Published on October 27, 2025, Deciding to Win is a report authored by Simon Bazelon, Lauren Harper Pope, and Liam Kerr, three leading figures of Welcome, a movement network advocating a majority-centered realignment of the Democratic Party.
It appears a year after Kamala Harris’s defeat, as Donald Trump begins a second term marked by tariff policies, cuts to Medicaid, and tax cuts for the wealthiest, and just days before the elections of Zohran Mamdani in New York, as well as the more centrist victories of Abigail Spanberger in Virginia and Mikie Sherrill in New Jersey.
This text, whose full version runs 352 pages, rests on a strategic bet summarized by the phrase: “Winning is a choice.”
This particularly articulated diagnosis relies on a substantial body of data. About thirty graphs, drawn notably from surveys of more than 500,000 voters conducted by Blue Rose Research, describe a party that has moved to the left on nearly every issue since Barack Obama’s 2012 re-election.
According to the authors, since then “highly educated collaborators, donors, pressure groups, experts and elected officials have redefined the Democratic Party’s agenda.” This shift has produced a detachment. By September 2025, 54% of them regarded the Democratic Party as “too liberal,” versus 49% who found the Republican Party “too conservative.” If 47% of voters placed the economy among their top three priorities, only 17% thought it was among the Democrats’ top priorities. This retreat has particularly affected moderate and conservative voters from working-class and minority communities, as in Starr County, Texas, where Hispanics exceed 95% and the Democratic vote fell from 86% in 2012 to 42% in 2024, contributing substantially to Donald Trump’s victory.
To regain a new majority centrality, the report’s authors proposed two ruptures with two different forms of “orthodoxy” that fueled both an intense internal dynamic among the party’s currents and a political dead end with voters, in order to “listen more to voters and less to donors disconnected from reality and party elites detached from the base.”
The first is a centrist orthodox doctrine, one portraying the party as the defender of the establishment and institutions, while a broad portion of the electorate believes the system is rigged in favor of the wealthy. The report therefore calls for denouncing the outsized influence of lobbyists and large corporations on American politics and breaking with a business-centric centrism. It also notes that “voter frustrations with the status quo are not synonymous with a desire for socialism,” with the vast majority of Americans remaining favorable to capitalism.
The second is a progressive orthodoxy that designates the range of positions that have become markers of affiliation with the Democratic camp since 2012, under the influence of a politically educated staff, donors and activist groups to the left of the average voter. It covers a line deemed lax on immigration and public safety, a desire to restrict energy production, and cultural positions such as affirmative action at universities or allowing transgender athletes to compete in women’s events.
Against these two orthodoxies, the goal is to embrace “popular, often heterodox” positions. Democrats must thus be “prepared to break with the party’s unpopular orthodoxies,” whether demands come from big private corporations, left-wing activists or donors, even if it leads to a line that seems ideologically less coherent or less driven by a base of activists.
The report draws on models from across the party, from Bernie Sanders, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Zohran Mamdani’s focus on the cost of living to Ruben Gallego’s firmness on immigration policy, because “every wing of our party has something to contribute.” It places at the heart of the program measures widely supported, such as drug price negotiation, a $15 minimum wage, and a fair contribution from the wealthy toward taxes.
The November 3, 2026 election provides a striking illustration. In Texas, James Talarico became the first Democrat elected as a Senator from Texas since 1988 by presenting himself as “a Democrat with border security,” acknowledging Biden’s migration failures and distancing himself from progressive calls for a fast exit from fossil fuels, defending the oil and gas industry, while basing his campaign on a populist economic message and an empathy-centered Christian-inspired reconciliation. In Georgia, Jon Ossoff, another figure now destined for potential presidential prospects, was likewise reelected by centering his campaign on fighting corruption, refusing corporate PAC money, and campaigning to prohibit legislators from speculating on financial markets—also decisively reelected.
It would be hard to overstate the significance of this report in the strategy that helped the Democrats win. Its authors warn, however, that winning midterms does not guarantee presidential results close to those at stake in a general election. This is why it deserves to be read in Europe, with the necessary transpositions, as the 2027 elections approach.
Summary
Donald Trump and the Republican Party are harming our economy and threatening our democracy. Their tariffs push prices up, hurt businesses and lead to job losses. Their legislative program – which funds tax cuts for the rich by reducing access to health care for the poor and significantly increasing national debt – harms all Americans and jeopardizes the country’s future. Their ongoing assaults on the rule of law are unacceptable. Defeating Republicans in 2026 and 2028 is a moral and political imperative.
To retake control of Congress and the presidency, Democrats must understand the political and strategic context we face. Deciding to Win aims to provide the most complete analysis to date of why the Democrats lost and what our party must do to win again. We draw on thousands of election results, hundreds of opinion polls and academic articles, dozens of case studies, and surveys of more than 500,000 voters since the 2024 elections. Deciding to Win argues that since 2012, highly qualified collaborators, donors, pressure groups, experts and elected officials have redefined the Democratic Party’s program and thereby reduced the party’s focus on economic issues that are the core concerns of the American people. These same forces have pushed our party toward unpopular stances on key issues for voters, especially immigration and public safety. To win again, Democrats must listen more to voters and less to reality-detached donors, party elites detached from the base, and Democratic leaders whose results lag behind those of their top-ticket candidates.
To give us the best chance of winning, we recommend the following changes to our approach. Democrats must:
- Focus our policy program and messaging on an economic agenda centered on lowering costs, fostering growth, creating jobs, and strengthening the social safety net.
- Defend popular economic policies (for example, expanding prescription drug price negotiation, ensuring the wealthiest pay their fair share, raising the minimum wage to $15) rather than unpopular economic policies (for example, student loan forgiveness, subsidies for electric vehicles, Medicare for All).
- Convince voters we share their priorities by placing greater emphasis on issues they feel the party does not adequately address (the economy, cost of living, health care, border security, public safety) and less on issues they feel we emphasize too much (climate change, democracy, abortion, identity and cultural questions).
- Moderate our positions when our program is unpopular, notably on immigration, public safety, energy production, and certain identity and culture issues.
- Adopt a principled critique of the outsized political and economic influence of lobbyists, big business and the wealthiest, while keeping in mind two considerations: first, voter frustrations with the status quo are not synonymous with a desire for socialism; and second, challenging the status quo can complement the defense of popular policies on the issues that matter most to the American people, rather than replace them.
