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For the first time since she entered the running for a major election, Marine Le Pen is shown as the winner in polls for both the first round and the second round. In the Cluster 17 survey conducted at the end of July, she secures around 30% in the two proposed first-round configurations. She then defeats each of the five opponents tested, and the tightest duel, against Édouard Philippe, remains measured at 52-48 in her favor.
Nevertheless, many continue to believe that the National Rally and its candidate are, in one way or another, doomed to defeat, that they can dominate the first round and give the impression of creeping toward power without a majority of votes in their favor ever materializing.
This disbelief has a history, because Marine Le Pen has already lost three presidential elections, including two in the second round. More crucially, during the 2017 vote, the debate between her and Emmanuel Macron established a lasting image of a candidate poorly prepared to wield power and, in 2024 as well, the RN appeared likely to win an early parliamentary election before defections, appeals to block the RN, and the mechanics of the second rounds prevented it from securing the majority that had been anticipated. This scenario has become a habitual way of thinking, the idea that the RN can be shown as the winner but would ultimately fail.
However, a presidential election, which is not simply a sum of 577 local ballots, obeys a different dynamic. Moreover, today the structure of rejections is no longer the same. The old reflex of treating the RN candidate as the most unacceptable outcome no longer automatically works. The electoral veto that applied to the party and its candidates has greatly weakened and is now replaced by a series of intense, cross-cutting refusals that can be explained by a multipolar political space.
Voters seem to have absorbed this new reality even before some observers. When independently questioned, 43% of them designate Marine Le Pen as the figure most likely to win the next presidential election. Édouard Philippe, in second place, stands at 19%. Jean-Luc Mélenchon is third with 11%. All other contenders trail far behind. Marine Le Pen is thus no longer seen merely as a candidate who is almost certain to reach the second round, barring a major misstep in her campaign. She is anticipated as a winner, even beyond her own base.
That, of course, guarantees nothing and is not necessarily favorable to her either. Indeed, it can encourage tactical voting in her favor, foster defections, and make it harder for a challenger to emerge within her camp. But it can also push voters who see her as the worst possible outcome to seek, from the first round, the candidate best placed to block her, in a logic of “tactical voting.”
In any case, the campaign begins with this possibility: in 2027, Marine Le Pen could become President of the Republic. This was not the case in 2012, 2017, or 2022, and it should contribute to making the forthcoming presidential election a markedly different one for her and for her challengers.
The five reasons Marine Le Pen is currently the favorite
The election’s most structural divide plays out on her turf
A presidential campaign is never determined by a simple list of issues, themes, or programmatic measures. It depends on how voters interpret them, link them to one another, and incorporate them into a broader representation of society.
Politics is first and foremost a matter of cleavages; a few major value-based oppositions shape the electoral demand over time, determine the problems citizens deem important, the meaning they attach to them, and the solutions they find acceptable.
For several years now, Cluster 17 surveys have revealed two broad attitudinal cleavages. The first pits progressive and cosmopolitan sensibilities against conservative and ethno-traditionalist ones, structuring attitudes toward immigration, cultural diversity, national identity, minorities, authority, shifts in lifestyles, or the sense of decline. The second concerns the relationship to the system and change, separating voters who favor stability, institutional continuity, and gradual transformations from those who desire deeper political, economic, or institutional ruptures.
Thus, the first cleavage indicates which side of the political spectrum voters align with, while the second informs us about the desired intensity of change. Today, the first cleavage remains the more tightly linked to voting behavior, thereby offering Marine Le Pen a particularly favorable terrain.
Cluster 17 divides the electorate into sixteen groups (clusters), built from about thirty questions on the main issues dividing French society. No voting intention or party proximity enters their construction; they bring together individuals who share broadly the same value systems and similar attitudinal dispositions.
The geography of voting is striking. More than nine out of ten votes for Marine Le Pen come from clusters located on the conservative and ethno-traditionalist side of the cultural cleavage. The RN candidate exceeds fifty percent of the vote in these five clusters, with particularly high levels among the Refractors, the Authoritarians, and the Identitarians, and she also records substantial scores among the Conservatives and the Traditionalists. Conversely, she remains almost absent from the most progressive and cosmopolitan clusters.
