Former Deputy Minister of Finance of the young Russian Federation (1993-1995) and First Deputy Chairman of the Central Bank of Russia (1995-1998), Sergey Aleksashenko led negotiations with the IMF in the 1990s. President of Merrill Lynch Russia in 2006-2008, he has also served on the boards of several major Russian companies and headed macroeconomic research at the Higher School of Economics.
Exiled since 2014, he contributed in 2017-2018 to Aleksei Navalny’s presidential program. After the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, he participated, from February 2022, in founding the Russian Anti-War Committee, alongside figures such as Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Lyubov Sobol, Mikhail Kasyanov and Garry Kasparov. He continues his work as head of economic research at the New Eurasian Strategies Centre, a think tank founded by Mikhail Khodorkovsky.
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In your latest publications, you describe a Russian economy that is not very efficient, but highly resilient, capable of absorbing major shocks, whereas many predicted a deep crisis, or even a collapse in the early years of the war. What have analysts misunderstood?
At its core, the Russian economy is a market economy. The mechanisms of supply and demand operate, alter prices, and automatically restore equilibrium. The main players in this economy are private entrepreneurs able to solve challenges quickly and fill gaps, as demonstrated by sanctions: after the disconnection of payments in dollars and euros, alternative settlement systems emerged; after the collapse of exchanges with the West, this economy managed to find other suppliers and other customers, while reinventing new logistics routes. In other words, the Russian economy is no longer the Soviet economy. Market prices and a floating ruble allow it to absorb internal and external shocks through price adjustments. To imagine that economic and social difficulties would by themselves lead to the cessation of hostilities and, even more, to a regime change, would therefore be a grave misjudgment.
Moreover, commodity markets no longer directly threaten the survival of the Russian economy. The federal budget is less dependent on hydrocarbons than in previous decades, and the ruble devaluation partly offsets the decline in export revenues. If sanctions and inflation exert real pressure, they do not create conditions for immediate political destabilization. Even more: the Russian economy boasts a current account surplus. While it depends little on Western imports to cover its day-to-day functioning (its deep reliance on imported technologies and equipment having only a limited impact on current dynamics), the global economy cannot do without Russian commodities, from oil to metals to fertilizers. Thus Russia does not suffer major difficulties balancing its payments balance.
In thirty-five years, the Russian economy has weathered a large number of crises of very different natures. The economic teams around Vladimir Putin have thus gained genuine know-how to face them.
But resilience does not equal dynamism. Since the end of 2013, on the eve of Crimea’s annexation, Russian growth has plateaued at an average of 1.4% per year, less than half the global growth rate. At that time, a realistic estimate of the country’s potential stood at about 4%. At that pace, Russian GDP would today be about a third higher. The cumulative shortfall amounts to about two and a half years of that hypothetical 4% growth, which is why I can say that Russia has fallen behind its own trajectory by two and a half years.
The Kremlin still seems to face rising risks: a constrained budget, a widening deficit, a military engine at the end of its road. How is it adapting its economic policies to meet these challenges? Is the 2027 budget realistic?
So far, budgetary constraints have been anything but strict. If the government can suddenly double the budget deficit relative to its own plan, with spending in 2026 about 4,500 billion rubles (more than 10%) above the cap set by law, it will be hard to call this a policy of austerity.
The adaptation of economic policy is ongoing. Three major decisions stand out. The first was the introduction in March 2022 of stringent restrictions on capital outflows, which helped avert a devaluation of the ruble. The second was the provision of high salaries to military personnel fighting in Ukraine, thereby ensuring a steady inflow of new contract workers. Finally, the third was the gradual increase in taxes, enough to maintain budget revenues despite the decline in oil and gas income. Tax pressure rose by nearly 3% of GDP during the war thanks to a diversified tax mix. First, in autumn 2022 there was a three-month windfall tax on gas extraction, then a windfall profits tax in 2024, and finally charges on exporters’ foreign exchange gains between October 2023 and the end of 2024. In 2025 and 2026, VAT, corporate income tax, and personal income tax rates were raised in turn. It should be noted, however, that this effort did not suffice to raise the total federal budget revenues: it barely offset the decline in oil and gas revenues tied to production declines and the fall, in 2025, of the price of oil exported in rubles.
S’imaginer que les difficultés économiques et sociales conduiraient à elles seules à la cessation des hostilités et, plus encore, à un changement de régime, serait donc commettre une grave erreur.
Sergey Aleksashenko
As for the realism of the 2027 budget, it is hard to judge. The architecture of the proposal submitted to the Duma is as follows: revenues would rise from 17.7% of GDP in 2026 to 17.4%, while expenditures would fall from 20.9% to 19.6%, bringing the deficit down to 2.2%. In nominal terms, federal spending would increase by only 0.44%. Two items would absorb the bulk of this overall amount, to the detriment of all others: military spending and debt service.
