Since its accession in 1973, the United Kingdom has made utilitarian use of the European Union, in order to optimize its economic interests. Is this still relevant at the time of Brexit? What consequences for these “two Europes” that are the euro zone and the single market?
The roots of British Euroscepticism
British Euroscepticism is rooted in a long tradition. Opposition to UK participation in theEU was already high in 1974 (39% of the British compared to 14% on average in the other Member States, graph 1), just one year after their accession. From a utilitarian perspective, Eurobarometer data show that a majority of British people have considered almost constantly for more than three decades that their country did not benefit from its participation in theEU (graph 2). From a more identity perspective, the British consider themselves very little European compared to the European average (graph 3). The 2015 British Social Attitudes survey indicates that 47% of British people considerEU as a threat to the cultural identity of the United Kingdom (compared to 30% who express the opposite feeling).
Traditionally, the United Kingdom’s participation in theEU was based on the desire to participate in the internal market, while the British rejected the idea of an ever closer union. The deepening of integration, for example with the creation of the Economic and Monetary Union and cohesion policies, has moved the reality away fromEU of the Economic Community into which the British had chosen to enter (and to remain following a first referendum in 1975). The result is that since 1996 the British have been overwhelmingly in favor of remaining in theEU provided that his powers are reduced. THE opt-outs and the budget rebate from which the United Kingdom benefited were intended to partly remedy this situation. In the same way, the agreement reached at the European Council in February 2016 aimed in its political and economic aspects to reassure the British about the sovereignty of the United Kingdom, by indicating that the United Kingdom is not bound by objective of an ever closer union and retains its autonomy vis-à-vis certain institutional reforms adopted by the euro zone following the financial crisis, for example the creation of the Banking Union and the European Stability Mechanism.
Furthermore, the referendum campaign showed that the British population did not share some of the foundations of British European policy. For example, it highlighted the rejection of migratory flows from other member states of theEU and the possible accession of Turkey, while the British governments have historically supported enlargement and had not adopted a transition period in terms of freedom of movement following the enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania .
These general considerations should not, however, mask notable differences within the British population. Recent studies show that individuals with lower income and educational level have a higher probability of being Eurosceptic. Likewise, Euroscepticism increases with age. Finally, geographically, urban areas, Scotland and Northern Ireland are structurally less Eurosceptic than the English countryside.
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Reason and feeling
We know the famous phrase from Zbigniew Brzezinski: “Through European construction, France aims for reincarnation, Germany for redemption”. For their part, the United Kingdom and the countries of Northern Europe (which draw a sort of geography of “reserve” with regard to European construction), traditionally aim for the “optimization” of their national interests. in a “utilitarian” logic of “cost”/“benefit” calculation. Is the United Kingdom, tempted by a “Brexit” (British Exit), still today in a logic of optimizing its national interests within theEU ?
Two seemingly contradictory temptations risk swelling the ranks of “leave” supporters. The first is the temptation of isolationism. This is fueled by fear of immigration and sovereignism, which could be reinforced by the influx of refugees into Europe in a context where confusion is maintained by supporters of “Brexit” between free internal movement and freedom of movement. external immigration. The second temptation is that of global free trade and the offshore financial center. Supported by the memory of the empire and the good health of the Commonwealth, but also by the desire to preserve the claimed status of the leading financial center, it affirms the global vocation of the United Kingdom, which European regulatory constraints would hinder. The two temptations, isolationist and globalist, are based on a logic that is more emotional and identity-based than just utilitarian. And their contradictions are only apparent: in the same way that the government aims to participate in the free movement of goods, services and capital, but not in that of people, the supporters of “leave” dream of making the United Kingdom a “greater Switzerland” open to foreign capital and competitive but closed to immigration and exempt from unwanted European rules. In the “stay” camp, emotional logic also mixes with the logic of interests. Its supporters thus play on the fear of the unknown and the prospect of a fragmentation of the Kingdom if an exit from theEU led to Scottish independence.
Brexit: amputation or “dis-integration” ofEU ?
