How the AfD Became Germany’s Mass Party

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1 — A historic result

By collecting 43.8% of the valid votes, the AfD achieved this Sunday the best result in its history in a German regional election. It thus surpasses by more than ten points its previous record – 32.8% obtained in 2024 during the regional vote in neighboring Thuringia.

2 — A sweeping victory

As polls had anticipated, the AfD won a resounding victory over the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), which came in second with 17.2% of the votes, nearly three points below the latest intention to vote. The three left-wing parties – the Social Democrats (SPD), the Greens and Die Linke – hover in a narrow band between 8.6% and 9.3% of the vote. The Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance (BSW, nationalist left) stands at 5.3%, above the 5% threshold required to secure seats.

3 — A progression across all constituencies

The AfD also records the strongest gains in 40 of the 41 constituencies, with the exception of the Halle III urban constituency, where the Greens achieve a slightly larger gain. Overall, the AfD has more than doubled its 2021 result; large urban areas are not an exception to this trend.

4 — The only Volkspartei

The AfD won in every municipality of the state, including university towns. Its score stands at 32.6% of the vote in Magdeburg and 29.9% in Halle. But it is in the southern part of the state, near the borders with Thuringia and Saxony, that it records its best results, with locally more than 60% of the votes. If it fails to secure an absolute majority of voters in most municipalities, the AfD asserts itself as a true Volkspartei (“mass party”), capable of prevailing across regions and across demographics. By contrast, the CDU, long strong in the region, seems to have lost this quality.

5 — Direct mandates captured by the AfD

On Sunday, September 6, voters had two votes. With the first vote (Erststimme), they could elect a direct candidate by a simple majority in their constituency. With their second vote (Zweitstimme), they decided the distribution of seats (direct and list) in the Landtag. Unsurprisingly, the AfD won 38 of the 41 constituencies. The three exceptions are urban constituencies won by Die Linke: Magdeburg II, Halle II and Halle III.

6 — The left’s tactical vote

In opinion polls, the SPD and the Greens had long hovered at the threshold (SPD) or slightly below (Greens) the 5% mark. They ultimately ended up on a par with Die Linke. This development owes much to what appears to be tactical voting: perhaps to help them reach the threshold, many left-wing voters cast their second votes for the SPD or the Greens while continuing to back Die Linke’s direct candidate. The phenomenon is especially visible in the Halle III constituency won by Die Linke: despite 40% of direct votes for its candidate, the party only secured 13.8% of second votes. Calls for tactical voting had been voiced by several left-wing organizations during the campaign.

If the first votes reflect voters’ true preferences, tactical voting even decided the election: without it, the Greens would have fallen below 5% and the AfD would have obtained a slim majority of one or two seats.

7 — The AfD, recipient of transfers and endorsed by former abstentionists

The AfD managed to double its score thanks to transfers from other parties (notably the CDU) and the votes of a large number of former abstainers. According to Infratest Dimap’s vote-day survey data, about 170,000 non-voters in 2021 shifted to the AfD, more than the total gains the party registered from other political formations and about 10% of Sachsen-Anhalt’s total electorate. This figure should be compared with the 45,000 abstentionists who switched to the left and the 30,000 abstentionists who voted for the CDU. To a lesser extent, the BSW also benefited from transfers from former Die Linke voters, while the center-left gained votes likely from more centrist CDU voters in 2021.

8 — Record turnout and a catch-up in the AfD’s strongholds

The turnout this Sunday was historic: 77.8%, up 17 points from 2021. Never have so many voters turned out for a regional election in Saxony-Anhalt since 1990. Nevertheless, and despite the large flows from abstainers, the raw data show no strong correlation between turnout and AfD support at the municipal level. This apparent paradox is explained by a phenomenon of catch-up: turnout in the AfD’s bastions rose to levels comparable to or higher than in the cities, with very high rates achieved mainly in smaller municipalities.

9 — The decisive vote of those over 70

The AfD vote is split by age group, education level, gender and economic status. According to Infratest Dimap’s vote-day survey, 30% of voters with a high level of education voted for the AfD, versus 57% of voters with no higher education. Men are more likely to vote for the AfD by eleven points (50% vs 39%); among those who describe their financial situation as poor, the gap reaches 28 points (65% vs 37%). Conversely, the 70-and-older age group is the only one to place the AfD on a par with the CDU at around 30% of the votes. Excluding this group, which accounts for about a quarter of the electorate, the AfD would have obtained an absolute majority in the Landtag with scores around 52% among the middle-age groups.

10 — A high-stakes coalition dynamic

The election results do not give the AfD an absolute majority, as it secures 39 seats out of the 83 in the Landtag. To govern, it could rely on the BSW abstaining, which on voting night affirmed its willingness to defeat the incumbent Sven Schulze (CDU). Together, the two parties would hold 44 seats, i.e., two more than the majority. The CDU also has reason to fear that the AfD might try to split its group by winning over potential defectors to back a joint government project. Of the 13 CDU MPs, three dissidents would be enough to flip the majority. Conversely, a majority of all other parties could block the AfD in the Landtag, provided it suffers fewer than two defections.

This situation promises an extremely tense inaugural parliamentary session. It must be held by October 6. One plausible scenario at this stage is a minority AfD cabinet allowed by the BSW’s abstention. However, this scenario is far from certain given the substantial pressure weighing on both the BSW and the CDU at regional and federal levels. Last night, the BSW’s Spitzenkandidatin Claudia Wittig indicated on the regional public channel (Mitteldeutscher Rundfunk, MDR) that her party, with four seats, would be open to political cooperation with the AfD. “I would not want to elect Mr. Siegmund, but neither would I want, or perhaps even less so, Mr. Schulze [the CDU candidate]. We see a deeply divided society, encouraged by the media between the AfD and the cordon sanitaire. Our position is precisely to mediate between these two fronts. It is not advantageous to line up in one camp, but if we pursue concrete policy with flexible majorities, the best (Prime Minister) for that would be a cross-partisan figure.”