These groups are not identical. The Social-Patriots often come from more popular backgrounds and are more favorable to rupture than the Traditionalists, while the Anti-Welfare group is more integrated into the system than the Refractors. Yet they share a common cultural grammar around the idea of excessive immigration, a demand for authority, identity anxiety, a sense of decline, and distrust of elites.
The map of intense support reproduces almost exactly the voting map. Support for Marine Le Pen thus results not merely from the tested candidate pool or a tactical voting calculation, but from her declared and potential electorate occupying the same geography of values. This constitutes her first structural advantage: to advance, she must first persuade voters who are somewhat less radical but located on the same cultural side as her core base, without crossing a major ideological boundary right away.
Priorities within the different electorates confirm this reading. Thus, Marine Le Pen’s supporters place security ahead of purchasing power and immigration. Bruno Retailleau’s supporters also prioritize security but assign more weight to debt and somewhat less to immigration.
This proximity helps explain the permeability between the two electorates. When a campaign concentrates on immigration, security, authority, or preserving the French way of life, it consolidates the RN core and can tip conventional right-wing voters, who share part of the diagnosis but remain uncertain about which candidate is most credible to translate it into policy.
The 2016 American election provides an illustration of this dynamic. In Identity Crisis, John Sides, Michael Tesler, and Lynn Vavreck explain that Donald Trump’s campaign did not create racial and identity divisions from scratch, but activated and intensified them by centering the competition on race, immigration, and religion. There is no direct mechanical analogy between the United States and France, but the lesson is that a candidate is favored when the campaign foregrounds the cleavage that unites his voters the most and divides his opponents the most.
This mechanism goes even further. Voters go beyond ranking themes by importance; they reinterpret them through their values. Ecology can be understood as protecting the climate and future generations, or as a punitive policy devised by urban elites against cars, single-family homes, and popular lifestyles. Welfare can be seen as a solidarity instrument, or as a reward for welfare dependence, a redistribution deemed unjust in favor of foreigners and the “lazy.” Thus, when a campaign structures itself around identity or security themes, such as immigration, authority, or a sense of cultural injustice, Marine Le Pen achieves several objectives. While we cannot mechanically conclude she will win, she manages to consolidate her base, stabilize hesitant voters with a traditional right-wing candidacy, and, in some second-round configurations, neutralize part of the center.
She won her camp’s primary without having to organize it
The second advantage for Marine Le Pen lies in the size and consolidation of her starting camp. To gauge partisan segments, we use a simple criterion: a political formation truly falls within the voter’s range of choice when it yields a probability of voting for it of at least 6 out of 10. For the center, the criterion is met whenever Renaissance, the MoDem, or Horizons achieve that score.
The RN-Reconquête segment is the largest: 33% of the French assign at least a 6 to one of these two formations. The central and LR segments each account for 22% of the electorate, LFI for 20%, and the PS for 19%. What is decisive for the competition is that these groups overlap, and more than half of LR voters who rate 6 or higher also rate the RN or Reconquête.
In the RN-Reconquête segment, 96% can imagine Marine Le Pen, and 89% give her a rating of 8 to 10.
To go further, we asked, without offering any list, which personality respondents “would like to see elected president.” Among voters giving at least 6 to the RN or Reconquête, 25% spontaneously name Marine Le Pen and 10% Jordan Bardella. The only other name that emerges strongly belongs to the same organization. Bardella, however, does not behave as a rival, at least for now.
Marine Le Pen therefore does not need to multiply transgressions to protect her right flank and can continue her normalization strategy, while Jordan Bardella occupies part of the RN’s media and generational space.
Bruno Retailleau remains acceptable to a significant portion of this electorate: 41% of the RN-Reconquête segment members can imagine voting for him. But his voting intention there only reaches 9%. Éric Zemmour sits at 7%. Both can penetrate this segment, but neither currently holds the leadership in it against Marine Le Pen.
Jean-Luc Mélenchon holds a comparable position in the LFI segment: 79% of his votes cast go to him. He is the only other contender who has already largely won the competition within his camp.
The PS does not yet have a clear usual representative, while Raphaël Glucksmann’s candidacy remains engaged in a broader competition. Édouard Philippe and Gabriel Attal continue to appear in opinion polls. Bruno Retailleau, finally, is not hegemonic among LR voters. In this context, where his rivals still need to win their own internal “primaries,” Marine Le Pen can therefore begin the campaign by seeking to broaden her base.