Overall, these five changes reflect, broadly, Barack Obama’s approach in 2012, Bernie Sanders’s approach (before 2020), and candidates such as Dan Osborn, Ruben Gallego, Jared Golden, Marie Gluesenkamp Perez, Mary Peltola, Adam Gray, Kristen McDonald Rivet, Tom Suozzi, Marcy Kaptur and Vicente Gonzalez in 2024. What these candidates teach us is that we must avoid both a pro-business centrism and a quest for ideological purity on the left. They have shown that we must instead remain firmly focused on economic issues that are the main priorities of the American working and middle classes, while closing the gap with voters on immigration and public safety.
Deciding to Win does not advocate abandoning the party’s core values or failing to defend disadvantaged groups. It also does not advocate indecision or weakness. Democrats must stay firm against Trump and the Republican Party’s extreme program. But we must also show discipline and strategy in choosing our battles and in how we fight them, concentrating most of our opposition on issues where public opinion is most favorable to us (such as protecting Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid, opposing Trump’s tax cuts for the rich and tariffs).
Deciding to Win also rejects the timid, risk-averse culture that pervades much of the Democratic Party apparatus. Democrats must show courage—be ready to break with the party’s unpopular orthodoxies, including if it means denying the demands of private-sector donors, left-wing activists, or party financiers. And Democrats must be bold—through new media platforms and through spontaneous encounters with voters—rather than listening to consultants whose greatest fear is a candidate misstep.
Democrats must also understand that every wing of our party can contribute to moving our cause forward. We have much to learn from Bernie Sanders, Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Zohran Mamdani’s relentless focus on lowering the cost of living and expanding opportunities for the middle class—just as we can learn from Ruben Gallego’s stance on border security and Sarah McBride’s inclusive approach to complex cultural issues.
Ultimately, deciding to win means taking a clear-eyed look at today’s political landscape, focusing on economic policies that can help working- and middle-class Americans, and steering the Democratic Party toward the program and discourse needed to build a strong electoral majority. As the disastrous effects of Trump’s second term have already shown, the scale of the challenges means we cannot settle for less.
Deciding to Win is divided into 11 sections, each devoted to a different facet of the political and strategic landscape our party faces.
1. How did we get here?
To understand how the Democratic Party can win again, we must understand how our party arrived at this point.
1.1. The Democratic Party has shifted to the left since 2012
Since Barack Obama’s successful re-election campaign, the Democratic Party has moved left on practically every issue. The simplest way to illustrate this shift is to observe the evolution in the share of Democratic lawmakers co-sponsoring progressive bills.
As the table below shows, between 2013 and 2023, the proportion of co-sponsors of progressive bills rose substantially.
1.2. The Republican Party evolved between 2012 and 2024
Between 2012 and 2024, Republicans adopted more extreme positions on questions such as democracy, the rule of law, immigration, and transgender rights. Yet they also moved toward the center on several issues, notably by moderating their positions on Medicare and Social Security, and by renouncing promises to repeal the Affordable Care Act, to nationally ban abortion, and to adopt a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage.
1.3. How voters’ perceptions of the two parties have evolved since 2012
Voters noticed the Democratic Party’s shift to the left. According to publicly available polls, the share of voters who consider the Democratic Party “too liberal” has risen substantially since 2012.
Conversely, during 2012–2024, the share of voters who considered the Republican Party “too conservative” declined—probably in reaction to the party’s political excesses. While this presents a major political opportunity for Democrats, we have not yet harnessed it. According to the latest opinion poll on the subject—a Washington Post/Ipsos poll conducted in September 2025—the share of voters who see the Democratic Party as “too liberal” (54%) remains well above those who see the Republican Party as “too conservative” (49%).
1.4. Democrats reoriented their priorities
Compared to 2012, today the Democratic Party concentrates more on issues such as climate change, democracy, abortion, and identity/cultural concerns, and less on the economy and the middle class. The table below illustrates this evolution, analyzing the frequency of certain words in the 2024 Democratic Party platform compared with the 2012 platform.
WHAT DRIVES THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY TO CHANGE ITS PRIORITIES?
As we will see in more detail in Part 3, highly educated and affluent Democratic voters care more about climate change, democracy, abortion, and identity/cultural issues—and less about the cost of living, gasoline prices, border security, and crime, than the average American voter.
1.5. Voters feel Democrats prioritize the wrong issues
As our party shifted its priorities, the share of voters who view the Democratic Party as “out of touch with reality” rose dramatically. Meanwhile, the share of voters who view the Republican Party as “out of touch with reality” declined slightly. The result is that Democrats are more often judged as out of touch than Republicans.
Moreover, Navigator Research—a Democratic polling firm—finds that only 39% of voters think Democrats are prioritizing the right issues, while 59% think they are not.
To examine which issues drive voters’ perception that Democrats don’t share their priorities, Deciding to Win conducted two surveys. First, we asked voters to what extent, in their view, the Democratic Party should prioritize various issues. The results of our first survey appear in the table below.
We then asked voters to what extent they believed Democrats currently prioritized each issue.
We then measured the gap between how important voters thought Democrats should prioritize each issue and how much Democrats actually prioritized it. The table below shows the results of this analysis.
These results are corroborated by a post-election survey conducted by The New York Times, which found that while 47% of voters cited the economy among their top three priorities, only 17% placed the economy among the Democrats’ top three priorities.
These findings are unequivocal. Voters feel that Democrats do not give enough weight to issues such as the cost of living, the economy, immigration, healthcare, taxation, and crime—issues that matter most to them. At the same time, they feel Democrats place too much emphasis on climate change, democracy, abortion, and identity/cultural issues.
In the future, it will be essential for our party to shrink the gap between what voters want Democrats to focus on and what they perceive Democrats actually focus on. This will likely require giving greater priority to issues such as the cost of living, the economy, healthcare, border security, and crime—both in our messaging and in our governance approach—and paying less attention to issues such as climate change, democracy, abortion, and identity/cultural concerns.
1.6. Joe Biden governed leftward—and voters noticed
Although Joe Biden was not the progressives’ preferred candidate in the 2020 Democratic primary, as president he adopted progressive positions on most issues. Polls thus show that between his inauguration and the end of his term, the share of voters who saw him as “too liberal” surged.
1.7. Recent Democratic presidential candidates’ failures were deemed “too liberal” by a majority of voters
The table below presents, based on the average of publicly available polls for each election, the share of voters who considered the Democratic presidential candidate “too liberal.”
