Homicide, a decline crime

Informed and deep, theHistory of homicide in Europeunder the direction of Laurent Mucchielli and Pieter Spierenburg, present in its first two chronological parts of the monographs of European countries, organized according to a grid of analysis relating to eight key questions: sources, forms, developments, factors of evolution, actors, motivations, conflicts, interpretations. The third part, the most remarkable, partly takes up the local information and the questions of the previous parts, while deepening them. Thus James Sharpe, by retracing the history of violence in England, he justifies the choice of the subject of research: homicide easily offers information on the state of respect for laws and the level of civilization of a society.

There are data on this violent act, which is more reported than rape or theft ; There is no shortage of sources, but their reliability and their dispersion according to the eras are problematic. For example, the registers holding is random in the Middle Ages, the wars partially destroy local archives, the estimates of the forensic doctists are subject to guarantee and recent victimization surveys. Then add Sharpe,

“” The social indicators built (age, basic social unit, “social class”) are mainly produced by an external researcher to the company observed and include a significant risk of anachronism. And finally, micro- or macro-sociological cultural determinations on the “functions” of violence are based on conjectural interpretations of the motivation of irreparably disappeared individuals. (P. 295)

Despite the fascination it exercises, homicide remains a minority act of which, according to L. Mucchielli, statistical sources present only one facet.

Pacification of customs or social discipline ?

Important questions appeal to the contemporary reader. First, the conceptualization by researchers of interpersonal violence. Can words be also “ killer That acts ? This was the subject of a keen debate between two Dutch researchers, W. de Haan and P. Spierenburg, published in Violence in Europe. Then how to explain the decline of homicides since the Middle Ages ? Medical progress must certainly be mentioned, but also, as the Spanish researcher T. Mantecon, the causes of economic, legal, institutional, administrative, social and cultural and, we could add, the progress of instruction. During the troubled periods, in particular wars, the brutalization of social behavior has an impact on the dynamics of violence. In contrast, the disarmament of the groups by the authorities, the eviction of the tramps of the streets of Madrid at the XVII^e century, the inspection of inns and the creation of “ peace courts “, Before which the peasants presented their complaints (p. 39), reduce it. The duel ban is also to be taken into account.

The interpretation of violence is available in time-was the Middle Ages more violent ? – And the place, local information being essential for this research. What place played the code of honor and shame in essentially collective and public conflicts managed by young men ? Its importance over the Mediterranean periphery leads to studying social attitudes towards homicide as a cultural phenomenon. It has long been Vendettas in Greece. But during the modern period, perceived through the laws as a sign of archaism and “ defective civilization He is gradually rejected.

Two major explanatory theories of the decline of homicides divide researchers. Can we generalize the English thesis of Norbert Elias, according to which the pacification of mores and the affirmation of the State, a police and professional justice have issued societies of the duty of revenge and self-defense ? Should we prefer that of the social discipline that Michel Foucault develops ? For Xavier Rousseaux, Bernard Dauven and Anne Musen, who analyze the evolution of European urban societies, the first theory highlights the mechanism of distinction-imitation combining coercion and internalization of behavior, while the second suggests a social control project by the authorities, articulated around the stigma and the repression of behaviors deemed to be antisocial (p. 306).

Elias’ theory is illustrated from the middle of XVI^e century in the County of Cheshire, in the northwest of England. At the beginning of modern times, between the end of the Middle Ages and the beginning of the XIX^e A century, Sharpe was surprised, courses did not want to declare guilty people accused of homicides, astonishing observant for the modern observer (p. 237). The evolution of interpersonal violence does not infirm the deepening of the process of pacification of mores and social disciplinarization, advance the researchers, but inscribes it in an increasing segregation of the democratic organization of the distribution of wealth (p. 275). Segregation, as illustrated moreover by the example of black Americans, deprived of mobility of the paved groups relegated to circumscribed spaces and generates a violent subculture, expressed by murders committed on other blacks. The two theses have in common to give the elites an initiative role. However, if social control is done well from above, it is also exercised from below within village communities, clans, guilds and cultures endowed with their own rules. It is the interaction of the two processes that makes sense.

A comparison of the contemporary evolution of violent crimes and crimes in England, Germany and Sweden by C. Birkel leads him to study the transformations of individualism. Moral individualism, formulated by Durkheim as a normative doctrine, would be based on a democratic welfare state. In contrast, individualism “ disintegrative »Place personal interest in its center ; It would be characterized by the utilitarianism to which a state would correspond “ night watchman And weakened. It would cause violence, in particular instrumental, rational and planned (p. 220). Justified in the English case, this hypothesis is informed in Sweden, quintessence of the welfare state, where the growth of violent delinquency remains strong.

In France, 1,000 homicides per year

The book addresses other themes, that of the conflicts of power of the elites, in particular the princely authorities, anxious to control collective violence in the north of Europe – they prohibit the use of dangerous weapons or “ sneaky Like sharp knives. What is the impact of urbanization ? Are cities more dangerous ? The answer is relative according to places and times. Finally, one can wonder about the European character of these phenomena. Political centralization in Europe leads to delegitimizing self -defense and private justice of local communities (p. 311).

Many information is attracting attention. Thus, the structural stability of homicides is striking in contemporary France: about a thousand per year, two thousand by counting attempts (uncertain concept). They are made by men, little educated, unemployed or inactive, Homelessengaging in proximity crimes between “ familiar ” And “ intimate ». It is wrong, according to L. Mucchielli, to read a rejuvenation in the phenomenon of contemporary violence. We must attach a particular interest to the suicide rates which inflate the criminal statistics.

P. Spierenburg, for his part, refutes the “ Polder model “:” No valid historical testimony makes it possible to affirm that the Dutch company is characterized by a tradition of non-violence (P. 79). It is in the European average. But his elites present the remarkable feature of having refused to join the formal duel, while they adopted the French aristocratic methods from half the XVII^e century. We still learn that brigandage has raged in rural and mountain Greece throughout the XIX^e century. The brigands had ambiguous relationships with the state. The latter sought to remove them to establish his power while pushing them to perform raids inside the Ottoman borders. The brigands here, as elsewhere, were assured of respecting peasants (p. 110). Many vignettes featuring quarrelsome sailors, avenging husbands, men anxious to avenge the honor of women or engaging in family vendettas make the reading of these works of historians and sociologists.