The conclusions one can draw from these data remain highly mixed. On the one hand, the planned consolidation of around 2% of GDP represents an extremely ambitious objective for any government. On the other hand, it would not be entirely unprecedented for the Russian authorities, who have already shown themselves capable of achieving such a challenge in 2010-2011 and in 2017-2018.
You note that the Ministry of Finance shows increasing opacity regarding its expenditures. Given these conditions, what do economists’ analyses and estimates rest on? Is this opacity itself an instrument of governance or of war?
It has long been the case that the Ministry of Finance has stopped being transparent about its expenditures: that dates back to the very beginning of 2022. Since then, the ministry has no longer published reports on the execution of spending. From this year, it can spend beyond the amounts set by law without adjusting them or disclosing how the funds are used. This opacity has a very concrete function, which also emerges from the analysis of the 2027 budget. After the failure of 2026, when the military expenditure ceilings could not be met, the ministry seems to have changed strategy: the Defense Ministry and the defense-industrial complex get everything they ask for at the planning stage, which makes it easier to refuse mid-year additions. By contrast, non-military beneficiaries must plead their case with the president and the prime minister. Hence the budget proposal becomes a mere starting point. The final outcome, impossible to predict, will be played out in a continuous bargaining process.
In terms of opacity, beyond budget statistics, the Kremlin has classified data on oil extraction and refining, on the population, on birth rates and mortality, and many other issues. This opacity is part of the war: the Kremlin intends to do everything to ensure that neither its opponents nor the population grasp the problems that arise in Russia.
Yet note that so far these restrictions have largely spared the Bank of Russia, which publishes a large amount of statistics. Rosstat, the Federal Statistics Service, also discloses a substantial volume of data. Being able to identify and analyze these data is precisely what distinguishes a good expert from a poor one.
You describe the clash between the siloviki (security-service chiefs) and the pragmatic officials as one of the main threats to the country’s economic stability. How could this conflict push the economy into a permanent crisis?
One must understand that the opposition between siloviki and pragmatics is the result of a fragmentation of the elites, who nevertheless remain dependent on a single actor: Vladimir Putin. The siloviki as well as the pragmatics are elements of the Putin system of governance. They are all loyal to the Russian president. They also share a desire to preserve the country’s stability. However, they do not envision it in the same way. For the siloviki, the priority remains sociopolitical stability. Their tools are repression, coercion, and the destruction of the rights and liberties protection judicial system. By contrast, the pragmatics emphasize macroeconomic stability first and foremost. Their tools are the containment of inflation and the budget deficit, as well as the protection of property rights.
This disagreement over the direction of domestic policy represents a structural vulnerability of the regime. More specifically, it poses an internal threat to the country’s economic stability. A marked strengthening of the siloviki within the president’s inner circle could brutally unbalance the economy and trigger a permanent crisis. Yet this scenario presently appears to be of relatively low probability.
According to the public opinion surveys you analyze, three quarters of Russians feel that the war worsens the economy and more than a third would like to reduce military spending in favor of social spending. Yet these sentiments do not seem to translate into political action. Is there a threshold beyond which discontent could provoke protest? If so, which political camp could benefit?
In fact, society today is more passive than confrontational. Most citizens are primarily concerned with coping with the decline in living standards and avoid getting involved in politics. It must be said that in countries under hard authoritarian rule, political dissent is impossible. The examples of Venezuela and Zimbabwe show that even a 20-30% drop in GDP does not lead to mass demonstrations or political upheaval, and certainly not the downfall of the regime.
Thus, discontent alone is not enough to threaten the regime, at least as long as it does not coalesce with elite fragmentation and a broader governance crisis. The army, too, has reasons for discontent, but there is no informal leader to express it; and since it is not a political actor in itself, its involvement remains unlikely.
Among the three regime-change scenarios, a popular uprising remains the least probable, behind the natural death of the Russian regime with Vladimir Putin and behind a split among the elites in the scenario where he weakens to the point of no longer being able to act as the supreme arbiter. At the popular level, if radicalization were to arise, it would come more from nationalist and pro-war circles than from the liberal opposition hostile to the war.
Beyond the war, a number of handicaps limit Russia’s economic possibilities, starting with demographic decline. Which of these handicaps are directly attributable to Vladimir Putin’s choices?