As the table shows, in the two elections won by Republicans, a majority of voters regarded the Democratic candidate as “too liberal.” Conversely, in the two elections won by Democrats, a majority regarded the Democratic candidate as “roughly in line” or “too conservative.”
1.8. Democrats lost substantial support among working-class and minority voters
Democratic support among working-class and minority voters has fallen sharply since 2012. The table below illustrates these shifts, drawing on Catalist data.
The share of Democratic votes declined most strongly in regions where racial and social issues intersect. In Starr County, Texas—where more than 95% of residents are Hispanic and poverty rates are three times the national average—the Democratic vote fell from 86% in 2012 to 42% in 2024. Likewise, the only Trump vote in Manhattan’s polling precincts was in a district housing a large stock of public housing with residents predominantly of Chinese-origin—previously a Democratic stronghold.
1.9. The decline in Democratic support was most pronounced among moderate and conservative voters—particularly among working-class and minority voters
The overall share of votes for Democrats in the 2024 presidential election was 2.8 percentage points lower than in 2012. Yet Democratic losses were not uniform. They were driven by declines among voters who described themselves as moderate or conservative.
Moreover, the disproportionate drop in support among working-class and minority voters is explained largely by a loss of support among those who described themselves as moderate or conservative. The shift toward the left within our party since 2012 appears to have contributed to our losses within these groups.
1.10. American political institutions disadvantage Democrats
Democrats must win more than 50% of the national popular vote to gain a Senate majority, which means we must appeal to voters in states that lean further right than the national average.
The situation is especially critical in the Senate, where 48 senators represent states that Donald Trump carried by 10-point margins or more in 2024, and where the median seat sits 2.8 points to the right of the national average.
1.11. The decline of “split-ticket” voting worsened Democrats’ challenges, especially in the Senate
Support for Democratic congressional candidates—both in the Senate and the House—has become far more tied to presidential results in recent years. More than ever, the fate of Democrats in states and districts that are politically challenging tracks national party image—meaning it is essential to improve the party’s overall image.
1.12. Democrats shifted from a party of swing voters to a party of highly engaged voters
Democrats now tend to perform better in off-year and midterm elections, where turnout is lower, and worse in higher-turnout elections—marking a major shift from 12 years ago. In 2024, for instance, authoritative analyses generally showed that non-voters tended to support Trump more than the overall electorate—meaning that if all registered voters had cast ballots, Trump’s victory would have been wider, not narrower.
1.13. Young voters massively shifted toward Republicans in 2024
In 2024, young voters—especially young men—supported Trump at much higher rates than previous Republican presidential candidates. This realignment should signal to Democrats that demographic change does not guarantee a Democrat victory and highlight the importance of restoring the party’s image.
KEY TAKEAWAYS FROM PART 1:
- Democrats shifted left since 2012 on nearly every issue.
- Democrats also chose to emphasize different themes, giving less weight to the middle class and the economy and more to climate change, democracy, abortion, and identity/culture issues.
- As we changed our positions and priorities, voters increasingly viewed our party as too liberal, insufficiently focused on the economy, border security and crime, and overly centered on climate change, democracy, abortion and identity/culture questions.
- Voters are now more likely to view the Democratic Party as too liberal than the Republican Party as too conservative—a significant shift from 2012.
- All these changes coincided with a decline in Democratic support among moderate and conservative voters—evidence that the party’s leftward shift has cost us votes.
- These declines were particularly pronounced among moderate and conservative workers and minority voters—suggesting that leaning further left is not the right approach to win these voters back.
2. The electorate
To win elections, the Democratic Party must have a precise understanding of the American electorate.
2.1. Demographic characteristics of the electorate
The majority of voters are white, most are non-college educated, and most are over 50 years old.
2.2. The ideological composition of the electorate
A very large majority of Americans (71%, according to Gallup) identify as moderates or conservatives, including a majority of undecided voters, non-voters, working-class voters and minority voters.
2.3. Voters’ views on abstract issues
On several philosophical questions—particularly regarding taxation, regulation, the role of government and immigration—majorities hold moderate or conservative views.
2.4. Views on institutions and ideals
A majority of voters hold favorable views of institutions and ideals such as the police, the military, capitalism, small business, and the United States, and hold unfavorable views of socialism.
2.5. Working-class vs college-educated voters
Working-class voters tend to be more conservative than college-educated voters on both social and economic issues.
KEY TAKEAWAYS FROM PART 2:
- Moderate and/or conservative electorate tendencies on several key issues highlight the challenges the Democrats face in turning leftward.
3. Forces within the Democratic Party
In Part 1 we saw how the Democratic Party has evolved in recent years. Part 3 helps us understand which groups within our party were behind these changes. We analyze how the opinions of different groups within the Democratic Party differ from each other and from the electorate as a whole.
3.1. Highly educated Democrats vs less educated Democrats
Highly educated Democrats are more inclined than their less-educated peers to describe themselves as liberal. Younger Democrats are also more liberal than older Democrats, and white Democrats are more liberal than non-white Democrats.
Highly educated Democrats also hold more liberal views than working-class Democrats, both on economic and social issues—and regard economic issues as relatively lower priority.
Similar differences exist between affluent Democrats and lower-income Democrats: the former place relatively greater emphasis on issues such as political polarization and climate change, while the latter prioritize poverty, unemployment, Social Security, and gasoline prices.
3.2. Democratic campaign staff vs Democratic voters and the electorate at large
Academic research shows that Democratic campaign staff sit farther to the left than Democratic voters overall. They are, on average, younger, more educated, more likely to be white, more likely to be female, and less likely to attend church than Democratic voters and the electorate at large.
3.3. Donors and Democratic elites vs Democratic voters
Some claim that Democrats are pulled toward the center by our donor class. But academic research shows that both large and small donors are more to the left than the party’s overall voters. Data for Progress shows that Democratic elites sit far to the left of the general public, and that the gap between Democratic elites and the public is larger than the gap between Republican elites and the public. Ultimately, it is likely that both large and small donors, campaign teams, and Democratic elites all push the party leftward rather than toward the center.
3.4. Highly educated and affluent Democrats vs working-class, undecided and general electorate
Compared with working-class, undecided, and the general electorate, highly educated Democrats place significantly more importance on issues such as climate change, gun rights, political polarization, voting rights, and income inequality, and place significantly less importance on border security, immigration, crime, gas prices, and the budget deficit.