She translates potential into actual votes better than her rivals
A political potential indicates availability, without any guarantee that the candidate is the first choice, or that that preference will be considered sufficient to vote for them at the moment of voting.
Thus, one could give 7 out of 10 to Bruno Retailleau and 9 to Marine Le Pen, then both 6, and choose Marine Le Pen because she appears more capable of qualifying and winning. Someone else could give 8 to Dominique de Villepin, signaling appreciation while judging his candidacy not credible enough to merit their vote.
These situations explain why candidates with similar potential can obtain very different scores.
Marine Le Pen currently has the broadest and most intense potential. Almost all those who could imagine voting for her already give her a rating between 8 and 10. Among voters who place her above the 6 threshold, nearly eight in ten rate her strictly higher than all other tested figures. Jean-Luc Mélenchon presents a structure somewhat similar, though on a smaller scale.
Bruno Retailleau and, even more so, Dominique de Villepin sit in the opposite configuration. Their candidacy is imaginable for a significant slice of the electorate, but it is far less often a first choice. Their potential is thus broad, but softer, and therefore much less easily translated into votes.
The RN’s 6-or-more segment helps illuminate this mechanism. Bruno Retailleau has the widest potential there: 73% can imagine voting for him, compared with 55% for Édouard Philippe and 53% for Marine Le Pen. Yet voting intentions distribute differently: Édouard Philippe reaches 33%, Marine Le Pen 32%, and Bruno Retailleau 25%.
To explain this reversal, one must consider the rank of preferences. Among potential Marine Le Pen voters in this segment, 60% place her alone at the top among the tested candidacies. They are only 27% among those who consider Bruno Retailleau, who remains a possible choice among several.
“Tactical voting” exists, but it does not primarily take the form of a conscious political sacrifice in favor of Marine Le Pen. Among LR voters who declare they will vote for her, only 2% rate Bruno Retailleau higher, and 7% give him the same rating. More than nine out of ten already prefer Marine Le Pen.
The credibility of victory plays a key role. Among voters who are considering Marine Le Pen, a very large majority believe she has the best chances of being elected. By contrast, Dominique de Villepin is acceptable but is not deemed sufficiently likely to qualify and win to convert that sympathy into a vote.
The “tie-wearing strategy” has reshuffled the rejection hierarchy
Since succeeding her father, Marine Le Pen has pursued a strategy of depthening the diabolization. She avoids as much as possible the most polarizing transgressions, cultivates an image of competence, and seeks to place her party within the routine of institutions. Since the large influx of RN deputies into the National Assembly, this approach has been extended by what has been called the “tie strategy”: respecting parliamentary codes, controlling speaking times, staging a disciplined party ready to govern.
The electoral effect is precise. Marine Le Pen is no longer subjected to an exceptional veto that would single-handedly erase her chances for broadening her appeal and condemn her to lose second rounds, especially against “moderate” candidates.
To measure it, we combined two questions. A voter is considered to reject a personality if they give them 0 out of 10 — meaning they are “completely excluded” from voting for them someday — and/or if they select them in response to the question: “Is there one or more of these personalities for whom it is absolutely excluded that you would vote someday in a presidential election?”
The result is one of the most important findings of the survey. Marine Le Pen remains rejected by nearly one in two French people, which shows she has not become universally acceptable. But her rate of rejection is not higher than that for Édouard Philippe, Gabriel Attal, Raphaël Glucksmann, Bruno Retailleau, or Dominique de Villepin. She is not only far less rejected than Jean-Luc Mélenchon.
This situation also stems from the intense multipolarity that currently characterizes the political space, producing strong cross-rejections: right-wing voters reject left-wing candidates, centrist voters reject radical candidates, left-wing voters reject not only right-wing candidates but also center candidates and even left-wing voters toward moderate left candidates, and vice versa.
Combined with the RN’s normalization process, this multipolarity constitutes a new and substantial electoral regime that has erased the exceptional character of rejection. Marine Le Pen can now accumulate intense support without an equivalent acceptance and a level of refusal that is no longer abnormal and does not distinguish her, at this stage of the campaign, from her main rivals.
