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The common thread among all populist discourses is the claim to defend the identity of a people, supposedly threatened both by internal subversion — de-Christianization, decadence, wokism — and by external submersion caused by demographic immigration bearing a different culture — usually Islam. Populists differentiate themselves by their nuanced reading of the relationship between these two “threats.” For the more traditionalists, subversion enables submersion, while for the more liberal, submersion leads to subversion.
The Anthropological Culture at Stake
When populists speak of defending a culture, it is not the culture embodied by Plato, Shakespeare, Goethe, or Proust that they have in mind. It is the anthropological culture of a society. In other words, the implicit structure of the social bond that its members are meant to share, but also a set of values and norms that seem self-evident, regardless of the political or philosophical differences among people. In short, it is a culture forged in a shared history and long tradition that the society would preserve in its roots and memory. Before any sociological differences such as class, fortune, location, or education, the society to be defended rests, according to populists, on an anthropological structure that allows for a functioning society, and, in a degraded form, for a certain way of life.
If culture, from an anthropological standpoint, is precisely what allows the symbolization and representation of this underlying structure — just as Marxism relates to social classes — then it is indeed the key to social order. For many populist leaders and thinkers, seizing political power would now be the sole means of refounding the cultural field, thereby defending or restoring this culture in the anthropological sense. This is indeed the definition of a cultural counter-revolution.
The question of the anthropological foundation of society has knowingly been ignored by liberal politics; it has, however, consistently been recalled by counter-revolutionary thinkers like Louis de Bonald. The achievement, but also the weakness, of liberalism is that it dodged the anthropological question through the social contract theory, treating society as if it were composed solely of unattached individuals. To this fiction, populists oppose the real country, common sense, identity, roots, history, and, on top of that, Christianity.
However, the paradox of today’s counter-revolution is that it can no longer rely on an existing society — the traditional, more or less Christian one. It thus finds itself obliged to (re)create its own anthropology, drawing on a fantasized past. In other words, tradition has become the new utopia.
Populist Strategies for Achieving This Cultural Reconquest
The priority, therefore, is cultural reconquest. Even before seizing power, this begins with penetrating the cultural field, developing a Christian symbolic culture to shape a new social and patrimonial landscape, investing in entertainment, and establishing spaces for crafting an intellectual vision — GRECE was its precursor, later taken up by Bolloré media and new think tanks. This groundwork thus prepares a electoral victory that will ensure the discipline or destruction of the “progressive” fortresses — media, universities, the “world of culture.” The question of the reversibility of the process will then arise. Take Hungary as an example. Orbán’s defeat shows that as long as democracy functions, the counter-revolution remains illusory. From this, two strategies present themselves: either we move directly to dictatorship as in Russia, or we attempt to transform society deeply and root a new reactionary habitus to secure an anthropological re-foundation. As lawyer Thibault de Montbrial, a proponent of broadening the hardening of legislation, says, “The restoration of authority will have virtuous effects in all fields of society. It will then be time to win back souls through education, around a Greco-Latin historical and Judaeo-Christian cultural heritage assumed. ”
But the crucial question remains: which past do the populists refer to? That is the problem. Is it the past prior to mass migration? The priority would then be remigration. Or is it the past embodied by a traditional society that gradually disintegrated under liberalism with the French Revolution, under progressivism with the left, and then with wokism? Populist programs thus intertwine two different, even contradictory anthropological foundations: on one hand, an anthropology advocating an “individualistic and hedonistic lifestyle” in opposition to fanaticism — the slogan “We are all Charlie” is an example —; and on the other hand, a Christian anthropology, the one attributed to the traditional society built around the family and based on gender. Two contradictory anthropological references, therefore. And this contradiction will continue to grow. For we are witnessing today, in the wake of the MAGA wave in the United States, a radicalization of populist governance projects. It is now about promoting a genuine cultural counter-revolution, aimed at making the reversal of the liberal order irreversible — wokism is no longer the sole target.”
domestically, the objective is to carry out a deep constitutional reform that would liberate the new regimes from the control of republican institutions, but also from Brussels and international bodies, of course. As for the inevitability of electoral alternation, to escape it without a coup d’état, and without counting solely on repression, populists intend to achieve it by deeply changing social bonds, by returning to the anthropological foundations of society. The aim is to render their norms and values “desirable,” presenting them as the reflection of the real or imagined lifestyle of a majority of the population.