The result of the referendum is naturally very difficult to predict. One thing is certain: a Brexit would throw the United Kingdom into the unknown and into prolonged negotiations – for at least two years – concerning the terms of separation and its future relations with the Union. In such a situation, European governments will be caught between two conflicting priorities: avoiding too quickly offering the United Kingdom an alternative to membership of theEU so as not to give the feeling that it is easy to get out of theEU and thus create a precedent; at the same time, find a solution and a way out for both political and economic reasons and in order to overcome the uncertainty that Brexit and the long negotiations that would result from it would inevitably bring.
A Brexit would be a bad thing for the Union: beyond the loss, in terms of the economic, political and strategic weight that it would represent for theEUan exit by the United Kingdom would be a symbol of disunity, in a context where the Union and its States need unity and cohesion to face the multiple crises affecting them. It would change the destiny of European integration by enacting a real political “dis-integration” of a regional experience without equivalent in the world and would not fail to boost Europhobic discourse in certain Member States: in the Netherlands, for example , some popular newspapers have already asked the question of organizing a referendum on the membership of the Netherlands in theEU and the neologism “Franxit”, in reference to Brexit, appeared in the French public debate. In addition, the United Kingdom is seen by many Member States as a fundamental player in European construction: particularly in terms of strengthening the internal market but also in terms of diplomacy, security and defense. Finally, for certain countries like France, Great Britain’s membership in theEU made it possible to establish a balance of power, particularly with regard to Germany.
Redefining relations between the “two Europes”
Although “Brexit” is not necessarily likely, we must nevertheless consider its possibility and think about the different scenarios that could result from these results. This is the condition for overcoming the uncertainty that weighs on the outcome of the process. The different options are now known: the “Norwegian” model in which the United Kingdom would join the European Economic Area; the “Swiss” option with the negotiation of bilateral agreements between the United Kingdom andEU ; the negotiation of a free trade agreement or an association agreement; the negotiation of a customs union with theEU (“Turkish” model). However, none of these different options is considered fully satisfactory by the British government since, of course, the United Kingdom would continue to participate in the internal market but would then lose a large part of its capacity to influence the rules of the internal market from then on. that he would no longer take part in their vote.
It is likely that, in the event of a vote in favor of leaving theEUa debate would begin in the United Kingdom and other European states as to the shape of the new relationship between the United Kingdom and theEU. It is notable that there is no agreement among the supporters of “leave” on this point and that a large part of the British political class wishes to preserve the United Kingdom’s access to the internal market. It is also not inconceivable that Parliament (or the British themselves if the question of the terms of the exit fromEU was subject to a referendum) is opposed to leaving the European Union which would imply a complete break with the internal market.
If the options of the European Economic Area and the Swiss model do not seem feasible for the United Kingdom in the current state of the existing systems, it is possible that the United Kingdom explores the possibility of a revision of the rules of the ‘European Economic Area (EEA) in order to confer equal voting rights on Member States of theEEA non-members of theEU (like Norway) for the policies in which they participate, in particular those relating to the single market.
Such an arrangement would have the advantage for the British of offering a compromise allowing them to avoid a brutal break with theEU and thus find a solution to the Scottish and Northern Irish questions. The United Kingdom would indeed continue to participate in the internal market and apply the corresponding rules which it would continue to help determine. It should certainly contribute to the budget of theEU but only for certain policies (for example, the United Kingdom would no longer participate in the common agricultural policy). Finally, freedom of movement would continue to apply but the Agreement onEEA provides for safeguard measures that can be activated unilaterally (Article 112 of the Agreement onEEA ).
This arrangement would nevertheless be potentially destabilizing for the rest of the Union since such a status could tempt other Member States. On the other hand, such a scenario could ultimately lead to realignment of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) with theEUwhile theEEA would provide the institutional framework for the single market. In such a scenario, the integration of the euro zone would be less subject to the need to create structures ad hoc. Such an arrangement could further offer an alternative for candidate states for enlargement which might choose to apply for entry into theEEA rather than in the Union.
This scenario is of course hypothetical but it suggests that, fundamentally, a “Brexit” could in fact lead to a rethinking of the relationship between the “two Europes” that are the euro zone and the single market.