The geography of rejection is even more decisive. Among Bruno Retailleau supporters in the first round, only 21% express a veto against Marine Le Pen, while in the same electorate, Édouard Philippe is rejected by 31%. The traditional right is thus not only an area where Marine Le Pen can gain votes but also the space where the moral or political barrier to her vote has largely receded.
At this stage, Marine Le Pen wins the battle of the “lesser evil”
In such a fragmented and polarized electorate, no candidate possesses a majority of support. The second round obliges voters whose candidate was eliminated to choose among three responses: vote for one of the finalists, vote for the other, or abstain, vote blank, or vote null.
In that case, non-voting often expresses a double rejection or an equivalent negative between the finalists, and the 2027 election could thus become one of those presidential races where voting by default and the lesser evil weigh the most. Yet, at this stage, Marine Le Pen also wins this battle.
Each opponent solves part of the equation to defeat Marine Le Pen and degrades another part.
Jean-Luc Mélenchon mobilizes his base but triggers a massive barrier at the center and on the right. Raphaël Glucksmann manages to rally more central voters without mobilizing the Mélenchonists enough, and remains very marginal on the right. A centrist candidacy fares well in attracting left-wing voters, but a large portion of them opt not to vote. Bruno Retailleau holds the right more effectively, while nearly preventing left-wing mobilization.
The Republican front has lost strength and, at this stage, hardly exists as a ready-made anti-Le Pen majority to be activated.
To test this hypothesis, we searched among voters who still declare a blank vote, null vote, or abstention, those who nonetheless clearly prefer Marine Le Pen’s opponent, either because they reject Le Pen but not her rival, or because they give the rival at least three points higher rating.
This reserve represents only 1% of the electorate against Mélenchon, 6% against Glucksmann, 4% against Édouard Philippe, 5% against Gabriel Attal, and 4% against Bruno Retailleau. It would not be enough, on its own, to close the gap in four of the five duels. In the only duel measured at 52-48, it reaches the necessary order of magnitude, but Marine Le Pen also has a symmetrical reserve among voters who prefer her and still do not vote.
This balance of forces shows a new electoral regime where the Republican front can no longer be thought of as a sleeping majority that would merely need to wake up between the two rounds. It must now be politically produced. Essentially, voters who clearly prefer the opponent of Marine Le Pen already vote for him. Those who remain in non-voting are often caught in a deeper double rejection.
The five mechanisms that could still make her lose
If the hierarchy of cleavages and issues changes
The first reason for Marine Le Pen’s current strength could become one of her vulnerabilities. Her first-round electorate is unified by the cultural cleavage; as we have seen, her main clusters all lie on the conservative and ethno-traditionalist side. Yet they are much more dispersed on the second axis, which contrasts the desire for rupture with the pursuit of stability.
Her most solid core — the Identitaires, the Social-Patriots, the Refracteurs, and the Authoritarians — is largely sovereigntist, anti-establishment, and in favor of a strong transformation. As she broadens her audience, she encounters the Anti-Welfare, Traditionalists, and Conservatives—older voters from the right and center who are more anchored in heritage and attached to institutional continuity.
Against Jean-Luc Mélenchon, Marine Le Pen becomes the majority even among Centrists and the Apolitical. Against Raphaël Glucksmann, her advantage tightens around right-leaning clusters. Against Édouard Philippe, to stay ahead she must keep the Conservatives and Traditionalists. Thus, the broader the majority she seeks to build, the more she depends on voters culturally close but institutionally prudent.
The relationship to the European Union constitutes a central difficulty. The heart of the Le Pen vote remains sovereigntist, while a substantial portion of its margin of progression does not want either an exit from the Union, nor a currency or trade crisis, nor diplomatic isolation. These pro-stability voters can even be sympathetic to the protective dimension of Europe, to a European defense, and to stronger cooperation in facing external threats.
International politics can open the same fracture. A perceived proximity to Vladimir Putin or to Donald Trump can be tolerated in the anti-establishment core and become a disqualifier among pro-stability voters. A campaign dominated by Transatlantic tensions, the war in Ukraine, or the defense of European interests would make these contradictions much more visible.
Economy and pensions also divide this potential electorate. The more rupture-prone groups — who are, on average, more popular — expect protection and can accept strong state intervention. The more patrimonial voters demand tighter budget discipline, fiscal stability, and financial credibility. A wealth tax, the legal retirement age, or labor rights could oppose a social, rupture-oriented component to a more liberal or even libertarian one.