Demography depends rather little on Vladimir Putin and his personal decisions. It concerns long-term dynamics, which nonetheless offer the advantage of being fairly predictable. If potential problems were already noticeable at the start of the 2010s, it is likely we will see a brief pause in their worsening between 2030 and 2035, followed by a renewed acceleration. Decision-making-wise, one can fault the Russian president for having pursued an illogical and inconsistent migration policy, while not fully leveraging his opportunities to address the country’s demographic problems. But it would still be false to claim outright that all of these problems would have emerged solely from his personal decisions.
De fait, la société actuelle est plus passive que contestataire.
Sergey Aleksashenko
If one had to name a systemic problem for which Vladimir Putin would truly be responsible, it would rather be the technological blockade of the Russian economy, i.e., the European ban on supplying Russia with modern equipment. In the past, Russia imported from Europe sequences of new technologies and production complexes. But all that ended in 2022. The resulting technological lag will only widen as long as Putin remains in power.
Finally, a more localized problem concerns Gazprom and its loss of access to the European market, where it sold a quarter of its gas and from which it drew more than 70% of its revenues.
Could the end of the war ultimately represent for the Russian economy a shock as deep as the war itself?
It is obvious that this shock would not be as profound. The economic problems of exiting the war and demobilizing a large portion of the workforce are quite predictable. First, the army will return to civilian life hundreds of thousands of people accustomed to high salaries, today 2.5 times the country’s average wage. All these people will need to find employment, often in regions where no new jobs have been created. The return of veterans therefore represents a long-term risk. Many will struggle to reintegrate, and their mass recruitment by the security forces and services could spread a culture of violence.
Moreover, the government will very likely reduce its orders for arms and munitions, which will free up several hundred thousand more people in the defense-industrial complex, whose employment rose from 1.9 to 2.8 million during the conflict. And all these people will also have to seek work. It will not be easy, as civilian enterprises are unlikely to see an uptick in demand for their goods and services.
Finally, the drop in income for these hundreds of thousands of people will cause a statistically significant fall in household consumption, slowing economic growth and risking a recession.
Given the Russian Ministry of Finance, I suspect that some of the funds freed up by reduced military spending will be used to reduce the deficit rather than to finance other budget programs, which would further depress the economy. The 2027 budget provides a rough sense of what is at stake: with military spending around 6.9% of GDP, or about 17,000 billion rubles, it is clear that any reduction will have serious consequences for jobs in the defense industry and for domestic demand.
However, one can anticipate that these transition processes will unfold over one to two years, and that the shock will not be as violent as at the outset of the war. The outcomes will largely depend on how quickly new relations with the West are arranged and how swiftly sanctions are lifted or eased.
You argue that the regime would not survive the death or incapacity of the Russian president, in the absence of institutionalized succession mechanisms. But can the Russian economy recover from Vladimir Putin? What would be the cost of leaving Putinism?
A personalist regime cannot survive its creator. All threads of power are tied to him. All counterweights were built by him. And the regime’s central weakness is the complete absence of a functional succession mechanism. The regime has been constructed around a single man and relies on his role as the supreme arbiter among political groups, the administration, and the security services. The latter, the main pillar of regime stability, have the Kremlin’s undivided attention, which deliberately encourages competition among the army, the FSB, Rosgvardia, the Interior Ministry, and other services so that none can seize excessive power. In the absence of a major political crisis, this strategy further reinforces presidential control.
Another notable dynamic is the controlled renewal of elites. Since 2024, aging cadres are ceding to younger technocrats, loyal administrators, and presidential confidants. As is clear from the outset, this policy does not create new centers of power; dependence on Putin remains total.
Un régime personnaliste ne peut pas survivre à son créateur.
Sergey Aleksashenko
By contrast, the question for the Russian economy is different. Can it “recover from Vladimir Putin”? Of course it can. It has already managed to recover from 75 years of communist rule. The question is how many years it will take to return to a “normal” state and what the extent of its technological lag will be—not merely relative to advanced countries, but—let us say—relative to Eastern European nations. An ongoing technological revolution centered on artificial intelligence is unfolding before our eyes. If Russia does not engage with it, it will simply widen its lag to the point of becoming irretrievable.
From your experience at the Central Bank and in negotiations with the IMF in post-Soviet Russia, what should be the stance of a new transitional power after Vladimir Putin? Are there historical mistakes not to repeat?
The first point to note here is that any post-Putin transitional power should strive to assemble the broadest possible coalition to set a new course and enable substantial reforms to be implemented as quickly as possible, relying on consensus rather than confrontation.
Second, Russia’s future will largely depend on how the country rethinks and rebuilds its relations with Western nations. Russia will inevitably have to abandon its grandiose fantasies, drastically reduce its level of militarization, and stop pursuing confrontation and antagonism at all costs.