The “Catholic Anthropology,” the Only Hard Anthropological Model Worth Keeping
The nostalgia for the fifties, and its counterpart ostalgia of East Germany, targets societies that lack an autonomous anthropological foundation capable of recreating social bonds. The de-responsibilization under a protective state — more or less benevolent —, the pleasures of mass consumption, the suburban dream: all of this assumed a certain prosperity sheltered from national borders. That prosperity is no longer on the agenda. These two postwar models, liberal and Soviet, were largely preserved by the Cold War and proved tenable only over two generations.
So what alternative “hard” anthropological model remains today? It is what I call the “Catholic Anthropology,” namely the traditional family and natural law. It sits at the heart of traditionalist and fundamentalist movements, but it is also regularly invoked by a wide spectrum of conservative right and far-right that view it as the counterpoint to a wokism seen as the ultimate stage of liberal Enlightenment thought. The central idea is that there exists an anthropological model inscribed in human nature, which can either be the result of the divine creative act or of evolution.
Why then “Catholic” and not “Christian”? Because only the Catholic Church claims to govern civil society, and this from the Gregorian Reform of the 11th century up to the development of the famous “social doctrine of the Church,” now claimed by a portion of the far right — the core of the “common good” of Sterin rests on a central concept of this doctrine. If Protestants and Catholics both claim Augustine’s theory of the two cities, they draw different consequences. The Protestant must live his faith in the city of man, but gladly delegates the management of this society to the secular order, which is explicit in Luther. The Calvinists emphasize more the “communion of saints” that distinguishes it from society. One can see the influence of predestination theory, even if it is no longer largely claimed theologically. American Evangelicals thus do not form society, in the sense that for them social links have no inherent positivity. Everything centers on the personal encounter with Jesus, the condition of individual salvation — the end of ends.
Yet for the Church there is indeed a natural law that applies to all; it is derived from the nature of the human being as God created it. A good society is therefore possible if founded on natural anthropology and the ethics that follow. Salvation, however, rests only on faith and works. It is an organic society, oriented toward proper ends. Consequently, there is indeed social autonomy, but grounded in the nature of the human being, i.e., indirectly, on creation. This autonomy does not depend on the will of the individual, for that will can exercise itself only within the framework of its own nature. The natural law is observable, it precedes any social contract, which it makes unnecessary, and remains accessible to non-Christians. Pope Leo XIV sums up this view that was systematized by Thomas Aquinas:
“[The] foundations [of the social doctrine] lie fundamentally in harmony with human nature, the natural law that all can recognize, even among non-Christians, even among non-believers. Therefore there is no need to fear proposing and defending it with conviction: it is a doctrine of salvation aimed at the good of every human being, the edification of peaceful, harmonious, prosperous, and reconciled societies.”
The Church’s opposition to same-sex marriage is thus not only expressed in terms of abomination — that is, an insult to God — but in terms of anthropological rupture, in the words of Cardinal Barbarin. Likewise, the non-negotiable principles of Pope Benedict, namely the defense of life and family, speak to all, and not only to Catholics.
The strength of this model fascinates far beyond the community of believers. It also explains the weight of Catholic intellectuals within the MAGA movement — often converted Protestants like J.D. Vance. By contrast, in Europe, the approach is more Maurassian: the Catholic anthropological model is praised by agnostic intellectuals who often have no Catholic culture, such as Éric Zemmour. For neo-reactionary thinkers, natural law is secularized into “common sense” — or into “nature” — invoking sociobiology and evolutionary theory.
Law or a New Christian Habitus: Returning to a “Catholic Anthropology”
The problem is determining how to effect this return to a “Catholic Anthropology” even when secularized, while society becomes increasingly dechristianized. The question goes far beyond the loss of faith: it concerns the very loss of any Christian culture.
To pursue this anthropological return, leaving aside the possibility of a widespread return of faith — which, in any case, will not necessarily manifest as identitarian Christianity — two options remain: either through norm, i.e., through law (and thus repression); or through the establishment of a new Christian habitus, notably through deploying a Christian symbolic culture.
We observe this among neo-reactionaries who push for conservative legistlation regarding family, gender, and sexuality via the prohibition of abortion, same-sex marriage, recognition of sexual diversity, affirmation of complementarity rather than equality between the sexes, etc. But the vast majority of the populist electorate, as well as a portion of populist leaders themselves, will not follow. Hence the populists’ caution, except when there is favorable ground, as in Texas and Poland today. Only the most extreme parties attempt this program, as with Vox in Spain, or General Vannacci in Italy. The priority will thus everywhere be the authoritarian reduction of existing spaces of cultural freedom: bans, censorship, firing, withdrawal of subsidies, appointment of partisans and friends to key posts. This works as long as it affects the “margins” (immigrants, young Muslim women, students, cultural milieus), but becomes problematic when one nears the heart of the electorate — Trump is the illustration today.