The table below shows these differences based on the surveys we conducted. Positive numbers indicate issues to which highly educated Democrats attach greater importance, while negative numbers indicate those to which they attach less importance.
The results are similar when looking at income. Democrats earning more than $150,000 per year assign greater importance to issues such as climate change (+23%), gun rights (+17%), and income inequality (+11%) than the average voter. Meanwhile, the wealthier Democrats place less emphasis than the electorate on border security (−27%), crime (−13%), and gas prices (−10%).
These differences suggest that the significant—and growing—influence of highly educated and affluent voters on the Democratic Party’s program and discourse could explain why the party drifts away from more pointed and tangible issues (as seen in Part 1), and why voters perceive that Democrats do not focus on the right questions.
These results also indicate that strengthening the influence of working-class voters on the Democratic Party’s program and discourse would likely shift priority toward issues such as crime, gas prices, border security, and the cost of living, and away from issues such as political polarization, gun rights, climate change, and voting rights.
3.5. Progressive advocacy groups vs working-class and minority voters
White, highly educated voters tend to be more liberal than white working-class voters. Minority voters who are highly educated also tend to be more liberal than minority voters from the working class. This can lead to a mismatch between progressive advocacy organizations—typically run by highly educated staff—and the groups they seek to represent, which are predominantly working-class. Democratic officials would be well served to remember that the policy preferences of progressive groups may not always reflect those of the communities they claim to champion.
3.6. Democratic voters highly value electoral victory
During the 2020 Democratic primaries, polls consistently showed that Democrats prioritized electability over ideology—a lesson for 2028 candidates.
KEY TAKEAWAYS FROM PART 3:
- Donors (large and small), Democratic campaign staff, Democratic elites, highly educated and affluent Democratic voters, and progressive advocacy groups all pull the Democratic Party leftward—shifting our focus toward climate change, democracy, abortion and identity/cultural issues at the expense of everyday concerns such as the cost of living.
- At the same time, Democratic voters strongly desire the party to win.
4. The mobilization myth
Certain Democrats argue that to win, our party should move to the left to better mobilize our base. This section analyzes mobilization theory in detail and concludes that reality contradicts it. Indeed, the most progressive Democrats tend to perform worse, while more moderate Democrats generally do better. The same holds for more moderate Republicans who tend to fare better than their more conservative counterparts.
4.1. Differences in electoral outcomes among different types of Democratic candidates
In House and Senate elections, moderate Democrats tend to exceed expectations, while progressive Democrats tend to underperform relative to forecasts. The table below illustrates this trend with the 2024 House elections as an example.
WHAT DO WE MEAN BY “MODERATE”?
• What we mean: adopt popular positions on voters’ top concerns; break from Democratic establishment orthodoxy on issues where the party’s stance is unpopular.
• What we do NOT mean: reflexively defend the status quo, the establishment, big-business interests—or adopt a centrist stance on all issues just because it is convenient.
In other words, moderation means adopting popular, often heterodox positions. Part 8, “What Being Moderate Means and Does Not Mean,” contains more details on this topic.
4.2. Differences in electoral outcomes between different types of Republican candidates
Moderate Republicans also tend to surpass expectations, while conservative Republicans tend to underperform relative to forecasts.
4.3. How ideology shapes outcomes for both parties
Across both parties, the table is clear: more moderate candidates tend to perform better, while more progressive Democrats and more conservative Republicans tend to perform worse.
4.4. How perceived ideology affects candidates’ results
According to public polling data available since 1960, presidential candidates perceived as more moderate generally perform better electorally.
4.5. A literature review on the electoral impact of a more moderate stance
Recent scholarly literature on the electoral impact of moderate ideology broadly confirms the above conclusions: the most extreme candidates face an electoral penalty, while more moderate candidates achieve better results, especially in executive branch contests and high-visibility elections.
4.6. The relative impact of turnout and persuasion in recent national elections
The effects of changes in how voters vote (persuasion) and changes in turnout (participation) tend to move in the same direction—but persuasion effects are generally larger.
4.7. Undecided voters do exist
Yes, undecided voters exist—and in close contests, they often determine victory or defeat.
4.8. Mood shifts across elections are often tied to issues
Data suggest that voter shifts from one election to the next correlate with the salience of issues in campaigns and with voters’ views on those issues.
4.9. Turnout rates across demographic subgroups tend to move in lockstep from one election to the next
Turnout varies by demographic subgroup. But these subgroup turnout rates tend to rise and fall together from election to election. This dynamic suggests campaigns struggle to mobilize groups that favor them. Moreover, as discussed in Part 1.12, Democrats are now the party of high turnout voters, meaning that a broader increase in turnout across all groups is more likely to benefit Republicans than Democrats.
4.10. Door-knocking, phone-banking and other ground games cannot save us
Academic research shows ground campaigns such as door-knocking and phone-banking have minimal impact on shifting voters’ opinions and only modestly affect turnout. In the end, little suggests our party can overcome its problems by knocking on more doors. If we fail to persuade voters through our policy program and discourse, there is little chance of winning by ground campaigning alone.
The fourth part also examines the differences and similarities between the voters Democrats must persuade and the voters they must mobilize.
4.11. How moderate voters differ from liberals and conservatives
Academic research shows that voters who hold consistently liberal or conservative views are less persuadable than those who hold consistently moderate views or who hold both liberal and conservative views.
4.12. How sporadic voters differ from regular voters
In political surveys we conducted (discussed in more detail in Part 5), we found that voters who “sat out” in 2024 after supporting Biden in 2020—those who voted for Biden in 2020 but did not vote in 2024—tend to have more moderate political preferences than those who voted for Biden in 2020 and Harris in 2024. In other words, Democratic-leaning voters who vote sporadically tend to be more moderate than regular Democratic voters.
4.13. The false dichotomy between persuasion and mobilization
Support for current and past Democratic Party policies among undecided voters is closely tied to the support of low-participation voters. As the graph below shows, for more than a hundred Democratic policies we surveyed, there is a strong positive correlation between support for these policies among undecided voters in 2024 (horizontal axis) and support among non-voters in 2024 (vertical axis). Popular policies are liked by both undecided voters and non-voters, while unpopular policies tend to fare poorly with both groups.
