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In major institutions, there is often a tendency to repeat what has been done before, a kind of somnambulism. This is precisely what is happening today within the European Union regarding its relations with Africa. Yet we must break decisively with this routine to succeed in reconnecting with a continent that will play a crucial role in the world’s future in the 21st century.
A Great Wave of Democratization
Let us first revisit what has happened in Africa over the past decades. In the 1990s, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War, a legitimate hope arose on the continent: that autocratic regimes ruling there almost everywhere would cede to democratic ones.
After several decades in which African countries were largely governed by one-party regimes, dozens of multi-party elections took place across the continent between 1989 and 1994. In the last decade of the 20th century, 42 of Sub-Saharan Africa’s 48 countries implemented democratic reforms. Thirty years after the great historical transformation of the independence wave, there was a sense that Africa was undergoing another historic shift. On the European side, this dynamic was broadly supported at the time, both politically and financially.
The circumstances varied from country to country, but the overall trend was clear. This movement primarily originated from a sense of great frustration among African populations whose quality of life had hardly improved, if at all, since independence. This point is particularly important and has not been sufficiently taken into account in Europe: African populations did not vote en masse simply because they enjoy voting or because they value the possibility of expressing their political diversity at the ballot box. They went to vote because they had high expectations for governance improvements and for economic and social progress.
Since then, African countries have shown an economic record that may seem positive in terms of growth, but which is far less in practice than often thought. The period from 1980 to 1995 had been disastrous. The meager growth in economic output was vastly outpaced by population growth. During this decade and a half, per capita income had fallen markedly.
The following twenty years were better. Certainly, thanks to economic reforms, but mainly due to the strong international demand for African raw materials. This period was also marked by a flood of foreign direct investment, which however largely targeted the primary sector, notably oil, gas, or minerals.
Significant Economic Growth but to be Contextualized
From the mid-1990s to the mid-2010s, the continent’s economic growth was substantial, averaging above 5% per year. A 5% growth rate would be a remarkable result for European economies, but such a rate must be contextualized in Africa for two reasons. First, due to a demographic growth of more than 2% per year, real per capita income growth is not sufficient. Second, because many African economies start from an extremely low baseline, and are therefore engaged in a catch-up process.
Over the past ten years, for various reasons, economic growth has again slowed to around 3–4% per year, which translates to barely more than 1% per capita once population growth is taken into account. Added to this is the fact that Africa is, along with Latin America, the region of the world with the strongest inequality. And these inequalities have not diminished over the last three decades. This is one of the most important factors that continues to hinder the continent’s development.
Africa is, in reality, extremely heterogeneous, and one must beware of overly general discourses about it. It comprises roughly fifty countries with very diverse histories, climates, cultures and political realities. But to understand African political dynamics, including international dynamics, one must recognize that a large portion of the African population continues to feel substantial frustration about its economic and social prospects.
The African population is the youngest on the planet. It is ambitious and possesses the same talents as anywhere else in the world, despite a lower level of education. When it examines its current situation and the path it has followed over the last decades, the predominant feeling is one of revolt. A climate of deep dissatisfaction prevails in Africa, not only toward its leaders themselves but also toward their traditional allies. This is where Europe intervenes.
A Distracted Europe
In recent decades, Europe has shown itself largely unable to understand the continent’s situation or adapt to the transformations it has undergone. The European Union has not remained inactive during this time, but it has been distracted.
A relationship centered on development aid had been established with Africa from the outset of European integration and African independence, with the Yaoundé, Lomé, and finally the Cotonou conventions. It was essentially through these mechanisms, initially largely promoted by France, that Europe-ward integration of Africa’s economic relations occurred. However, the core of the political relationship remained centered in Paris and London more than in Brussels. In other words, the architecture of relations between the Union and African countries was technocratic and focused on economic development, but it did not include a significant political dimension and did not create a dynamic at that level.
From the 1990s onward, after the end of the Cold War, Europe withdrew inward, focused on the historic task of reunifying the European continent. Within the Commission, a few thousand civil servants continued to work in a technocratic manner on promoting cooperation projects with African countries. Although the texts of the agreements increasingly highlighted the political dimension of this relationship, the actual dialogue remained essentially technical in nature. The will to engage politically was very limited on the European side and meetings were generally led by directors-general or division chiefs, even when on the other side of the table there were presidents, prime ministers, or ministers.
The New European Countries Do Not Know Africa
In 2004, the Union underwent a major enlargement with the accession of ten new member states, eight from Central and Eastern Europe, followed a little later by Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia. None of these new member states maintains significant political relations with the African continent. Inevitably, the EU’s center of gravity shifted toward the east and the north. Countries like Spain, Portugal, France, and Italy did their best to keep Africa and the Mediterranean as important components of European policy, but enlargement worked decisively in the opposite direction.