Because in order for the norm to take hold, it must be desirable: legal changes are the consequence, not the cause, of anthropological changes. They reflect, frame, slow down, or accelerate them. We have seen this with gay marriage, which became acceptable once it passed into law. But a society is not built from law. Hedonistic individualism is deeply rooted in Western society, starting with the populist elites.
Thus the whole point of cultural policy is to erase the progressive culture alone—not enough, because the question remains: what will replace it? It is necessary to render Christian culture desirable even in a secularized form.
The second component is to saturate the “landscape” with markers, icons, vignettes, and narratives highlighting a Christian nation. This is what I call “Christian symbolic culture”: street names, theme parks, ostentatious pilgrimages, grand pardons, processions, paths of Saint James, ringing bells, flags, uniforms, calvaries and shrines. One devotes oneself to all the saints of the repertoire to mark the territory. This staging phenomenon is found at Puy du Fou, as well as in Bolloré television, which offers Latin Mass at peak hours with priests in finery.
Yet this symbolic marking does not correspond to any genuine anthropological structure. They are ostentatious rituals, detached from the sociological contexts that gave rise to them: those of guilds, rural life rhythms, rites of passage, and the great common sorrows of the people. Indeed, there are no longer Breton sailors risking their lives in the North Atlantic, only bottom-fishers and countryside cyclists passing a pleasant Sunday on the day of the Pardons. The insistence of populists on this festive mode responds to a structural necessity: in the absence of anthropological foundation, one plays. One dresses as knights with Joan of Arc, poses in folk costume between bourrée and bagpipes — even Bolloré joins in with a round hat. Mass and bullfighting appear on the program of Béziers’ mayor.
This is indeed a folkloric culture that is being promoted. But as the great scholar of French folklore, André Varagnac, noted, folklore is what happens when popular culture has lost its “civilizational” — i.e., anthropological — anchor. We are in the playful lifestyle of re-enactment. In fact, we intensify the deculturation we claim to combat — i.e., the gap between social practices and representations, between staging and real life. We push toward turning real life into a staging. This unrealization is amplified by the role of social networks, a real venue for social bonds staged through festive performances, whether in a playful mode or in the form of an identity ritual. There is then no popular culture left; there is only folklore or entertainment. Hence the kitsch aspect. We pretend, we caricature, we embellish.
Moreover, this strategy lacks a crucial element: the Church. While it has nothing against popular religion or identity, it defends above all value and norm. Certainly, the Church does not object to folklore repackaged as “popular religiosity,” Corsican polyphonic chant, or the Ave Maria in Gascon, but it cannot compromise on its values. I propose illustrating the tension between, on one side, a folkloric symbolic Christianity (and patriotic), and on the other, faith and norm, with a recent incident. Note that the protagonist is not a politically defined “populist,” but he fits within this frame of symbolic culture returning to tradition and roots.
On the occasion of the “Wool Fair” — a revival of a medieval tradition and celebration of Jean de Dunois, companion of Joan of Arc — the mayor of Châteaudun, Philippe Vigier, makes the Sunday mass of July 5, 2026 a “Medieval Mass.” The deputy mayor and his city council dress as medieval knights. The priest, Father François Yambressinga from Ivory Coast, not particularly inspired by chivalry, delivers a sermon against the euthanasia law. Yet the deputy mayor, dressed as Dunois, is the general rapporteur of the bill on assisted dying. Furious, he demands apologies from the priest, and declares: “I told him that this was neither the place nor the moment to discuss assisted dying. It was a medieval mass. The elected officials were in costume, there were standard-bearers, and Luc Arbogast accompanied the ceremony by performing three medieval chants.” Folklore triumphs over religious norm: it points toward a simulacrum, that of staging, of spectacle, of event. This appropriation of Christianity by the identitarian is, of course, unacceptable to the Church. The bishop supported the priest and asserted that there would be no apologies.
This anecdote clearly shows that the conflict between symbolic culture and religious demand is a question of purpose. If play is indeed a form of learning, there comes a moment to stop playing and grow up. Habitus does not create anthropology.
Populism will be as incapable of reviving the past world as it is of founding a new society. It belongs to a society of spectacle and the expansion of the empire of norms.