For example, expanding prescription drug price negotiations—a long-standing priority of Senator Bernie Sanders—enjoys stronger support among the general electorate than 98% of the Democratic measures we surveyed and sits above the 95th percentile of support among both undecided voters and mobilization targets among non-voters. By contrast, increasing the number of refugees allowed to enter the United States annually sits at the 8th percentile of support with the general electorate relative to all Democratic measures we surveyed—and sits below the 10th percentile for undecided and mobilization-target voters.
The persuasion effects of political rhetoric also correlate strongly between undecided voters and non-voters—and so do the issues these groups prioritize.
These results suggest there is no trade-off to be made between, on the one hand, a program, message and priority set likely to appeal to voters Democrats must persuade and, on the other hand, a program, message and priority set likely to mobilize voters Democrats must bring to the polls.
4.14. Correlations in support for public policies across other groups
4.15. Beyond mobilization theory
Our party must move beyond mobilization theory and recognize that focusing on our most ardent partisans is not the best path to electoral success. We should instead aim to persuade centrist voters: many have supported Democrats in the past and could do so again if our party offered a more appealing program, priority set, and message.
KEY TAKEAWAYS FROM PART 4:
- Progressive Democrats often argue that to win, the party should position itself further left to “mobilize the base.”
- Yet data show progressive Democrats underperform relative to moderate Democrats, undecided voters exist and are often decisive, and sporadic Democratic voters tend to be more moderate than regular voters.
- Ultimately, persuasion and turnout go hand in hand. Voters from across the political spectrum and all demographic groups want Democrats to focus on the cost of living. The most effective messages and the most popular policies tend to center on everyday economic issues, appealing to undecided or occasional voters.
5. What is popular and what is not
To determine the path Democrats should take once these findings are established, we must understand which policies are popular and which are not. This section explains why traditional public opinion polls on policies are unreliable. It also presents what more rigorous methodological surveys reveal about the truly popular components of the Democratic platform.
5.1. Why traditional public polls on policy are less reliable
Academic research comparing the outcomes of popular initiatives to theme poll averages shows that traditional theme polls—such as those conducted by advocacy groups—greatly overstate support for liberal policies.
5.2. A better polling method
We apply a different methodology to our policy polls that, in our view, yields more accurate estimates of support for Democratic and Republican measures—even if this approach yields a less optimistic view of some Democratic policy planks.
5.3. Voter trust and issue importance
Before examining our poll results, we analyze the results of our surveys on voters’ trust and the importance they attach to various issues. We find that:
- Issues such as the cost of living, the economy, inflation, taxation, and public spending, as well as health care, are of paramount importance to voters.
- Democrats face a trust deficit on most issues voters consider highly prioritised, especially the economy, cost of living and inflation. This trust deficit is particularly pronounced on border security and crime.
By contrast, topics on which voters trust Democrats more—such as climate change, abortion, and LGBTQ-related issues—tend to be less important to voters’ eyes.
Our survey also shows that foreign policy questions are of secondary importance to voters, with the “war in the Middle East” ranking 30th in importance among the 36 issues we tested, and the “war in Ukraine” ranking 34th.
5.4. Context for our policy polls
This section provides context and nuance to help understand our thematic poll results. We encourage readers to consult the full wording of each policy measure we polled to better understand our results.
5.5. Poll results
Overall, we find that the most popular elements of the Democratic policy agenda are protecting and expanding access to health care, defending Social Security and Medicare, implementing fair taxation of the wealthy, and protecting abortion rights.
But while many measures proposed by Democrats are popular, about half of the measures we examined in our poll are unpopular. Democratic unpopular measures are generally progressive proposals on immigration and crime, proposals to restrict energy production, and proposals to create new large-scale social programs that voters do not consider top priorities.
The most unpopular Republican measures are typically cuts to health and social welfare programs, as well as proposals to restrict reproductive health rights.
However, roughly half of the Republican measures polled enjoyed majority support. Popular Republican measures tend to emphasize stricter border security and crime-fighting approaches, tax cuts, increased energy production, and more conservative positions on certain identity and cultural issues.
We surveyed 190 measures in total: 105 Democratic measures and 85 Republican measures. Average support for Democratic measures was 49.3%, while Republican measures averaged 50.4%.
The average support for the Democratic stance—i.e., “for” on Democratic measures and “against” on Republican measures—across all 190 measures surveyed was 49.4%. It is notable that this figure is eerily close to Kamala Harris’s overall share of the vote in the 2024 election (49.2%). While this proves nothing, it indicates that our methodology and results align with real public opinion.
The tables above present a selection of results from our polling on various public policies. The full results of these polls can also be consulted by policy domain, including health care, taxation, other economic policies, immigration, crime, law enforcement and criminal justice, tariffs, climate and energy, reproductive rights, primary and secondary education, higher education, family policy, democratic reforms and voting rights, LGBTQ issues, the DOGE, artificial intelligence, abundance and other policies.
5.6. Overall synthesis
A clear picture emerges when one combines results from our polls on policy support, party trust, and issue importance.
First, Democrats should foreground their popular positions on the issues that voters deem most important. This entails protecting and expanding Medicaid, Medicare and Social Security, resisting Trump’s tariff policies and tax cuts for the wealthy, and proposing an economic program aimed at helping working-class Americans—through measures such as expanding prescription drug price negotiation, ensuring the wealthy pay their fair share of taxes, raising the minimum wage, expanding Medicare to include dental, vision and hearing care, and making school meals free for all students.
Second, Democrats should proactively moderate their positions on highly publicized issues that evoke voter distrust and where progressive policies are unpopular—particularly immigration, crime, and energy policy. These issues matter to voters, and we should not simply hope they will be less salient. If we continue to advocate unpopular measures on these topics, they are likely to cost us votes.
Third, Democrats should continue to champion broadly popular progressive positions on lower-priority topics, foremost among them the defense of reproductive rights.
Fourth, Democrats should reassess their positions on less-publicized, more cultural questions (positive discrimination in university admissions, transgender athletes) where their stances are unpopular. Democrats should deprioritize these issues, seen as secondary by voters, and focus more on the economy and the cost of living.
Finally, while we note the unpopularity of certain Democratic measures, it is important to highlight that our results give all strands of the Democratic Party ample grounds for optimism. Measures such as raising the minimum wage to $15 per hour; protecting abortion rights nationwide; expanding drug price negotiations; returning tariff powers to Congress; eliminating tax loopholes for the wealthiest Americans; banning partisan gerrymandering; banning discrimination against LGBTQ Americans in housing and employment; investing in reducing lead pollution; curbing estate tax avoidance; expanding Medicare to include dental, vision, and hearing care; increasing Social Security benefits for low-income seniors; and implementing a universal free school meals program are all supported by a clear majority of Americans. A Democratic government capable of implementing all these measures would represent a monumental victory and a major win for the progressive movement.
