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A strategic principle tinted with black humor unfolds before us: in a lightning war, the first four years are always the hardest. The fifth has just begun, and it is hard to believe the president of the Russian Federation will accommodate it. In recent months, a cascade of adverse developments has accumulated: failure of the spring offensive, devastating images from the May 9 ceremonies with a furtive and hastily arranged victory parade, drone strikes on Saint Petersburg during the economic forum, then on Moscow, the cancellation of the traditional naval parade in Saint Petersburg, all against a backdrop of a deteriorating economic situation.
The Muscovites, the residents of Saint Petersburg, and other major cities, all the way to Omsk, 2,500 kilometers from Ukraine beyond the Urals where a refinery was hit, are discovering that the “special military operation” has become a war. The Kremlin spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, acknowledged this for the first time about a month ago. Daily life is upended by internet and Telegram blockages and fuel shortages. Crimea is isolated. Worry and fatigue are rising among the population, undermining confidence in Vladimir Putin ahead of the parliamentary elections from September 18 to 20.
The Kremlin’s two options
In this context, what choices lie ahead for the Kremlin? Two moves seem possible.
The first option would be to stage a false concession to negotiation, attempting once again to manipulate President Trump.
The aim would be to offer him a fake deal, just before the November midterm elections, urging him to press Volodymyr Zelensky. Vladimir Putin could declare that NATO aggression has been repelled victoriously and call an end to the fighting. Propaganda would run at full tilt. He would not be criticized by the Duma, nor by a state-controlled press.
While plausible a few months ago, this option is now overtaken by reality. Russia is going through a rough patch and will appear weak, which is intolerable for Vladimir Putin. The Ukrainian army will undoubtedly contradict him on the ground. The Russian president is likely disillusioned with Donald Trump after the Evian G7, June 15–17, marked by a realignment of the United States toward European positions. The Anchorage spirit is dead, according to Kremlin diplomatic adviser Yuri Ushakov. And essentially Moscow’s line has not deviated since the reference speech by the Russian president, June 14, 2024, at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. First, a global deal with conditions tantamount to Ukraine’s capitulation, the thawing of sanctions and “the return” to Russia of part of the annexed territories that were never theirs and are not even occupied, then a ceasefire — the exact inverse sequence of what Ukrainians and their supporters have demanded.
The second option would be to choose escalation.
Moscow has failed to turn its minor tactical gains, which allowed it to nibble some ground in Ukraine, into a strategic breakthrough. It lacks the manpower needed, and a second wave of mobilization, after the September 2022 one, would be very unpopular.
When things go wrong, Moscow overreaches.
Pierre Lévy
Rather than simply holding out bravely, the Ukrainians have regained the initiative. In the strategic arena of perception and narrative warfare, Ukraine is scoring points and proving that it “has cards in hand,” to borrow a phrase dear to Donald Trump.
When things go wrong, Moscow overreaches. According to my official Moscow interlocutors, advances on the ground were not as rapid as expected because the Russian army found itself facing NATO rather than Ukrainian forces. Nuclear apocalypse rhetoric is part of this strategy designed to frighten European opinion. “A nuclear power cannot lose,” is the slogan through which those in power seek to reassure themselves. One should also read the posts of ultranationalist bloggers, the voenkory, war correspondents: “It is time to fight the war for real.” The recent massive ballistic missile strikes on Kyiv have shown, if need be, the Russian choice.
Ultimately, this alternative clearly shows that Russia is at an impasse. The Kremlin has neither the intention to negotiate a just and durable peace that preserves Ukraine’s sovereignty, nor the capacity, at this stage, to subdue it on the ground.
The method of a serial aggressor
How can we best prepare, from the French and European perspective, for this critical sequence?
That is the whole point of profiling Russia, i.e., to specify the pattern of the moment of action by this serial aggressor. It involves analyzing past conflicts to identify Moscow’s modus operandi and avoid repeating our mistakes.
Wars follow a double tempo. On one hand, the long arc during which the seeds of crisis are sown: the geopolitical project, the historical vision, risk assessment, coalition-building, alliance consolidation, the militarization of the apparatus; on the other hand, the short interval of explosion: the moment of action, the frontal clash of weapons and political will.
We find there the three-time pattern of the Russian operation: first a long-matured project, then a systematic analysis of power relationships, finally the choice of war. To take only recent examples, this is the model of intervention in Georgia in August 2008, then in Ukraine in February 2022.
The long duration
The first phase is invariant: Vladimir Putin’s memory-obsessed persona, the “chief historian,” is well known. He has incessantly revisited, rammed, and hammered the victory in the “Great Patriotic War,” supposedly denied by the West, to legitimize his fight against the “Nazi regime” in Kyiv.
