Madagascar the unstable

Since its independence in 1960, Madagascar has experienced four major political crises. Strangely, each of these episodes of institutional instability was preceded by a period of economic improvement, the gains of which were in fact quickly cancelled out. How can we explain this link between periods of economic growth and political crises? This is the paradox that Mireille Razafindrakoto, François Roubaud (economists, respectively director and research director at theIRD) and Jean-Michel Wachsberger (sociologist, lecturer at the University of Lille).

This book thus aims to identify the structuring nodes of the Malagasy enigma, in other words the political, economic and social factors which would make it possible to explain this inability to initiate a process of sustainable development and to establish a stable political order.

Economic theory facing the Malagasy enigma

The first step in this approach is to mobilize development theories. The subject here is somewhat technical, but the pedagogy demonstrated by the authors makes the reading accessible even to non-economist readers. The theory of growth, the authors remind us, tends to explain the absence of growth by a suboptimal use, or even a deficiency of certain production capitals such as labor, land or infrastructure resources. The authors nevertheless quickly dismiss this hypothesis: Madagascar benefits from a more educated and healthier population than other African countries that are more successful economically; the country also benefits from a certain linguistic homogeneity and the ethnic fact remains relatively unimportant; it is well endowed with land and natural resources; finally, it is in the average of African countries in terms of governance, even if the last political crisis has undermined this capital.

The authors then turn to political economy, using the conceptual framework of different social orders developed by North and his co-authors. This framework stipulates that access to a stable social order capable of managing violence, which North et al. call the “open access order,” is based on the ability to establish political and economic competition, the state’s monopoly on the control of violence, and strong state institutions. However, on these three aspects, Madagascar does not stand out from the African average.

Inequality, the key to socio-political instability

The authors then undertake a large-scale historical synthesis – over the last three centuries – of economic, cultural and political work in order to reveal the structuring nodes of the evolution of Madagascar. We will note here the concern for pedagogy of the authors, who, through summary tables, clearly and concisely present the main changes during the six historical periods investigated. Some positive developments are thus highlighted, in particular the progressive widening of the political-economic elite circle and the emergence of a democratic aspiration within the population. But it is above all the persistence and increase over time of a certain number of inequalities that this historical analysis shows: economic inequalities and political participation between urban and rural dwellers (who represent nearly 80% of Malagasy people); the excessive personalization of presidential power; the economic importance of cash crops, which since the early 2000s have become the subject of a mafia economy with trafficking in precious wood and mineral resources.

Extending this historical analysis, the authors then take stock of the strengths and weaknesses of Malagasy society and economy. Concerning the strengths, they note the capacity of the State to control violence: political crises and changes at the head of State have taken place with very little recourse to violence, and its use has not been privatized by the army. In general, the level of violence suffered by the population (physical attacks or home robberies) is low compared to other African countries. This control of violence, explain the authors, is partly linked to the very hierarchical structure of Malagasy society. The authors also highlight the capacity of State institutions to initiate economic development processes, although these processes are not able to be maintained over time.

Finally, they highlight the ability to fight corruption and the population’s attachment to democracy. The importance of expectations in terms of democratic governance also seems to arouse a feeling of frustration among the population and could be an explanatory factor in the link between periods of growth and political crises, the former stirring up aspirations that become less and less bearable and leading to a questioning of the established order.

Concerning weaknesses, the authors distinguish between internal and external factors. Several internal factors thus explain the political sluggishness of Madagascar: the atomization of the rural population which remains cut off from the rest of the country in terms of infrastructure, economic exchanges, but also means of communication (Madagascar is thus one of the countries where inequalities between cities and the countryside are the most significant); the absence of an intermediary body due to very low membership in political parties and associations; the inability of elite groups (religious, economic, political and ethnic) to consolidate alliances in order to bring about stable political forces. Concerning external factors, the authors highlight, among other things, the weakness of international aid to Madagascar compared to other developing countries: in 2013, Madagascar was the penultimate country in Africa that received the least aid per capita (only Angola did worse). This low investment from the international community can be explained, according to the authors, by the non-geostrategic nature of the island (whether in military, commercial or resource terms) and – more ironically – by the latent and non-acute nature of the crises, which do not cause media excitement.

A dive into the world of Malagasy elites

The last part of the book focuses on elites, who play a central role in institutions and organizations and therefore more generally in the development process. This part is undoubtedly the most original and stimulating aspect of the demonstration. On the one hand, because this subject is not a traditional research theme in development economics and international action, focused on issues of the fight against poverty. However, it can be linked to the recent emergence of the research agenda on inequalities, popularized among others thanks to the work of Wilkinson or Piketty. On the other hand, the methodology deployed enriches the historical approach used until then: the last chapter is based on a statistical survey carried out among 1000 people considered to be part of the elites in Madagascar in different spheres (politics, economy, religion, army, civil society, international organizations, public institutions) and therefore constitutes a new source of information. The survey thus reveals a typical profile of these elites: a man with an average age of 55, a Protestant, a graduate and originally from the region of the capital, Antananarivo. This social group is fairly watertight and enjoys strong social reproduction: nearly half of the people who are part of it have at least one parent who is/was part of the elite. Thus, the Malagasy elite, associated by definition with the ruling class, has been broadly the same since independence in 1960. We also note a strong capacity of this social group to accumulate positions of responsibility in the different spheres of power (political party, civil society, businesses, religious groups, international organizations, etc.), which accentuates the phenomenon of concentration of power.

This ruling class is therefore largely disconnected from the issues that affect the majority of the population, as shown by their opinion on political priorities and their understanding of the factors blocking and/or long-term development of the country. Thus, while the population as a whole tends to place the improvement of living conditions as an absolute priority, the elites tend to place the maintenance of order at the top of the political agenda. Moreover, while the mismanagement of leaders is considered by the elites to be the main obstacle to development, other factors are also incriminated, such as the “mentality of the population” or foreign interference. In conclusion, the Malagasy elites have demonstrated a strong capacity to maintain their status over time since the colonial period, to the detriment of the interests of the population.

This work therefore provides extremely interesting reading keys to better understand Malagasy society and development trajectory. We will underline the methodological ambition of this research in a country where the lack of data and reliable analysis is obvious. We regret, however, that the final recommendation proposed by the authors is limited to the creation of a body for dialogue between the authorities and citizens, aided by scientific research. In view of the wealth of the preceding analysis, this proposal does not appear to be sufficiently supported, nor up to the challenges described in the work. Beyond the country itself, it is a more general reflection on the development process to which the authors invite us, and in particular on the weight of social structures and values.

Without falling into a culturalist determinism, the fine analysis of the economic, political and social determinants and especially their comparison with other countries of the African continent make it possible to show the Malagasy specificities such as the social structure (isolation of the rural population, absence of intermediary bodies). The culture of non-violence that characterizes Malagasy society also explains the absence of strong social demands that would allow for the nourishment of a real political contestation. So many factors that allow the elites to ensure their social reproduction.