POINTS TO REMEMBER FROM PART 5:
- Thematic traditional polls greatly overstate support for progressive measures.
- In reality, Democrats have both popular positions (on health, Social Security, and reproductive rights) and unpopular positions (on immigration, crime, energy policy, and certain identity/cultural issues).
- We must focus on our popular positions, especially on health and the economy, while moderating our unpopular positions, especially on immigration and crime.
- A Democratic program focused solely on the party’s most popular policies would offer many elements capable of energizing both moderate and progressive Democrats.
6. What candidates do and say matters
As the inflation impact on the 2024 elections clearly showed, the economic situation is arguably the most determining factor for the president’s party’s electoral results. But the economy is not the sole factor shaping elections.
6.1. Positioning on substance influences electoral results
In recent years, a politics of “feeling” has gained traction, arguing that electoral outcomes have little to do with candidates’ substantive policy positions. This section provides evidence that positioning on substance does influence electoral outcomes.
In the table below, we examine the relationship between the positions of incumbent Democratic representatives and their electoral results. There is a clear relationship: Democratic incumbents who adopt more moderate positions on various issues tend to perform better in elections, while those with more progressive positions tend to fare worse. We also see this pattern for incumbent Republican members of the House, as well as for the two Senate parties. Across both parties and both chambers, candidates who adopt more often moderate positions tend to achieve better results.
Numerous academic studies corroborate the conclusions of the table above.
6.2. Substance positioning shapes how candidates are perceived
We conducted a large-scale study to determine where each 2024 House candidate stood on a left-right ideological spectrum. The results show a correlation between candidates’ substantive positioning and voters’ perceptions of their ideology: Democrats with more moderate positions are perceived as more moderate, while those with more liberal positions are perceived as more liberal. Similarly, Republicans with more moderate positions are perceived as more moderate, and those with more extremist positions are perceived as more conservative.
6.3. Case studies on the electoral impact of positioning on the substance
Several case studies of politicians whose positions evolved over time—for example Bernie Sanders, Tim Walz, and Joe Biden—demonstrate the link between positioning and electoral results or voters’ perceptions.
6.4. Understanding how and why substance positioning affects electoral outcomes
We present a model to understand the mechanisms by which substantive positioning influences electoral outcomes, drawing on the data presented in Parts 6.1 to 6.3.
KEY TAKEAWAYS FROM PART 6:
- There is solid evidence that candidates’ substantive positions—their voting records, their campaign rhetoric, and their governance decisions in office—influence electoral results.
- How voters perceive candidates matters—but these perceptions are shaped by substantive positioning and do not exist independently of it.
7. The themes pursued by the most successful Democratic candidates
7.1. Campaign ads by Democrats who performed well relative to the national Democratic average in the last elections
To understand which political messages and which issue positions are most effective for Democrats, a good starting point is to examine the messages aired by Democrats in pivotal districts—especially those who performed above average. These candidates have the smallest margin for error and the strongest incentive to present the strongest possible platform.
Our analysis of the ads of some of the most effective frontline Democratic candidates shows a tendency to center campaigns on pragmatism, economic priorities, and to break from progressive orthodoxy on issues such as immigration, crime and energy production, while also highlighting popular positions on health care, border security, and reproductive rights.
As our party seeks to rebuild and form a national electoral majority for the future, we should take the approach of representatives like Jared Golden and senators like Ruben Gallego as a starting point.
7.2. Campaign ads by Republicans who performed well relative to the national Republican baseline
Republicans who achieve significantly above-average electoral results also tend to emphasize bipartisanship and more moderate positions on issues such as health care and Social Security.
7.3. Case study: the Nebraska Senate race
Dan Osborn, an independent Senate candidate in Nebraska, drew strong attention for his excellent results in a state with high political polarization. While Osborn adopted anti-elite rhetoric and supported some progressive positions during his campaign, he also advocated conservative stances on several important issues, particularly immigration.
KEY TAKEAWAYS FROM PART 7:
- To determine which messages work best, study the strategy of Democratic candidates whose results were strongest relative to the national score.
- These Democrats primarily rely on economic messages, bipartisanship and pragmatism, and on popular measures—including policies that break with progressive orthodoxy on issues such as immigration, crime and energy policy.
8. What being moderate means and does not mean
Throughout this report, we have argued that Democrats should adopt a moderate stance. In this section, we examine more closely what being “moderate” exactly means, and how it aligns with being an outsider and/or adopting a critical stance toward the establishment.
8.1. Being moderate means taking popular and often heterodox positions—and not defending the establishment
Voters express significant skepticism about the status quo, the establishment, and political elites. A large share of the electorate believes the system is rigged against people like them and in favor of the rich. A large majority of the electorate believes that a candidate who improves people’s lives through change is preferable to one who preserves the status of the institutions.
All of this is not in conflict with the report’s earlier sections. Presenting oneself as an outsider or as a critic of the establishment can be compatible with, and even complementary to, a moderate campaign. Therefore, we contend that:
- Being moderate means adopting popular positions on issues that matter to voters and being ready to break with one’s party’s official line on topics where it is unpopular.
- Being moderate does not mean running a campaign to defend the political establishment, the elites, corporate interests, or the status quo. It does not mean acting in a docile manner or taking a centrist position on every issue.
Distinguishing “moderation” from “defending the establishment” leaves open the question of whether Democrats should be more critical of the political establishment, align with anti-elite sentiment, and/or nominate an outsider in 2028. In our view, there are strong arguments in favor of adopting a more anti-establishment stance—with a few important caveats:
First, anti-establishment rhetoric cannot solve problems caused by unpopular positions: Democrats who attack the establishment but campaign on unpopular stances on voter-important issues like immigration or public safety tend to perform poorly. In other words, anti-establishment rhetoric can supplement a popular policy program but cannot replace it.
Second, younger candidates will not solve all our problems: There are good reasons to think the Democratic Party would benefit from older incumbents passing the baton sooner. But simply aging the Democratic Party is not a panacea. A youthful influx should complement a fundamental repositioning and reorientation of priorities, not substitute for them.