Ecology, finally, forces coexistence of climate skeptics, climate-concerned voters who resist constraints, and techno-solutionist profiles. As long as the campaign frames ecology as defending lifestyles against a punitive ecology, Marine Le Pen holds an advantage. If it becomes a question of energy, industry, or European credibility, the fault lines reappear.
Marine Le Pen is therefore strongest when the first cleavage drives the campaign. She becomes more vulnerable when she moves away from her core and the debate shifts toward Europe, institutions, international politics, or economic credibility.
If a credible rival obliges her to choose between her base and her margins
The current lack of strong competition on the right provides Le Pen with a major strategic advantage. This situation could evolve under two scenarios.
The first would come from traditional right. Bruno Retailleau (David Lisnard, in a different configuration, could seek to occupy part of the same space) is today the most visible competition and has considerable potential among LR voters who give at least 6, but he often remains a second choice, which limits his ability to compete directly with Marine Le Pen for qualification and, even more so, victory.
To become dangerous, Bruno Retailleau would need to convert his acceptability into intense support and win directly back from Marine Le Pen the voters who currently prefer her.
Thus, if Bruno Retailleau fully converted his currently mobilized potential, he could approach 28%. Marine Le Pen would drop to around 20% and Édouard Philippe to around 12%. This deliberately maximalistic scenario shows, however, that Retailleau’s current weakness lies mainly in the stronger preference of voters for other candidates and not in a lack of voice reservoir.
The second scenario would be a competition emerging within the RN-Reconquête segment itself, modeled on Éric Zemmour’s candidacy in 2022. If Éric Zemmour, Sarah Knafo, or another figure ran, it would not necessarily deprive Marine Le Pen of qualification but would force her to harden her rhetoric, multiply identity markers, and interrupt her normalization strategy.
If the electoral veto can be reactivated at least partially
Second-round voting intentions taken months before the election do not carry the same meaning as a vote cast in the actual between-round period.
Respondents do not know the first-round result, whether the duel will be close, whether abstention could help Marine Le Pen or her opponent, or what dynamic will dominate the campaign. They have not been exposed to media coverage, potentially decisive televised debates, positions taken by political leaders, unions, intellectuals, artists, or other public figures. They have not yet discussed their final choice with family, colleagues, or friends.
The second round can thus reduce some opponents’ sub-conversions. A left-wing voter who rejects the Macronist experience might end up voting for a centrist candidate to block the RN, just as a moderate right voter might decide to vote for a left-leaning figure they would never have chosen in the first round.
The months of campaigning, the national and international context, debates and events can especially alter the relative perception of the candidates. Marine Le Pen could become more unacceptable again than her opponent who would gain presidential credibility she currently lacks. Non-voting could appear as a decisive choice with significant consequences.
Nevertheless, the data we have allow us to say, and this bears repeating, that this evolution is neither natural nor inevitable. It will not suffice in most cases to activate an anti-Le Pen preference already formed. The campaign would therefore need to modify relative judgments, render the challenger more acceptable, reactivate the fear of a Le Pen presidency, and give abstainers the impression that their non-vote will affect the result.
The situation changes depending on the opponents. The rejection Mélenchon provokes on the center and right is stronger than that provoked by Marine Le Pen. Glucksmann and Attal have more substantial reserves, but not enough on their own. Retailleau aggregates better the right but encounters a very low ceiling on the left. More broadly, a centrist candidacy enjoys broader acceptability, but it must overcome the rejection of Macronism.
Thus the vote for the lesser evil can still be rebuilt, and such reactivation could hinge on the democratic threat. Indeed, after Mélenchon, she embodies the risk of drift toward authoritarianism. But this vote for the “lesser evil” would need to be mobilized by the campaign, because, as we have already stressed, simply waking a pre-existing anti-RN majority among voters does not match the data available today.
A 52-48 lead is a very modest advantage at the starting line
A 52% to 48% score places Marine Le Pen at the top but does not give her a comfortable lead. Several months before the vote, such a balance remains fragile, if we take into account the margin of error in polls, and the fact that relative to the electorate, the gap represents a very small number of behaviors to move.
In the three most recent presidential second rounds, the expressed votes represented on average about 69% of registered voters. Applied to a 52-48 gap, this corresponds to just under 3 percentage points of the entire voting population.