The end of the USSR, a seismic shock with ongoing aftershocks, is his other torment. It is unacceptable to him that post-Soviet states choose different destinies, especially if they lean toward Europe and the Atlantic. Georgia, then Ukraine, and more recently Armenia are cases in point. It is worth underscoring the extreme rigidity and threats from the Kremlin in response to developments in that country after European meetings in Yerevan in early May, and the victory of Nikol Pashinyan’s pro-European line in the parliamentary elections of June 17.
Finally, the constitutional reform, passed in July 2020, acted as a trigger. The resetting of presidential mandates allows him to run in 2024 and again to stay in power until 2036. I then have the sense that he is now aiming to leave a mark on history. His ambition is to enter the history books as the one who restored Russia’s power, notably by resolving the “Ukrainian question,” an existential problem for Russia’s identity in his demiurgic vision.
The time of cracks
The second phase is the analysis of the adversary’s weaknesses to exploit. It is the perception of a divided and indecisive West.
The Bucharest NATO summit, from April 2 to 4, 2008, laid bare the divergences among allies regarding Ukraine and Georgia’s accession. President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel opposed the launch of the accession process against George W. Bush. The compromised bargain, with a promise of admission without a precise roadmap, did not escape Moscow. The rejection of a US-led initiative at NATO was unprecedented, signaling a sense of US weakening while bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan. The sequence that followed included border pressure, armed and hybrid actions, and the pretext of genocide in South Ossetia.
The same pattern replayed with Ukraine’s large-scale aggression. A sequence of events in 2021 convinced Vladimir Putin that the moment was ripe to act.
On the American side, the Capitol attack on January 6 was interpreted, not without reason, as a sign of the fragility of the political system; in August, the chaotic withdrawal from Kabul cast doubt on the reliability of the United States and the solidity of its alliances. On December 9–10, the relative failure of the Summit for Democracy, desired by Joe Biden, was seen as another mark of weakness, on a symbolic point of his foreign policy.
Moscow has good reasons to think the West has a short memory, is wavering and fickle.
Pierre Lévy
On the European side, the Normandy format process did not advance in implementing the Minsk agreements, while Moscow persisted in presenting itself as an external arbitrator in the conflict between Kyiv’s authorities and the separatists, something none of the other players (Germany, France, Ukraine) could accept. Russian forces’ involvement in Donbas was established and documented. Paris and Berlin were seen as reluctant to take risks given the context of France’s local elections and Germany’s new government as well as Macron’s EU presidency. Putin perhaps recalled a striking parallel: France would hold the rotating EU presidency in the first half of 2022, as during the Georgia war in August 2008, even though the institutional setup was quite different. The Russian president may have thought Macron’s efforts would be constructive, as Sarkozy’s had been in Georgia mediation. Sarkozy’s mediation in Georgia, often viewed as a success, is open to question.
The European Union had a reputation for powerlessness in Moscow’s eyes. The disastrous visit of the EU’s High Representative and Vice-President to Moscow on February 4–5 further damaged Moscow’s perception of Europeans. He came to prepare the EU-Russia relationship re-evaluation on the agenda of the European Council of March 25–26; Josep Borrell was trapped and humiliated by Sergei Lavrov, who delivered harsh, often insulting remarks toward the Union and certain member states. The exercise promised to be arduous, but this episode proved decisive.
Months later, the difficult discussions at the European Council on June 24–25 did not go unnoticed in Moscow: the Franco-German proposal for an EU-Russia summit, in fact Berlin’s hastily initiated and poorly prepared move, was blocked by some member states. Merkel undoubtedly wanted to try everything before leaving power and rightly believed that talking to Vladimir Putin was necessary after his meeting with Joe Biden in Geneva on June 16. Reflecting on this episode, a Russian deputy minister spoke of the EU’s “Polonization,” now dominated by “Russophobes,” dismissing French and German views.
There is also the question of the post-blast period. Moscow has many reasons to think the West has a short memory, is indecisive and fickle. After the war in Georgia, Europeans adopted minimal sanctions. In December 2010, France agreed to sell Russia two Mistral ships, amphibious assault ships (LHDs). It was for Moscow a way to fill a capability gap revealed by the Georgian war. The contract was fortunately canceled by President Hollande.
The moment of action
Finally comes the third phase, the act itself. In the case of the large-scale aggression against Ukraine, it was preceded by diplomatic preparation, or rather a staged display. Moscow proposed, in mid-December 2021, two treaty drafts, one bilateral with the United States, the other with NATO, on measures to “ensure the security of Russia and NATO members.” The Kremlin had previously laid out red lines and called for the drafting of “legally binding security guarantees.”