Third, frustration with the status quo is not synonymous with a desire for socialism: While many voters feel frustrated with the status quo and their economic situation, a broad majority of Americans still views capitalism positively, and a broad majority remains skeptical of socialism.
As Democratic Senator Ruben Gallego—who exceeded expectations in the 2024 Arizona Senate race—explained in a New York Times interview about the Democrats’ mistakes with working-class and minority voters:
“These people want to be rich. They want to be rich! And there’s nothing wrong with that. Our job is to expose the abuses of the rich, the entitled and the powerful. That’s how we’ll convince people who aspire to that to vote for Democrats…
“We’re afraid to say, for example: ‘Hey, we’ll help you find a job so you can become rich.’ We use phrases like ‘bring more economic stability.’ These people don’t want that. They don’t want ‘economic stability.’ They really want the American dream…
“Working-class people, the poor, don’t necessarily see ultra-rich people as their competitors. They want to become rich someday. And so they don’t necessarily resent the rich for being rich. It is when it affects them that they begin to resent them.”
KEY TAKEAWAYS FROM PART 8:
- Being moderate is not incompatible with criticizing the establishment, the status quo, or big-business interests.
- Criticizing the establishment does not replace adopting positions with which voters agree on the issues that matter to them.
9. Lessons from the Biden years
To move forward, we must honestly examine the mistakes our party has made over the last four years. Part 9 reviews what we consider the era’s key political lessons, including:
9.1. Inflation
Voters despised inflation and blamed the Biden administration for it. Inflation was probably the most decisive factor in the Democrats’ 2024 defeat. Yet while it is a crucial lens for understanding what happened, it does not explain everything that occurred, nor the long-term trends highlighted in earlier sections.
9.2. Immigration
Immigration is an important issue for voters, and the Biden administration’s approach in its early years proved highly unpopular. This likely cost Democrats some votes in 2024.
9.3. Biden’s decision to run for re-election
Biden’s decision to seek a second term was a disastrous misstep.
9.4. Talking democracy or the economy
Democratic norms are under threat from Trump’s presidency. But messages framed around the threat to democracy proved less convincing to voters in 2024 than those focused on concrete economic policy. A New York Times poll also shows voters feel Democrats pay too much attention to democracy, at the expense of such issues as the cost of living.
9.5. Reproductive rights
Abortion rights enjoy broad support, and attempts to curb abortion trigger political backlash. That said, voters feel Democrats give abortion too much emphasis, particularly relative to issues like the economy and the cost of living.
KEY TAKEAWAYS FROM PART 9:
- Most importantly: inflation and immigration harmed Democrats in 2024.
10. The new politics of avoidance
Since November, several hypotheses have been advanced to explain the Democrats’ difficulties in the 2024 elections. This section examines some of the most common explanations, including those attributing losses to Kamala Harris’s “moderate dream” campaign, to traditional media, to Democrats’ use of academic language, to the impact of social media, and to a Democratic economic program that was not leftward enough. We find that while some of these explanations contain a kernel of truth, none alone fully explains the party’s recent electoral failures.
10.1. But didn’t Kamala Harris run the “moderate dream” campaign and still lose?
Harris did attempt to adopt more moderate positions during her abbreviated presidential campaign. Although she lost, her centerward shift coincided with a significant rise in her popularity, raising doubts that her moderation cost votes. More importantly, despite attempts to moderate her rhetoric, most voters still viewed Harris as too liberal. Her efforts to moderate her message met limited success, primarily due to:
- her record of advocating broadly liberal policies throughout her career;
- her close ties to a president whom a large majority of Americans disapproved of and who they judged to be too far left; and
- her explicit reluctance to distance herself from President Biden on major issues. The Harris campaign reminds us that being moderate is not something Democratic candidates can simply “switch on” during a campaign or govern as progressives, then pivot to a moderate platform during an election and expect voters to accept their claim of genuine moderation.
10.2. Blaming the traditional media
Traditional media is less powerful than ever, and people who work there and those who consume it are among the demographic groups most likely to swing toward Democrats since 2012. Blaming the New York Times and its election coverage for Democrats’ 2024 difficulties does not hold up.
10.3. Accusing social media (“the Joe Rogan problem”)
Democrats lost the social media battle in 2024, which likely cost us votes. In the future, Democrats should increase their share on platforms like TikTok, Instagram, YouTube and X, where an increasing number of voters get their information.
That said, theories that Democrats can once again win simply by improving the “channels” for spreading their message—without changing their priorities or positioning—are extrapolations. In the end:
- It is impossible to dissociate Democrats’ social media challenges from the party’s substantive difficulty addressing the groups of voters who get their information on these platforms.
- Election theories based on social media dynamics do not account for variation in results among Democratic Congress members. Above-forecast results for Democratic candidates correlated with a more moderate positioning, not with greater popularity on TikTok.
- Indeed, when examining all Democratic House candidates for 2024, the relationship between total social media followers and candidates’ results relative to expectations is actually slightly negative, as the graph below shows.
Trying to be more present on social networks is a good idea, but setting this as an objective does not answer what Democrats should tell less-engaged voters who get their information via TikTok and similar platforms.
For example, the day after the 2024 elections, there was much debate about whether Kamala Harris should have appeared on Joe Rogan’s podcast. Less often asked but more important questions include: what would she have said? how would she have answered tough questions about inflation, border security, crime, or culture war topics? how would her message have been perceived by Rogan’s audience?
Ultimately, the best answer to how Democrats should approach social media is to use these platforms to discuss the popular positions on issues that matter most to voters.
10.4. Blaming jargon
Democrats would benefit from using less academic or progressive activist jargon. But simply changing words will probably not be enough if we do not also modify unpopular positions and reframe our priorities.
10.5. An economy agenda deemed not left enough
In this section, we examine the idea that Democrats could win back working-class voters by running a more left-leaning economic program than the party currently defends. In our view, the leftist economic populist argument is partly sound and partly flawed. We propose distinguishing between:
Priority: we believe Democrats should place more emphasis on economic issues—such as cost reductions and ensuring economic fairness—in their program and communications. This also means de-emphasizing issues that working-class voters do not prioritize, such as climate change, democracy, abortion, and identity/cultural concerns. In this regard, we should draw inspiration from politicians like Bernie Sanders and Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez. The emphasis they gave in their “Fighting Oligarchy” tour on President Trump’s policies to cut rich people’s taxes while dismantling health coverage for low-income Americans shows how Democrats should set their priorities. We must relentlessly focus on criticizing Republican policies that benefit the rich and promoting our own policies for the middle class.