A few years later, the great financial crisis hit. For several years, European summits focused on rescuing the euro and several economies, sparking the controversies we know. Then came Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the immense complexity of transatlantic relations since Donald Trump’s arrival in Washington, the Covid-19 pandemic, and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. From the early 1990s to today, Africa has been far from a priority for European decision-makers.
The idea that Europe–Africa relations were broadly settled, despite the crises any given country on the continent might go through, also dominated. In many cases, African elites studied in Europe and sent their children to universities there, notably in France or the United Kingdom. Europe remained a reference for African populations, and there seemed little need to pay close attention to internal dynamics on the continent, especially since there were other more pressing urgencies for Europeans.
In other words, for the Union, relations with Africa followed their usual course, under the guidance of technocrats. They were convinced that the millions of euros devoted to development projects would be enough to resolve all problems or misunderstandings that might arise.
The Gordian Knot of Migrations
Let us return to the African continent to specify the challenges it faces. The first concerns demography. Population growth remains high there and contrasts with Europe’s demographic stagnation and the rapid slowdown observed almost everywhere else. In 1950, the European population was more than double that of Africa. By around 2000, Africa’s population had surpassed Europe’s. Today, at the end of the first quarter of the 21st century, Africa has about twice as many inhabitants as Europe. In about a quarter of a century, Africa’s population will reach 2.5 billion, more than triple the European population which will be around 700 million.
Africa is by far the youngest continent on the planet. Today, the median age is 19.5 years. About 60% of Africans are under 25. In the Sahel region, this percentage rises to 70%. This situation is radically different from Europe, where only 25% of the population is under 25. It is not merely a statistical gap: these different realities have a profound impact on how Europeans and Africans view the world and how they perceive each other.
For the overwhelming majority of Africans born in recent decades, the main thing they know about Europe is that obtaining a visa to go there is extremely difficult. They also know that the only way to seek opportunities in developed European economies is to risk their lives crossing the Sahara desert and the Mediterranean, or by boarding canoes to reach the Canaries.
Africa is the youngest continent, while Europe is the oldest: by 2050, nearly one in three Europeans will be over 65. The consequences will be obvious: there will be fewer and fewer young people to support a growing number of retirees.
The topic of migration is politically explosive in Europe. It is unfortunately often exploited demagogically to fuel fear and hatred. A calm and realistic view helps reveal other realities.
The demographic evolution of Europe is hardly sustainable without immigration. The vigor of Africa’s demographic dynamism also makes the idea of building walls in the desert or at sea to block migratory flows toward Europe ridiculous. For migratory flows to be controlled without young Africans having to take extraordinary risks to reach Europe, it is essential that Africa experiences strong economic growth, creates many jobs, and offers better prospects for its youth. Without this, it would be illusory to imagine that healthy migratory relations between Africa and Europe could be established.
Two other points should be noted regarding African flows. The vast majority of African migrations occur within the continent, not between Africa and Europe. There are, in fact, more than twice as many Africans who migrate to other African countries as to Europe. The growth of intra-African migratory flows is much higher than that of migrations to Europe. It should also be recalled that Europeans migrate far more than Africans. About 3% of Africans live outside their country of birth, compared with more than 10% of Europeans. Although Africa’s population is twice as large as Europe’s, there are nearly 90 million Europeans living outside their country of birth, compared with about 40 million Africans. And overall, among migrants worldwide, only 14% are African, compared with over 40% Asian and nearly 30% European.
The political and media debate sometimes gives the impression that Europe is threatened by vast hordes of Africans determined to invade it. This is false. In reality, population movements between the two continents remain relatively modest. It is our duty to reject politically motivated manipulation and to examine honestly the real numbers and trends. That does not mean there is no work to do; obviously there is. But we would be deeply mistaken to think this is Europe’s greatest challenge.
Fixing Climate Injustice
Climate change has especially grave consequences in Africa.
There is clearly a deep injustice here: Africa is responsible for about 3% of total global carbon emissions, and yet it is on this continent that some of the fastest changes are observed. Moreover, agriculture is one of the sectors most affected by climate change, and Africa employs a disproportionately large share of workers in this sector. In other words, climate change harms the planet as a whole but hits Africa hardest.
Consider the Sahel, where a complex relationship between herders and farmers has existed for centuries. Some populations live by sedentary agriculture, while others rely on long-distance pastoralism across hundreds of kilometers with seasonal movements. When herds cross cultivated lands, they cause damage to farmers, but traditionally such damage was compensated. Historically, tensions between farmers and herders arising from these different lifeways are well documented, yet there are countless examples of coexistence and of people seeking peaceful, mutually beneficial solutions.
