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In France, top voices keep asserting that the Russian threat does not exist, even less so, they say, that Putin’s Russia is in difficulty in Ukraine. You run a country that borders Russia. What do you tell them?
Russia is in trouble only because the European strategy is working. It may seem dull and predictable, but it has produced stunning results. We cut Moscow off from the technologies and resources it needs to feed its war machine through sanctions, we track its ghost fleet, we keep its assets frozen. Those who invoke Russia’s difficulties to deny the threat are confusing cause and effect.
And I will give them a very concrete example of what awaits us all. Estonia has just taken an initiative: denying entry to anyone who has fought or supported Russia’s aggression against Ukraine.
Putin currently has more troops than at the start of the war. Before and during the conflict, we dealt with mercenary groups such as Wagner. Even if the fighting stopped tomorrow with a ceasefire or a lasting peace, Russia would still count hundreds of thousands of battle-hardened and murder-ready men.
That is a matter of European internal security.
In what sense? Isn’t the veterans’ problem more Russia’s problem?
These men are celebrated as heroes in Russia, but many are criminals who do not even belong to the regular army. The only question that matters is: where will they go?
That is a question addressed to all the French, Italians and Germans.
How many of these war criminals would you like as neighbors? At what point is it too many? These men will not join the regular job market. They will turn to illicit, even criminal activities. It’s a huge problem for Putin, but also for us.
Estonia routinely endures hybrid attacks from Russia that Western Europe largely ignores. Can you cite concrete cases?
In 2007, after the removal of a statue commemorating the Soviet occupation, Estonia became the first country in the world to be targeted by systematic Russian cyberattacks.
One might think that Russia is currently concentrating all its resources on the aggression against Ukraine. That is false. Over the last three years, the number of cyberattacks against Estonia has tripled. The Kremlin is developing new electronic and digital warfare capabilities.
To answer your question. Why should we all worry about this? Because everything contained in our phone can be turned against us. And I am convinced that within six to eighteen months, they will use artificial intelligence to analyze, corrupt, alter, and steal our data on a large scale.
As long as Putin’s regime does not abandon its objective of expansion and reconstitution of the Soviet Union, all NATO and European countries will face a problem. That is why we should all worry. We defend the Eastern flank. Ukraine holds the front line against Russia. Ukraine holds the front line. But Russia already threatens in our digital space, right at our doorstep.
Let us return to the war in Ukraine. Is a ceasefire feasible? And to achieve it, must Europe dialogue with Russia?
The only negotiations that should take place are those between Ukraine and Russia. They should occur on the terms set by Ukraine, which implies maintaining the pressure on Moscow until it accepts those terms.
If Europe positions itself as a mediator, it traps itself. A mediator stands between the two parties, and it always ends up saying: “Okay, I give up on new sanctions, I ease my position on this point.” We would thus lose our leverage without gaining anything in return. This would help neither Ukraine nor peace.
The division of roles must remain simple: Europe supports Ukraine — and France is already doing an excellent job —, Ukraine negotiates with Russia.
You are at the highest level of the volunteer coalition. What concrete outcomes has it produced?
Each country and each leader has their own stance. But the overall message is clear: support for Ukraine is so broad that Russia has no chance, and we will not give way. Emmanuel Macron, Keir Starmer and Friedrich Merz have succeeded in mobilising broad backing. It is not just the European Union or the usual group of Ukraine’s allies, but also Turkey, Japan and Canada.
Ukraine knows it can count on dozens of states to help it face any problem with Russia. And Russia sees that too.
We will stay engaged for as long as necessary, and we will do whatever is required to push back Russia and support Ukraine.
The United States were the great absence from the coalition as well as yesterday’s parade on the Champs-Élysées. Do you think this July 14 marks a turning point by making a non-NATO military alliance clearly visible?
If the question is whether we are witnessing the emergence of a European defense force, I would probably say yes. However, everything is framed within NATO defense plans.
This is the strategy on which we base our spending in particular. In Estonia, it amounts to 7% of GDP: 5.4% for basic defense, 1.5% for broader defense, in line with NATO objectives. We are developing our industry and capabilities, in addition to the Alliance, never in competition with it. Donald Trump’s demands also go in the same direction.
At its creation, Europe was a peace project without weapons. It becomes a peace project with weapons. In three to five years, we will have a defense industry capable of producing what we need. Europe is the wealthiest and most free region in the world. If we want to stay that way, we must invest there.
Over the past years, several layers of defense have been put in place in Europe: there is Article 5, the volunteer coalition, and bilateral agreements. The President has launched the debate on nuclear deterrence. Do you think at some point this mechanism should be institutionalized as a European defense treaty?
We already have Article 42(7), which is a mechanism for sharing burdens. In European Council meetings, we have discussed the need to better understand how it works and its implications. The European Union and its member states are fully capable of handling crises.