Substantive positioning: many Democratic economic policies are popular, but some are less so. Democrats should center their campaign on popular economic policies that help low-income and middle-class families, whether these policies come from the party’s “progressive” or “centrist” wing. But we must also avoid campaigning on unpopular economic policies, whether branded as centrist or progressive. This means avoiding unpopular centrist positions—like former Senator Kyrsten Sinema’s opposition to price regulation for prescription drugs—and avoiding unpopular progressive positions—like broad student loan forgiveness.
Merely focusing on economics in our messaging is not enough. Talking more about the economy will not prevent Democratic candidates from being attacked on unpopular issues such as immigration, public safety, energy production, and certain cultural issues. To defuse attacks on these topics, we will need to adopt more popular—and more moderate—positions on these issues, while also increasing emphasis on economic issues.
KEY TAKEAWAYS FROM PART 10:
- While some explanations have truth in them, none alone can explain the party’s difficulties.
- Rather than avoid analyzing the role of our party’s positioning and priorities in our defeat, we should confront these issues head-on.
Part 11: Outlooks for the future
The terrain on which the 2026 and 2028 campaigns will unfold is not yet defined and will largely depend on decisions by the Trump administration and Congressional Republicans in the coming years, as well as on domestic and international events. Nevertheless, the sections above show that, in a wide range of possible circumstances, Democrats would do well to adopt more popular positions on issues where our views are unpopular. Issues on which our party should moderate its stance will certainly include immigration, security, energy production, and certain identity and cultural concerns. Democrats should also focus more on issues voters believe we do not give enough importance to—particularly the economy and the cost of living—and less on issues voters view as overemphasized, such as climate change, democracy, abortion, and identity/cultural issues.
Moreover, Part 11 discusses several other strategic choices Democrats should make, including how we frame the Biden administration, strategies for countering the Trump administration, and the importance of recruiting candidates who have demonstrated heterodoxy, moderation and above-expectation electoral results.
11.1. Democrats should distance themselves from the Biden administration
The Biden administration has a record of significant legislative achievements, but voters did not perceive it as a success. Democrats should distance themselves from the Biden administration, notably by criticizing its approach to border security and the cost of living.
11.2. Democrats must exercise discipline and strategy in choosing battles
Deciding to Win does not mean Democrats should bow to the Trump administration. We must oppose him vigorously, but we must also exercise discipline and strategy in how we do it. We should focus our opposition to Trump on issues where voters are most aligned with us, such as tariffs, Medicaid cuts, and tax relief for the wealthy, rather than on issues where voters distrust us, such as immigration.
11.3. The importance of recruiting nonconformist candidates in 2026
Just as we did in 2006, Democrats should field candidates who break with the progressive orthodoxy for the 2026 legislative elections, where competition is expected to be tight. This is especially important in the Senate, where winning the majority requires taking seats in states with conservative majorities like Iowa, Nebraska, Texas, Kansas, and Alaska. In some deeply Republican states, Democrats should also consider stepping aside to let unaffiliated candidates run against Republican contenders.
11.4. What Democrats should look for in our 2028 presidential nominee
Our party must carefully consider our 2028 candidate. In evaluating candidates, we should closely examine:
- Their electoral track record: When evaluating candidates who have previously sought office, Democrats should pay particular attention to whether they performed better or worse than the national ticket in their prior campaigns. The table below shows the performance of potential 2028 Democrats against expectations in their most recent elections.
We should also take a close look at:
- Their current positions on issues: Candidates who advocate popular positions on issues important to voters—especially on economic policy, immigration, public safety, energy production and certain identity/cultural concerns—are more likely to be strong general election contenders.
- Their record of positions: In 2024, Kamala Harris’s attempts at moderating were undermined by positions she had taken in prior campaigns. A 2028 Democratic candidate would fare worse if their attempts to campaign on a popular, common-sense program contradicted a past marked by unpopular positions.
- Deciding to Win: Democrats should choose a candidate who understands what it takes to win in a difficult environment—and who is willing to campaign on positions supported by the majority of Americans, even if that occasionally means pushing back against the anti-establishment demands of progressive activist organizations, corporate interests or Democratic donors.
Now that our coalition is the one most capable of mobilizing voters, Democrats must also resist the idea that strong results in midterm or off-year elections in 2026 guarantee a smooth path to a presidential win in 2028. The less engaged voters we have lost in recent years are less likely to vote in midterms or special elections, but they may return in 2028. As we observed between 2017 and 2024, strong midterm and special-election results do not guarantee anything close to presidential-level results in 2028.
11.5. Reasons for optimism
The radical agenda of Trump’s second term has already turned away many voters who seek low prices and secure borders, not cuts to Medicaid, trade wars and tax cuts for the rich. If Democrats show discipline, strategy, and a focus on voters’ top priorities, and adopt a moderate stance on key issues, we have a strong chance of regaining control of Congress in 2026 and the White House in 2028.
POINTS TO REMEMBER FROM PART 11:
- Although Democrats faced difficulties in 2024, there are reasons for optimism for the future. Our party will, however, be best positioned to win in 2026 and 2028 if we nominate candidates whose views and priorities match those of the electorate.
Conclusion
“Hope is not blind optimism… Hope is that thing within us that insists, in spite of all the evidence to the contrary, that something better awaits if we have the courage to reach for that goal, work to achieve it, and fight for it.”
– Barack Obama
To win elections, Democrats must implement the following changes. First, we must focus more on the issues that voters feel we do not prioritize enough (the economy, the cost of living, health care, border security, security), and less on those they consider overemphasized (climate change, democracy, abortion, and identity/cultural issues). Second, we must moderate our positions on topics where our program is unpopular, particularly immigration, security, energy production, and certain identity and cultural concerns.
We must also listen better to voters and address their frustrations with the political class, drawing on critiques of political corruption and the outsized power of lobbyists, big business and the wealthy. But we must understand that criticizing the status quo complements defending popular policies on the issues that matter most to the American people, and does not substitute for them.
It is essential that we implement these strategic changes, because winning is essential. If we fail to win, we will be unable to prevent the dreadful consequences of Republican policies or to improve the lives of all Americans.
But victory is not by chance. Winning is a choice: a choice to be disciplined and strategic, and to face the hard truths about the electorate.
We must make this choice. The stakes are too high for us to settle for less.