With a voter population of around 50 million registered voters, the equality could be achieved by roughly 1,400,000 additional votes for the opponent, if no Marine Le Pen voter changes their behavior. A direct transfer is twice as effective, about 700,000 voters moving from Marine Le Pen to her opponent would suffice. An abstention of roughly 1,400,000 Marine Le Pen voters would have the same effect.
The most realistic scenario would be a combination of more limited movements, including a bit more participation among left-wing voters, some transfers among LR voters, and a slight decrease in RN mobilization.
Édouard Philippe is an example of the tested configuration where the gap is smallest, but the question of which candidate will represent the center bloc remains open and other figures may emerge. What matters at this stage is that a second round measured at 52-48 at the start of the campaign remains easily reversible. The four other duels would require a deeper recomposition of preferences and rejections, but an eight-month campaign can produce shifts of this magnitude.
Because she is more anticipated than desired
The last fragility of Marine Le Pen lies in the nature of her lead. She holds a high voting intention, intense support, and a strong credibility of victory, but these three advantages do not necessarily mean that she already generates a large wave of expectation.
To measure this, we asked an open-ended question: “Which personality would you like to see elected President in 2027?”, without proposing any name, thereby seeking to identify spontaneous presidential desire.
Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon arrive individually at the same level, around 8%, while Marine Le Pen leads by about twelve points in voting intentions. Marine Le Pen and Jordan Bardella together reach 11%, and the major nationalist figures cited total around 15%.
Thus, among those who declare they will vote for Marine Le Pen, 33% spontaneously name her and 13% name Jordan Bardella. In Mélenchon’s electorate, 51% name Mélenchon and 5% François Ruffin, which shows that the Mélenchonist demand is more focused on a single person, whereas the RN’s demand is spread between a candidate and a political family now with several embodiments.
If we look at how voters rank candidates’ strengths, Marine Le Pen leads nationwide for presidential bearing, understanding of everyday life, and ability to improve the country, which aligns with her current leadership. However, she never garners a majority. Only 22% see her as the most capable to improve the country’s situation, and on the question of uniting the country, the highest percentage response is “none of them.”
The gap is even more revealing when analyzed by partisan segments. Among voters giving at least 6 to the RN or Reconquête, 63% believe Marine Le Pen would improve the country, but this falls to 27% among those who could vote LR, then to 9% in the central segment. Yet these are precisely the voters she must win over to convert her lead into a majority.
The same dynamic appears when we consider institutional questions. In the LR segment, only 19% designate Marine Le Pen as the candidate who would best respect institutions, and in the central segment, only 6%. Nearly three in ten still see her as the main risk of drifting toward authoritarianism.
Normalization has made her victory possible without generating a majority desire to exercise power. Nothing in these data resembles a grand alternation driven by massive collective longing. Anticipation can feed tactical voting, but at the same time it means a portion of her lead remains vulnerable to the opponent’s credibility and to the return of doubts about her governance capacity.
Favorite, but not invincible
Can Marine Le Pen lose the presidential election?
Yes, but, as noted, she would probably not lose simply by the repetition of the logic that prevailed in previous ballots. The Republican front has eroded and no longer constitutes a latent majority guaranteed by its activation. At the same time, Marine Le Pen is not more rejected than the leading contenders tested, and she enjoys the strongest support, dominates the RN-Reconquête segment by a wide margin, makes deep inroads into the LR electorate, and faces opponents who elicit, in parts of the electorate, a rejection or abstention at least as strong as the rejection she provokes.
Despite her advantages, the outcome of the election remains open. A Marine Le Pen defeat could result from a campaign that shifts the debate from the cultural cleavage toward European, economic, and institutional fractures cutting across her broadened electorate; from a right-wing competition forcing her to choose between normalization and radicalism; from a real-world reconfiguration of the lesser-evil vote in the second round; from limited expressions of participation or transfers in a tight duel; or from a reactivation of doubts about her governing capacity in an electorate where anticipation of victory still far surpasses the hope she inspires.
Today Marine Le Pen enjoys the easiest majority to construct, which makes her the favorite of the election. She does not yet possess, far from it, a majority eagerly supporting her arrival to power. The 2027 presidential election will be played in this gap.