The real question — how to align Article 42-7 with NATO’s Article 5 — is already on the table. Article 5 is the clear bedrock. European defense cooperation projects come to add to it, not substitute it.
What place should Ukraine occupy in this architecture?
Its future lies in the Union, without a doubt, and it could also be in NATO. Ukraine today has the most capable army in Europe, the only one truly facing Russia. Where else should it belong if not in both?
Kyiv today possesses the sharpest understanding of this war and the most advanced know-how in electronic warfare and drones. Estonia has even signed a drone treaty with Ukraine. One figure: Putin sends about 35,000 of his soldiers to death in Ukraine each month, and 90% of these losses are caused by drones.
How do you assess Germany’s defense spending efforts? Is this a lasting strategic transformation or merely a short-term correction?
That is for Friedrich Merz to answer. As prime minister, I would say only that what is written in the budget has a strong likelihood of being kept, and that everyone expects Germany to invest more.
Many aspects must be taken into account. The defense industry already represents a substantial value. It is not only about producing munitions, but also about implementing highly sophisticated technologies and maintaining a solid knowledge base, including AI. It is a capability one would want to have in one’s industrial arsenal. Germany is the engine of the European economy; I hope therefore that it will increase its defense spending and support its industry.
Should this effort be part of the European project to strengthen a common European defense base rather than remaining a purely national reinforcement?
It already fuels the European project. France has deployed troops to Estonia, which we greatly appreciate. The German-Dutch corps is now responsible for defense planning in our region. I hope this continues, because as long as Russia remains a serious threat to all members of the Union and NATO, these investments will be necessary. They will not diminish.
I do not want to give the impression that everything will be fine and nothing will happen. Because Putin has not changed his goals. He is ready to kill 35,000 of his own citizens every month to restore the USSR. Those who have known the Soviet Union up close know that we must oppose him.
What might Europe-Russia relations look like if a ceasefire were concluded?
I may be optimistic, but I hope things unfold like this: we reach a just and lasting peace on Ukraine’s terms, Russian leaders will be judged, and it will be the Russians who pay for all the damage caused, not our taxpayers. That should be our vision.
And what if reality lies somewhere between the two?
The fundamental principles, however, do not move. First, the frozen assets must compensate Ukraine. Since that will not be enough, there will probably be taxes or customs duties on Russian products to cover the rest. It is not just about money; paying for the damages we caused keeps us aware of our responsibility. Then the Russian leaders must answer for their acts. If no one is brought to justice, territorial aggression will resume. We do not know when or how — but aggression will resume.
Sovereignty is no longer fought only with tanks and territory, but in technology and the digital space. Estonia is one of the most advanced states in Europe in digital terms. Yet, like the whole continent, it depends on American AI models.
The whole world depends on these technologies and the markets built around them, and the United States are the leading developers, with numbers almost unimaginable. The Union is not there yet, even as cutting-edge technology becomes a new battleground.
Europe must meet this challenge. We need our own processor capabilities, cooperation rather than dependence on a single large data center, our own AI models and our own algorithms. Let us hope that cooperation prevails. Because if decisive technologies exist and we do not have access to them, divergence will hit our economies and our societies.
Without a union of capital markets, can European businesses compete at this level of financing? Would Estonia be ready to fund a top-tier open European AI lab, even if it wasn’t located on its own soil?
Everything comes down to details. But if the objective is to build in Europe a structure capable of competing with the United States or China, then yes, we would be ready to help.
One caveat, however: these projects succeed when they arise from private competition. I have never seen a good project that is purely state-driven. There must be private champions who show the way and states that follow, saying: “Yes, we buy your processors. Yes, we use your algorithms for our most strategic infrastructures.”
Negotiations on the next multiannual financial framework are opening, in a context marked by the question of new common debt. Do you think it would be possible to fund common public goods with new debt?
No, and that will probably not happen, due to insufficient support. But discussions ahead of us remain, and I support the European Council President’s aim to reach an agreement by the end of the year.
The current proposal suits us. For additional funding, we are ready to contribute from our national budget, but not through new taxes. So expect lively discussions on how to fund a larger budget. The question of balancing new priorities with old ones also arises. For us, military capabilities and critical infrastructure should be part of it.
We already see that net contributing countries say this budget is still too high and a choice must be made: either additional funding is provided, or cuts are made elsewhere.
France, Spain and Italy vote next year. Will the European architecture you describe — defense, infrastructure, AI — survive a change of leadership?
I hope so. The Russian threat remains, and I imagine all leaders are aware of that. But in every country — including Estonia — populists repeat that “it’s not our war,” that we should not “get involved,” that the eastern flank should fend for itself.
France, for its part, has been at the forefront: it faced the Russian threat, asked the right questions, pressured Moscow. I hope to see the same momentum after the elections, because Europe’s future depends on it, at least in the short term.
In the long run, I remain convinced that history ultimately vindicates: the European project is a success far greater than anyone would have dared imagine.