today maintains this resolutely pro-European posture. At the end of the 1990s, the Blair and Brown mandates confirmed this opening towardsEUalbeit from a more social democratic perspective. However, the feeling of distrust towards Brussels still persists within the old Labor guard, resistant to the centrism of “New Labour”. From a sociological point of view, its supporters belong more to the working classes than to the intellectual and liberal professions, a group which forms the other core target of the Labor electorate. As on the right, we find in this left-wing Euroscepticism an attachment to certain values ​​perceived as typically British, such as the defense of parliamentary sovereignty in relation to Brussels authorities. However, criticism of the neo-liberal excesses of the Union is still present, especially since the Cameron government is accused of having supported this trend. Eurosceptic Labor members thus campaign against austerity policy, and for the maintenance of workers’ social rights despite the crisis. This is particularly the case of Jeremy Corbyn, the current leader of the party.

On the right, Euroscepticism displays a more contrasting face. Within the Conservative Party, the anti-EU often belong to the middle and upper classes, or even to the country’s political-financial elites, like Boris Johnson, former mayor of London and leading figure in the campaign for withdrawal. The rhetoric sometimes mixed with xenophobia of these conservatives can to a certain extent be confused with that of the UKIPbut the latter is aimed at a completely different audience. Indeed, the supporters of Nigel Farage’s party are mainly recruited from the most disadvantaged sections of the British population and/or those who consider themselves to be the first victims of European directives: precarious people from the old industrial centers in crisis, but also a good part of the rural world and fishermen, particularly in the east and south of England. With the UKIPthe sovereignist discourse no longer has the international dimension that it often has within the conservative party. In a populist vein, priority goes to the defense of English interests, allegedly besieged by greater Europe and, beyond, by the mass of migrants from outside the Union.

The case of UKIP thus recalls that in the United Kingdom, Euroscepticism is above all an English phenomenon, and not British strictly speaking. Let us recall the particular political nature of the country, which is not a federation, but a union of four nations where one (England) dominates the other three (Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland) by one point from a political, economic and cultural point of view. Consequently, Euroscepticism has never really spread into what has long been customary to condescendingly call the “Celtic margins”. For the Scots, Welsh and Northern Irish, theEU precisely represents a safeguard against English power. THE SNPScottish independence party and third political force in Great Britain since the general elections of May 2015, does not envisage its emancipation outside theEU.

Brexit and exploitation of Euroscepticism

Rightly, the rise of UKIP was analyzed as a blow to the two-party system which traditionally underpins the political landscape across the Channel. In this context, it is hardly surprising that Brexit is the privileged place for elaborate electoral strategies, aimed at (re)conquering the political field. The exploitation of Euroscepticism is therefore visible in the content of the debates, in particular with the crystallization around the question of migrants and Islamist terrorism. We can go further, however, and argue that the very idea of ​​the referendum is a matter of exploitation. The vote of June 23, 2016 is in fact not the result of popular will, but the result of a promise made by David Cameron during the 2015 general elections to the right wing of the Conservatives, a party of which he is also the leader. We therefore find ourselves in a paradoxical situation: a pro-European Prime Minister who organizes a referendum on the withdrawal ofEU. This is the result of a double pressure, exerted both by a party of which Cameron wants to keep the lead, and by the fear of seeing the Conservative vote transferred to the UKIPas was the case during the last European elections.

The use of Euroscepticism for strategic purposes is also on the Labor agenda. In the spring of 2016, Jeremy Corbyn surprised the political class by declaring himself opposed to Brexit, propelling his party into the “stay” camp. On only one condition: that Labor firmly commits to the reform of European institutions, in partnership with the other socialist parliamentary groups of the Union. It is a question of preparing the advent of a more social Europe, where the conservatives pro-EUDavid Cameron and George Osborne in the lead, want the liberal consensus to be maintained, driven by the strengthening of austerity measures and security policies in terms of immigration and the reception of refugees. By championing a reformist euroscepticism, which would not necessarily demand the withdrawal ofEUJeremy Corbyn pursues two specific political goals. It is firstly a question of gaining legitimacy within his party, to the extent that his positions have never been unanimous, in particular among those nostalgic for the more moderate New Labor. Second, he wants to assert his status as leader of the opposition. If the “stay” camp wins on June 23, Labor does not intend to cede the monopoly of victory to the Cameron government.

Whatever the outcome of the vote, Euroscepticism tells us as much about the United Kingdom itself as about its relationship with theEU. The prospect of the referendum has highlighted deep divisions between the different nations that make up the country, but also revealed internal party divisions, as well as significant competitive relationships and power struggles. It is therefore, at present, one of the most important barometers of British society.