With climate change, transhumance routes are altered for short periods, and herders then come into contact with populations they are not accustomed to resolving these problems with. This provokes conflicts. Traditionally, in the Sahel, herders are predominantly Fulani (Peul, Peulh), and these new conflicts thus take on an ethnic dimension in a context of extreme fragility of state authority and capacity. It is in this way that over the past fifteen years, radical Islamist insurgent groups have developed. Do not believe that adherence to these jihadist groups stems from a wave of religious radicalization. It is mainly explained by resource shortages and a lack of prospects for young people, drawn to these uprisings by the promise of a better life.
It is mainly young Fulani people, increasingly marginalized and with fewer prospects due to climate change, who swell the ranks of the jihadists. This reinforces the idea, widespread in other sectors of the population as well as among some military and paramilitary groups, that all Fulani are terrorists. It results in genocidal attacks against villages and Fulani populations.
When climate change is discussed in Africa, it is not only about the shrinking arable land, which would already be very serious in itself, but also about the acceleration of internal imbalances in societies that are already highly fragile. The example I gave comes from the Sahel, but similar dynamics related to climate change are found in many other regions of the continent. This is notably the case in the tragic civil war in Sudan, where twelve million people have been displaced and where two hundred thousand, or even four hundred thousand, have already lost their lives in the last three years.
Opportunities Exist for Converging Interests
The African continent faces colossal challenges, and hundreds of millions of Africans live in extreme precariousness, trapped in vicious circles of poverty and insecurity. Colonial structures and postcolonial misgovernance have given rise to many fragile states, whose capacity to exercise sovereign functions and to provide basic public goods to their populations is severely limited.
But there are also well-governed countries where the energy of youth represents a definite demographic asset and a promise for the future. Moreover, changes in the global context offer new prospects for Africa.
This is the case of the energy transition and the digital transition, which can offer new opportunities to Africa and its relations with Europe. These transitions depend in particular on access to critical minerals. It is precisely in Africa that the largest concentration of these minerals is found, with about one third of the world’s total reserves, including 55% of cobalt, 70% of manganese, 80% of platinum, 62% of chromium, and 25% of natural graphite.
In theory, this could be a major asset for Africa in the 21st century. Provided, however, that African states manage to control mining exploitation, develop value chains, and implement advanced technologies to become exporters of high-tech products. So far, however, critical minerals and rare earths seem poorly positioned to truly contribute to the continent’s development, just as fossil fuels did previously, despite their abundance in Africa.
New Actors Are (Very) Present in Africa
While we were lost in our internal quarrels in Europe, new players arrived in Africa, bringing with them investments and innovative proposals. They occupy the space left vacant by Europe’s distraction and its inability to establish an Africa-policy for our era.
For three decades, China has positioned itself to harness opportunities related to Africa’s resources, whether oil, gas or critical materials for high-tech technologies. Public buildings, such as parliaments or ministries, have been built and offered by China across the continent. This does not mean, however, that Beijing has significantly contributed to Africa’s development to date, and in some countries tensions arise from the heavy indebtedness provoked by China. Yet when talking with African leaders, they value what they see as a respectful attitude on the part of the Chinese, as well as their willingness to keep promises.
Turkey, which had 12 embassies in Africa at the beginning of this century, now has 44. In conflict-affected countries, Turkey sells weapons, including drones, that are now on many fronts. But in other countries, which make up the majority of the continent, Turkish influence is rapidly growing in numerous sectors of the economy. Turkish Airlines directly serves nearly 50 destinations in Africa, meaning that more and more Africans seeking to travel outside the continent, or even within it, pass through Istanbul. In the Sahel and West Africa, Turkish presence at airports and in hotels is now hard to miss. Even in the education sector, Turkish schools are being established in many African capitals, and a growing share of the children of African elites go to universities in Turkey.
The United Arab Emirates perhaps represent the most striking case of recent years’ interest in Africa. The Emirates, seeking to secure their future after the depletion of fossil fuels, are now the main source of investment on the continent. It is estimated that around $30 billion of undeclared African gold passes through Dubai each year, thereby skirting regulations in European countries. There are now 30,000 African companies registered with the Dubai Chamber of Commerce, and the city has become a major money-laundering hub for Africa’s political and economic elites.
These interests come with increasing political influence and engagement. Starting with Sudan’s civil war, where the United Arab Emirates strongly support the Rapid Support Forces rebels. Gulf states’ fierce competition is also reflected in growing presence of Saudi Arabia and Qatar on the continent. For now, these countries have only made occasional investments, but they will certainly move toward deeper engagement.