Their proposals aimed to roll back NATO to its pre-1997 configuration, i.e., to challenge NATO membership for Central and Eastern European countries that had previously been in the Eastern bloc. The Russians knew their proposals were immediately unacceptable. It was a staged ultimatum designed to justify going to war.
A weakened and anxious Russia can be even more dangerous than a strong, assertive Russia.
Pierre Lévy
We nevertheless decided to take them at their word, to avoid letting them claim again that Russia had not been heard. There was a lengthy NATO-Russia Council meeting in Brussels on January 12, 2022. It was the last possible diplomatic exit on the highway toward war. It failed. The choice of war was probably already made when Vladimir Putin traveled to Beijing on February 4 for the Olympic Games opening and hosted the Russian president in Moscow on February 7, around that six-meter table whose image has remained.
By the way, it is interesting to note Moscow’s singular relationship with the calendar, since its coincidences signify the scornful indifference of the Russian authorities toward the outside world. The Georgia war began on August 7–8, 2008, at the opening of the Beijing Summer Games, once again. The poisoning of Sergey Skripal and his daughter with the nerve agent Novichok on March 4, 2018 in Salisbury occurred seemingly without regard for the risks to the World Cup in Russia starting June 14. It is also worth noting Navalny’s death on February 16, 2024, the day Munich Security Conference opened, which created a powerful ripple effect.
Preparing to face it
What lessons can we draw from this analysis, as we navigate a very delicate sequence? A weakened and anxious Russia may actually be more dangerous than a strong, assertive Russia. It is crucial to be lucid about the levers at our disposal.
To counter the first phase, the maturation of aggression, one must acknowledge that their leverage is limited, or even non-existent. How can we influence Vladimir Putin’s mental calculus, which has continued to radicalize over the past years?
On the other hand, it is up to us to avoid placing ourselves in a vulnerable position, as described in the second phase of profiling. What are our most sensitive nerve points?
The first parameter is Washington. Donald Trump is entangled in the Iran conflict. The United States has repeatedly asserted military superiority but has not translated it into political victory. The image of the American president, and of his country, is weakened. He will move from one war to another as if flipping channels on a remote control for foreign policy. What consequences might follow? He could align with the Evian G7 stance, sell weapons to Kyiv, back European efforts, widen sanctions against Russia. He could lose interest, leave Europe to lead, or worse, align again with Moscow.
Profiling Russia, in essence, is like looking in a mirror: its pattern of action reveals, in the mirror, the portrait of our own failings.
Pierre Lévy
On the European side, as policy becomes more substantive and riskier, the strategic debate over war aims grows more urgent. The current discussions in Brussels about resuming dialogue with Moscow have clearly shown that the question is about the content of the message rather than the messenger.
In Ukraine, democratic life, however imperfect, continues to unfold, as shown by the latest ministerial reshuffles. Moscow sees this as a vulnerability. Yet the practice of democracy should not be treated as a weakness; these developments in Kyiv illustrate the ability of those in power to reassess themselves and to bring forward a new generation of military and political leaders — something Russia, for its part, is wholly incapable of.
Other worrying evolutions also play into Moscow’s hands, such as recurring tensions with Poland due to the vivid memory of bilateral history, particularly the Volhynia massacres. Finally, Ukraine’s process of joining the European Union is underway. The road will be long and paved with difficulties. After the broad political declarations, since the June 2022 European Council recognizing its European perspective, divisions will emerge among member states as the process enters the substantive phase.
Ultimately, this profiling shows that resentment and ruminations chronically fuel Russia’s aggressive behavior. And it acts by slipping into our vulnerabilities. Beyond Georgia and Ukraine, there are other examples of this pattern. Let us remember the Budapest intervention in November 1956, just after the Suez operation’s disaster the month before, and a dramatic Atlantic fracture.
The first lesson of this analytic framework is clear: Russia primarily profits from our weaknesses, our missteps, and our divisions. The risks are numerous in the coming months, especially given France’s electoral timetable. Yet the trend is quite encouraging: Europeans are gaining strategic maturity under the influence of the Russian threat and the unpredictable American diplomacy, and are increasingly able to confront Moscow.
We must especially learn to manage our vulnerabilities. Profiling Russia, at bottom, is like looking into a mirror: its pattern of action secretly outlines the portrait of our failures. The day we stop providing Russia with opportunities, the serial aggressor will have lost its weapon of action.