As Europeans, we must question the interest shown by other powers in Africa. We can no longer treat the continent as a reserved domain. We must accept the presence of these other actors on the continent: the colonial era of possession and control ended decades ago. The neocolonial relationships that often emerged between former colonizers and many countries are unhealthy and increasingly rejected by African populations. This is a good thing: we should take very seriously the sovereignist discourses that criticize European paternalism voiced by African elites and, more importantly, populations themselves. The will to defend and advance one’s own interests is entirely legitimate. This is a point we share, notably in our relations with the United States or China today.
We nevertheless have assets that stem from our shared history and geographic proximity. An extremely critical Prime Minister from the Sahel told me that he far preferred working with Europeans than with the Chinese. In his view, when he spoke with us, he could understand what lay behind the words, which was not the case with his Chinese interlocutors.
We Must Counter Russia’s Presence in Africa
There is another country whose presence and activity in Africa cannot be ignored: Russia. Unlike the other actors mentioned so far, Russia has almost never contributed to building a school, a clinic, or a well. Russia has only one motive for its increased presence in Africa in recent years: to complicate Europe’s southern flank. For Moscow, Africa is not a true partner but a region that can be manipulated to sow discord, for example by instrumentalizing migration flows, following the model already used by Belarus. For Russia, Africa is useful only insofar as it can help foment divisions and conflicts in Europe.
Russia acts mainly in Africa through mercenaries, notably those of the Wagner group, which are today integrated into the Africa Corps. These mercenaries are the same individuals, but now under a closer chain of command from the Kremlin. They are very present in the Sahel, in particular, but their real impact is limited, because the conflicts in this region cannot be solved by brute force alone. Another Russian export to Africa is know-how in manipulation and disinformation, as demonstrated by the events that led to French troops departing the Sahel.
It is therefore essential to distinguish between the intensified presence of various international players in Africa, which stems in part from Europe’s incapacity to respond to the continent’s aspirations and needs, and Russia’s presence in Africa, which is specifically aimed at challenging Europe. We must cope with the former, but we must counter this Russian presence, even if it must be done in a smart rather than direct manner.
A New European Attitude Toward Africa?
Africa is much richer and more complex than can be captured here, but let us conclude this work with four guiding ideas for a new European approach to this continent.
First, we must recognize that Europe has a direct stake in working for peace, prosperity, and stability on the African continent. Solidarity is a noble sentiment, but let us not be mistaken: if Africa does not know peace, prosperity, and stability, we will bear the consequences. It is not good intentions, but this direct interest, that must constitute our primary reason to act.
Second, we must admit that our current approach is completely outdated. The mediocre routines of our technocrats prevent European and African leaders from meeting regularly to discuss in a respectful manner and share their concerns and interests. Changing this requires political will from our leaders. They do not need to spend all their time traveling across Africa, but they must recognize the importance of our southern neighbors and take the time to listen to what they have to say. If we are not capable of doing so, we should not be surprised that Africans continue to turn their backs on Europe.
We must also be willing to invest on a much larger scale in the various economic sectors. Just as Americans invested in the Marshall Plan after World War II, recognizing that the prosperity and security of the United States depended on Europe’s economic recovery, we must acknowledge that, after Africans themselves, we are the first to be affected by Africa’s prosperity and development.
In recent years, development aid has fallen sharply, particularly aid targeting Africa. This situation is partly due to budgetary difficulties, but above all to the sense of disillusionment, both in Africa and Europe, with the results of this public aid. This is an opportunity to seriously rethink how we invest on the African continent.
This means focusing economic support on the sectors that matter: education, health, high-employment-creating sectors, as well as those that enable the integration of new value chains, such as critical minerals. The rest will follow naturally.
Our key partners must be the African Union, with its overarching plan for Africa by 2063, as well as the regional economic communities. We need more financial resources, but in the long term, these resources will translate into substantial savings and will be a major asset if our neighbors are prosperous, stable and at peace.
Finally, we must invest far more seriously in peace and stability. The small European military training and security missions deployed on the African continent do not have the scale needed to make a meaningful impact. And if we persist in absurd approaches, such as training military personnel while refusing to supply them with weapons, we should not be surprised if they go elsewhere to obtain them, from the Russians.
Developing a European defense hinges on strengthening increasingly solid partnerships with African countries. We should aim to build a defensive alliance with all of West Africa, currently threatened by destabilizing forces. We have a role to play, and we must live up to our responsibilities and our interests.
The rapprochement with Africa is both a geopolitical imperative and a question of the EU’s credibility, but it will only be possible if we break with the status quo.